Larson v. Larson

661 P.2d 626, 1983 Alas. LEXIS 403

• Court: Alaska Supreme Court
• Decided: April 1, 1983
• Docket: 6474
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

MATTHEWS, Justice.

This appeal concerns the propriety of a judgment modifying spousal support ordered in a decree of dissolution of marriage. The superior court concluded that sufficient grounds existed for modification pursuant to AS 09.55.220.¹ We disagree and therefore reverse.

In a petition seeking dissolution of marriage filed April 7, 1978, William Larson agreed to pay spousal support to Patricia Larson in the amount of $1250 per month for a period beginning June 1, 1978 and ending May 1, 1981. Performance of that agreement, among others, was ordered by the superior court in a decree dissolving the marriage entered May 15, 1978. The purpose of spousal support was to enable Mrs. Larson to complete her education and thereby become financially independent.

Both parties apparently contemplated that Mrs. Larson’s educational goal was to attain a Ph.D. in Art Education so that she would be qualified to teach at the university level. At the time of the decree ordering dissolution Mrs. Larson believed that she would require four years of study to achieve that goal. However, during Mrs. Larson’s second year of course work her doctoral advisor discovered that she had no teaching certification, whereupon Mrs. Larson was informed that an additional year would be necessary to complete her doctoral program.

On June 4, 1981 Mrs. Larson moved in superior court to modify the decree of dissolution entered May 15, 1978. She sought, among other things, an order requiring Mr. Larson to continue payments of spousal support for an additional two years. The superior court found that the necessity of an additional year of studies constituted a material and substantial change of circumstances and for that reason ordered Mr. Larson to pay $1350 per month as spousal support for two more years. Mr. Larson appeals from that order.

As the superior court correctly observed, to modify a support decree pursuant to AS 09.55.220 a material and substantial change in circumstances is generally required. Curley v. Curley, 588 P.2d 289, 291-92 (Alaska 1979). However, the superior court incorrectly applied that test. There is no evidence in the record of any change in circumstances relating to the time required for Mrs. Larson to obtain a Ph.D. The time she requires is five years, as it has been since the initial decree of dissolution. The only change which has occurred is that Mrs. Larson has discovered her mistake in assuming that she could complete a doctoral program in four years. We hold that the superior court’s finding that this mistake was a material and substantial change in circumstances was clearly erroneous. The change in circumstances test relates to changes in external facts, not to mistakes.² See H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 14.9, 456-65 (1968); see also Ex parte Allen, 221 Ala. 393, 128 So. 801 (Ala.1930) (holding that a petition for modification of alimony which failed to allege that the conditions upon which relief was predicated did not exist at the time of the divorce decree was fatally defective); see generally Annot., 18 A.L. R.2d 10 (1951).

Rules governing relief from final judgments on such grounds as mistake or fraud apply to support awards and property settlements incorporated in divorce decrees.³ Thus, in order for Mrs. Larson to obtain relief from the provisions of the initial decree of dissolution on the basis of her mistake, she must establish that she is entitled to relief pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b).⁴ A party seeking relief under that rule on the ground of mistake must make a motion within a reasonable time not more than one year after the original judgment. Here modification was sought more than three years after entry of the initial decree. Mrs. Larson’s mistake was therefore not a permissible basis for modification of the decree.

For the foregoing reasons we REVERSE.

CONNOR, J., not participating.

1 . AS 09.55.220 provides:

Modifícation of judgment. Any time after judgment, the court, upon the motion of either party, may set aside, alter, or modify so much of the judgment as may provide for alimony, or for the appointment of trustees for the care and custody of the minor children, or for their nurture and education, or for the maintenance of either party to the action.

2 . In Headlough v. Headlough, 639 P.2d 1010, 1012-13 (Alaska 1982) we held that a mistake in the amount needed to support minor children could warrant modification of a child support order under the material and substantial change of circumstances standard. That case is distinguishable however. First, it was a case involving the duty to support dependent children. As our opinion emphasized, the paramount concern in such cases is the best interests of the children. Here by contrast we are dealing with an adult who is quite capable of self-support. As a result, the interest in finality of judgments becomes relatively more important. Second, the change in circumstances standard is not strictly speaking a requirement for modification of child support orders. See LeBus v. LeBus, 408 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Ky.1966); Myrick v. Myrick, 478 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex.Civ.App.1972); MaGill v. MaGill, 133 Wash. 597, 234 P. 273 (Wash. 1925); see also Crowe v. Crowe, 247 Ind. 51, 211 N.E.2d 164, 166-67 (Ind.1965); Tank v. Tank, 272 N.W.2d 831, 832-33 (S.D.1978). Thus, Headlough was dictum on this point.

3 . See O’Link v. O’Link, 632 P.2d 225, 228-31 (Alaska 1981) (holding superior court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief from property settlement incorporated in divorce decree where parties’ motions for relief were filed more than two years after initial decree was entered); see also Pittman v. Pittman, 397 So.2d 139, 141—42 (Ala.Civ.App.1981) (relief from alimony decree); Collie v. Collie, 242 Ark. 297, 413 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Ark.1967) (relief from alimony and child support decree); Kulchar v. Kulchar, 1 Cal.3d 467, 82 Cal.Rptr. 489, 462 P.2d 17, 19 (Cal.1969) (relief from property settlement); Eisenson v. Eisenson, 158 Colo. 394, 407 P.2d 20, 20-21 (Colo.1965) (property settlement); Richardson v. Richardson, 3 Kan.App.2d 610, 599 P.2d 320, 322 (Kan.Ct.App.1979) (property settlement); Kaleal v. Kaleal, 73 Mich.App. 181, 250 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Mich.Ct.App.1977) (alimony); Galloway v. Galloway, 281 N.W.2d 804, 807 (N.D.1979) (property settlement, custody and alimony); Qualls v. Qualls, 589 S.W.2d 906, 909 (Tenn.1979) (alimony); Gabritsch v. Gabritsch, 260 S.E.2d 841, 842 (W.Va.1979) (property settlement).

4 . Alaska R.Civ.P. 60(b) provides in pertinent ' part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, ...

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The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and ... not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.