Lape v. O'Malley

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedAugust 8, 2024
Docket7:23-cv-00470
StatusUnknown

This text of Lape v. O'Malley (Lape v. O'Malley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lape v. O'Malley, (W.D. Va. 2024).

Opinion

CLERK'S OFFICE U.S. DISTRICT COURT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ee FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA August 08, 2024 ROANOKE DIVISION LAURA A. AUSTIN, □□□□ BY: s/ 5. Neily, D Cl JOSHUA L.,! ) sre en □□□ ) Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 7:23-cv-470 ) Vv. ) ) REPORT & RECOMMENDATION ) MARTIN O’MALLEY,’ ) By: C. Kailani Memmer Commissioner of Social Security, ) United States Magistrate Judge ) Defendant. )

Plaintiff Joshua L. (“Joshua”) filed this action challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) finding him not disabled and therefore ineligible for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act (“Act”). 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433. Joshua alleges the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Joseph Scruton erred in his assessment of Joshua’s (1) physical impairments and RFC findings and (2) subjective allegations. This case is before me on referral under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). See ECF No. 9. I now submit the following report and recommended disposition. Neither party has requested oral argument; therefore, this case is ripe for decision. Having considered the administrative record, the parties’ filings, and the applicable law, and for the reasons set forth below, I respectfully

' Due to privacy concerns, I use only the first name and last initial of the claimant in Social Security opinions. ? Martin O’Malley became the Commissioner of Social Security on December 20, 2023. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Martin O’ Malley should be substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi as the defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

recommend the presiding District Judge AFFIRM the Commissioner’s final decision and DISMISS this case from the Court’s active docket. STANDARD OF REVIEW The court limits its review to a determination of whether substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s conclusion that Joshua failed to demonstrate he was disabled under

the Act.3 Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal citations and alterations omitted); see also Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (emphasizing that the standard for substantial evidence “is not high”). While substantial evidence is somewhat deferential standard, the Court does not “reflexively rubber-stamp an ALJ’s findings.” Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 870 (4th Cir. 2017). “In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the court should not] undertake to re-weigh

conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (quoting Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d at 589). Nevertheless, the court “must not abdicate [its] traditional functions,” and it “cannot escape [its] duty to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are rational.” Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). The final decision of the

3 The Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period for not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Disability under the Act requires showing more than the fact that the claimant suffers from an impairment which affects his ability to perform daily activities or certain forms of work; instead, a claimant must show that his impairments prevent him from engaging in all forms of substantial gainful employment given his age, education, and work experience. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2), 1382c(a)(3)(B). Commissioner will be affirmed where substantial evidence supports the decision. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F. 2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). In contrast, remand is appropriate if the ALJ’s analysis is so deficient that it “frustrate[s] meaningful review.” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that “remand is necessary” where the court is “left to guess [at] how the ALJ arrived at his conclusions”). The

ALJ must sufficiently articulate his findings such that the district court can undertake meaningful review. See Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2016). CLAIM HISTORY

Joshua filed for DIB on April 30, 2021, alleging disability beginning on March 7, 2021. R. 28. Joshua’s claims were denied by the Commissioner at the initial and reconsideration levels of administrative review on September 28, 2021, and November 9, 2021, respectively. R. 28. On June 9, 2022, the ALJ conducted a telephone hearing. R. 28. Brandon Kortgard, a non-attorney representative, represented Joshua at the hearing. R. 28. The ALJ denied Joshua’s claims on August 29, 2022, using the familiar five-step process4 to evaluate his request for benefits. R. 41– 42. At step one, the ALJ found that Joshua had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 7, 2021, the alleged onset date. R. 31. At step two, the ALJ determined Joshua has

4 The five-step process to evaluate a disability claim requires the Commissioner to ask, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) is working; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of a listed impairment; (4) can return to his past relevant work; and if not, (5) whether he can perform other work. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 654 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460–62 (1983). The inquiry ceases if the Commissioner finds the claimant disabled at any step of the process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four to establish a prima facie case for disability.

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