Langmeyer v. State

656 P.2d 114, 104 Idaho 53, 1982 Ida. LEXIS 318

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: December 23, 1982
• Docket: 13610
• Status: Published

Opinions

DONALDSON, Justice.

Plaintiff-Appellant Langmeyer, a three-year resident of Bonner County, sought appointment to the Bonner County Planning and Zoning Commission.¹ Because Langmeyer did not meet the five-year residency requirement prerequisite for appointment, I.C. § 67-6504, he brought an action for declaratory judgment requesting that the five-year residency requirement of that provision be declared unconstitutional. The district court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and later granted summary judgment in favor of the State. Langmeyer appeals alleging that the five-year residency requirement of I.C. § 67-6504 violates both the equal protection and due process clauses of the United States and Idaho Constitutions.

I.

We first consider the challenges to the five-year durational residency requirement of the statute which are based upon the equal protection clauses of the United States and Idaho Constitutions. U.S.Const. amend. XIY; ID.Const. art. 1, § 2. “[W]e must examine the character of the classification in question, the importance of the individual interests at stake, and the state interests asserted in support of the classification.” Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 183, 99 S.Ct. 983, 989, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979); see also Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 253-54, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1079-80, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335, 92 S.Ct. 995, 999, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972).

The statute classifies those eligible for appointment on the basis of their length of residency in the county. Only those who have resided in the county for five or more years are eligible for appointment. Langmeyer argues that the classification impinges upon his constitutionally protected right to travel. He argues that the law impermissibly burdens his fundamental right to travel in violation of the equal protection clauses and therefore must be subjected to strict scrutiny. If this standard were applied, the State would have to demonstrate that the classification was necessary to further a compelling State interest. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). We are not convinced that this strict standard need be applied for the reasons set forth below.

The nature of the right to travel vis-a-vis durational residency requirements has been considered by many courts. E.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975) (divorce laws); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974) (nonemergency medical care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (welfare benefits); Beil v. City of Akron, 660 F.2d 166 (6th Cir.1981) (upholding durational residency requirement of one year for candidacy); Hawaii Boating Association v. Water Transportation Facilities Division, Department of Transportation, State of Hawaii, 651 F.2d 661 (9th Cir.1981) (boat mooring rates); Wellford v. Battaglia, 485 F.2d 1151 (3d Cir.1973) (five-year durational residency requirement for mayor); Sununu v. Stark, 383 F.Supp. 1287 (D.N.H. 1974) (seven-year durational residency requirement for state senator), aff’d mem., 420 U.S. 958, 95 S.Ct. 1346, 43 L.Ed.2d 434 (1975); Alexander v. Rammer, 363 F.Supp. 324 (D.Mich.1973) (durational residency requirement for city commissioner); Chimento v. Stark, 353 F.Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.), aff’d mem., 414 U.S. 802, 94 S.Ct. 125, 38 L.Ed.2d 39 (1973) (seven-year durational residency requirement for governor); Walker v. Yucht, 352 F.Supp. 85 (D.Del.1972) (three-year durational requirement for state representative); McKinney v. Kaminsky, 340 F.Supp. 289 (D.Ala.1972) (five-year durational residency requirement for county commissioner); Mogk v. City of Detroit, 335 F.Supp. 698 (D.Mich.1971) (three-year durational residency requirement for city charter revision commission); Thompson v. Mellon, 9 Cal.3d 96, 507 P.2d 628 (1973) (two-year durational residency requirement for city councilmen); Bay Area Women’s Coalition v. City and County of San Francisco, 78 Cal.App.3d 961, 144 Cal.Rptr. 591 (1978) (five-year durational residency requirement for appointive position); Cowan v. City of Aspen, 181 Colo. 343, 509 P.2d 1269 (1973) (three-year durational residency requirement for municipal candidates); Castner v. Clerk of City of Grosse Pointe Park, 86 Mich.App. 482, 272 N.W.2d 693 (1978) (durational residency requirement for municipal judge); Hatcher v. Bell, 521 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn.1974) (five-year durational requirement for circuit judge); Lawrence v. City of Issaquah, 84 Wash.2d 146, 524 P.2d 1347 (1974) (one-year durational residency requirement for city councilman).

