Lanuza v. Holder

Ninth Circuit

Lanuza v. Holder

597 F.3d 970, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4702, 2010 WL 744710

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMarch 5, 2010

Docket07-71943

StatusPublished

Cited by31 cases

This text of 597 F.3d 970 (Lanuza v. Holder) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lanuza v. Holder, 597 F.3d 970, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4702, 2010 WL 744710 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Elsa Emilia Samayoa Lanuza (“Samayoa”) and her daughter, Elsa Lopez Samayoa (“Lopez”), are natives and citizens of Guatemala. They petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) affirmance of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision pretermitting their applications for special rule cancellation of removal under Section 203 of the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (NACARA), Pub.L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193-2201 (Nov. 19, 1997), amended by Pub.L. No. 105-139, 111 Stat. *972 2644, 2644-45 (Dec. 2, 1997). 1 To the extent that we have jurisdiction, it is pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review claims of constitutional violations de novo. Torres-Aguilar v. INS, 246 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir.2001). We dismiss in part and deny in part.

The government argues, and Samayoa does not contest, that we lack jurisdiction to consider Samayoa’s application for relief. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub.L. No. 104-208, § 309(c)(5)(C)(ii), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), expressly precludes us from reviewing the BIA’s determination of eligibility for NA-CARA § 203 relief. Section 309(c)(5)(C)(ii) provides that “[a] determination by the Attorney General as to whether an alien satisfies the requirements of clause (i) is final and shall not be subject to review by any court.” IIRIRA § 309(c)(5)(C)(ii), as amended by NA-CARA, Pub.L. No. 105-100 (1997). Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to determine Samayoa’s statutory eligibility for NACARA § 203 relief.

Samayoa also argues that she was denied due process because the IJ determined that she was ineligible for NA-CARA § 203 relief before she began to testify. The record, however, belies this contention. The IJ reviewed all the record evidence, heard counsel’s arguments and Samayoa’s testimony, allowed cross-examination, and directly questioned Samayoa over the course of four hearings before making the ineligibility determination. Therefore, the IJ did not violate Samayoa’s constitutional right to due process by depriving her of a full and fair hearing and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on her behalf.

We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction in part, and deny in part.

DISMISSED; DENIED.

1

. The IJ and the BIA granted the petitioners’ request that Samayoa act as the lead applicant, and that Lopez act as a derivative beneficiary of the petition.

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PER CURIAM:

Elsa Emilia Samayoa Lanuza (“Samayoa”) and her daughter, Elsa Lopez Samayoa (“Lopez”), are natives and citizens of Guatemala. They petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) affirmance of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision pretermitting their applications for special rule cancellation of removal under Section 203 of the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (NACARA), Pub.L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193-2201 (Nov. 19, 1997), amended by Pub.L. No. 105-139, 111 Stat. *972 2644, 2644-45 (Dec. 2, 1997). 1 To the extent that we have jurisdiction, it is pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review claims of constitutional violations de novo. Torres-Aguilar v. INS, 246 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir.2001). We dismiss in part and deny in part.

The government argues, and Samayoa does not contest, that we lack jurisdiction to consider Samayoa’s application for relief. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub.L. No. 104-208, § 309(c)(5)(C)(ii), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), expressly precludes us from reviewing the BIA’s determination of eligibility for NA-CARA § 203 relief. Section 309(c)(5)(C)(ii) provides that “[a] determination by the Attorney General as to whether an alien satisfies the requirements of clause (i) is final and shall not be subject to review by any court.” IIRIRA § 309(c)(5)(C)(ii), as amended by NA-CARA, Pub.L. No. 105-100 (1997). Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to determine Samayoa’s statutory eligibility for NACARA § 203 relief.

Samayoa also argues that she was denied due process because the IJ determined that she was ineligible for NA-CARA § 203 relief before she began to testify. The record, however, belies this contention. The IJ reviewed all the record evidence, heard counsel’s arguments and Samayoa’s testimony, allowed cross-examination, and directly questioned Samayoa over the course of four hearings before making the ineligibility determination. Therefore, the IJ did not violate Samayoa’s constitutional right to due process by depriving her of a full and fair hearing and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on her behalf.

We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction in part, and deny in part.

DISMISSED; DENIED.

1

. The IJ and the BIA granted the petitioners’ request that Samayoa act as the lead applicant, and that Lopez act as a derivative beneficiary of the petition.

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597 F.3d 970, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4702, 2010 WL 744710, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lanuza-v-holder-ca9-2010.

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