Larose v. Office of Chief Financial Officer

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: December 8, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-3684
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PSHATOIA LAROSE,

Plaintiff, Case No. 25-cv-3684 (JMC)

v.

OFFICE OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court for review of Plaintiff’s pro se Amended Complaint

(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1-1.1 Plaintiff sues “the Office of Chief Financial Officer,” the “Office of

the General Counsel,” and the Biden Administration (“Defendants”).2 See Compl. at 1. The

Complaint devolves into ruminations regarding a conspiracy of wrongdoing orchestrated against

her by Defendants, including electronically stalking and harassing her, and accuses a number of

celebrities of reusing her personal data without permission. See id. She demands a jury trial and

$9.5 million in damages. See id. at 1–2. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DISMISSES

the complaint for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).

First, pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Jarrell v.

Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987), and here, the complaint fails to comply with Rule

8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a pleading to contain “(1) a short and

plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of

1 Plaintiff originally filed her suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, but Defendants removed the case to this Court on October 16, 2025. ECF 1. 2 Plaintiff also fails to provide addresses for Defendants in contravention of D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1).

1 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8

standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can

prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of

res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). Here, the Complaint

is neither short nor plain, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), the allegations cannot be described as simple,

concise, and direct, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1), and the paragraphs are not limited to a single set

of circumstances, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

When, as here, a pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly

nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and

personal comments [,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v. District of

Columbia, 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. District of Columbia,

No. 17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). And “[a] confused and rambling

narrative of charges and conclusions . . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks

v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Plaintiff’s Complaint falls squarely into this category. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s

complaint contains no factual support for her assertions that a far-reaching government conspiracy

has been orchestrated against her. See Compl. at 1 (asserting that the “U.S. Government, President

Biden, IC3.gov, Local Police and FBI” have been “Electronically and Virtually” stalking and

harassing Plaintiff and stealing her data). Plaintiff, based on speculation only, offers “only ‘a

laundry list of wrongful acts and conclusory allegations to support her theory of a conspiracy,’”

and such allegations are patently “‘insufficient to allow the case to go forward.’” Curran v. Holder,

2 626 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as

frivolous) (quoting Richards v. Duke Univ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 222, 233 (D.D.C. 2007)).

Plaintiff’s complaint is therefore dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2). The

Court acknowledges that dismissing a case sua sponte is an unusual step, but the Court has the

authority to do so when plaintiffs fail to comply with procedural rules. See, e.g., Brown v. WMATA,

164 F. Supp. 3d 33, 35 (D.D.C. 2016) (dismissing a complaint sua sponte for failing to comply

with Rule 8(a)); Hamrick v. United States, No. 10-cv-857, 2010 WL 3324721, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug.

24, 2010) (same); see also Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–69 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding no

abuse of discretion where a district court dismissed a claim without prejudice for failure to comply

with Rule 8(a)).

The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to refile within 30 days (i.e., by January 7, 2026) an

amended complaint that cures the existing deficiencies. If she does not file an amended complaint

within that timeframe, files an amended complaint that recycles the present complaint, or otherwise

fails to comply with Rule 8, this action may be dismissed with prejudice. Brown, 164 F. Supp. 3d

at 35. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

For all the above stated reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate Order

accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

__________________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge

Date: December 8, 2025