This Court has previously accepted the premise that the nature of the right to travel is fundamental. Miller v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 99 Idaho 299, 302, 581 P.2d 345, 348 (1978). See also, Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 101 S.Ct. 2434, 2439, 69 L.Ed.2d 118 (1981); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1177-79, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966). Although considered fundamental, classifications which impact on this right to travel are not necessarily subjected to strict scrutiny under the equal protection doctrine. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406, 95 S.Ct. 553, 560-61, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 258-59, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1082-83, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n. 21, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1333, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969).

In Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, the United States Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge to statutes which established minimum residency requirements before individuals could qualify for welfare benefits. The Shapiro Court found the statutes unconstitutional. The statutes impermissibly penalized the right to travel and the asserted governmental interests were not compelling. The Court stated that “in moving from State to State ... appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.” Shapiro v. Thompson, supra at 634, 89 S.Ct. at 1331. The Shapiro Court did not establish that any burden on the right to travel was per se unconstitutional. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, supra at 256-57, 94 S.Ct. at 1081; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra at 638, n. 21, 89 S.Ct. at 1333.

Later, in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), the Court applied strict scrutiny to durational residency requirements which acted as a penalty on the exercise of the right to travel of potential voters. Then in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974), the Court held unconstitutional a statute which conditioned receipt of nonemergency medical care by an indigent on the basis of a durational residency requirement. The statute created an invidious classification which was unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection. However, the Memorial Court explained the broad language of Shapiro with respect to durational residency requirements and the right to travel:

“Although any durational residence requirement impinges to some extent on the right to travel, the Court in Shapiro did not declare such a requirement to be per se unconstitutional. The Court’s holding was conditioned ... by the caveat that some ‘waiting-period or residence requirements ... may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel.’ The amount of impact required to give rise to the compelling-state-interest test was not made clear. The Court spoke of the requisite impact in two ways. First, we considered whether the waiting period would deter migration .... Second, the Court considered the extent to which the residence requirement served to penalize the exercise of the right to travel.” Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256-57, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1081, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974) (citation and footnote omitted).

The denial of welfare benefits (“basic necessities of life”) in Shapiro, the denial of the franchise to vote in Dunn, and the denial of nonemergency medical care to an indigent (“a basic necessity of life”) in Maricopa County served as penalties to the right to travel. The statutes imposing the durational residency requirements were tested by the compelling state interest test and found unconstitutional.

In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975), the Supreme Court implicitly tested a one-year durational residency requirement before a divorce proceeding could be instituted in Iowa under the rational basis test and found it constitutional. The Sosna Court acknowledged that neither Shapiro, Dunn nor Maricopa County “intimated that the States might never impose durational residency requirements, and such a proposition was in fact expressly disclaimed.” Id. at 406, 95 S.Ct. 560-61.

The State argues and we agree that it is unlikely that the durational residency requirement at issue would deter a potential new resident from migrating into Bonner County. One does not migrate in anticipation of possible appointment to a purely advisory nonpaying governmental commission. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the relationship between eligibility for appointment and the right to travel is indirect and remote. The durational residency requirement does not in the constitutional sense penalize the right to travel. See Beil v. City of Akron, 660 F.2d 166 (6th Cir.1981); Hawaii Boating Association v. Water Transportation Facilities Division, Department of Transportation, State of Hawaii, 651 F.2d 661 (9th Cir.1981); Leech v. Veterans' Bonus Division Appeals Board, 179 Conn. 311, 426 A.2d 289, 292 (1979); Lambert v. Wentworth, 423 A.2d 527, 532 (Me.1980). But see Bay Area Women’s Coalition v. City and County of San Francisco, 78 Cal.App.3d 961, 144 Cal.Rptr. 591 (1978). While we acknowledge the important functions served by commissions appointed by governing bodies within this state, eligibility for appointment to one of these commissions cannot be equated with the franchise to vote or attain the same level as a “basic necessity of life.” Therefore, the statute is measured under the traditional equal protection test— whether the classification rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404, 102 S.Ct. 1137, 71 L.Ed.2d 250 (1982); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); see also Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 557, 659 P.2d 111, (1982); Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2173, 53 L.Ed.2d 223 (1977). The classification does not forever foreclose eligibility but only serves to delay eligibility in rational furtherance of the State’s asserted interest to insure familiarity with previous conditions, trends and problems in the area. I.C. § 67-6508.

While many courts have addressed the nature of candidacy and durational residency requirements for elective office, see, e.g., Beil v. City of Akron, 660 F.2d 166 (6th Cir.1981); Chimento v. Stark, 353 F.Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.) (three-judge panel), aff’d mem., 414 U.S. 802, 94 S.Ct. 125, 38 L.Ed.2d 39 (1973); Walker v. Yucht, 352 F.Supp. 85 (D.Del.1972) (three-judge panel), few have addressed the analogous issues with respect to an appointive office. See Green v. McKeon, 335 F.Supp. 630 (D.Mich.1971) (invalidating a two-year residency requirement for a city office, elective or appointive), aff’d, 468 F.2d 883 (6th Cir.1972) (questioned in Beil v. City of Akron, 660 F.2d 166 (6th Cir.1981)); Bay Area Women’s Coalition v. City and County of San Francisco, 78 Cal.App.3d 961, 144 Cal.Rptr. 591 (1978) (applied strict scrutiny test to hold a five-year durational residency requirement imposed on an appointive office unconstitutional). We have not previously considered these issues.

The United States Supreme Court has not considered candidacy for elective office as a fundamental right. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). In Bullock, the Court considered the validity of statutory filing fees for candidates for elective office. The Court stated that the existence of barriers to candidacy of itself does not require close scrutiny. Id. at 142-43, 92 S.Ct. at 855-56. However, due to the impact of the barriers on voting rights, close scrutiny was required, id. at 144, 92 S.Ct. at 856, and the statute was held unconstitutional. Id. at 149, 92 S.Ct. at 859. Here, the position was appointive and therefore voting rights were not implicated. Less than strict scrutiny is required.

Appellant argues that it is irrational to permit election to the governing body as a county commissioner after one year of residency, I.C. § 34^617(2), while denying eligibility for appointment as a planning and zoning commissioner until after five years of residency, I.C. § 67-6504(a). The State argues that the durational residency requirement is rational to insure that the appointees have the opportunities to know the customs and the mores of the people and a working knowledge of the local area. The planning and zoning commission’s recommendations should reflect the community’s desires for orderly growth; one reasonable way to assure this happens is to require a five-year residency before appointment to the planning and zoning commission.

We are convinced that the five-year residency requirement for appointment to the planning and zoning board, is not an unreasonable or irrational means to effectuate the State interest of insuring that the potential appointee has been exposed to the issues and problems of planning and zoning and to afford the governing board an opportunity to gain firsthand knowledge about his or her character and expertise. Cf. Lawrence v. City of Issaquah, 84 Wash.2d 146, 524 P.2d 1347, 1349 (1974) (utilizing strict scrutiny a one-year residency requirement for elective office of city councilmen not unreasonable or unconstitutional). The five-year residency requirement is also rationally related to the requirement under I.C. § 67-6508 that the planning commission in developing the comprehensive plan (concerning land use) consider the previous conditions of the area. The classification under the traditional rational basis test is not unconstitutional because it results in some inequality — mathematical precision is not required. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911); Walker v. Yucht, supra. The statute -withstands challenges based upon equal protection.

Appellant contends that the residency requirement for planning commissioner (five years, I.C. § 67-6504(a)) is disproportionate as compared to the residency requirements for board of commissioners (one year, I.C. § 34r-617(2)), state senator (one year, I.C. § 34-614(2)), and governor (two years, Id. Const., art. 4, § 3; I.C. § 34r-607(2)) and therefore is invidiously discriminatory. Appellant cites Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970), for the proposition that there exists “a federal constitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications.” Id. at 362, 90 S.Ct. at 541. We accept this proposition; however, because we hold that there exists a rational basis between the classification and a legitimate state interest a fortiori the classification is not invidiously discriminatory.

II.

We next review the challenges to the statute based upon the due process clauses of the United States and Idaho Constitutions. U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Id. Const, art. 1, § 13.

Appellant argues that the durational residency requirement violates due process in that it invades two fundamental rights: the right to travel and the right to seek public office. We disagree. Neither the right to travel has been penalized nor the right to seek public office has been foreclosed as we have previously pointed out. Furthermore, candidacy for an appointive position is not a fundamental right.

Appellant argues that § 67-6504(a) creates an irrebuttable presumption that new residents are incapable of giving constructive advice on planning matters. We do not think so since the “Local Planning Act of 1975,” Title 67, Ch. 65,1.C., provides a public forum at which interested persons can participate at meetings of the planning and zoning commission, I.C. §§ 67-6504(c), -6509, and at the hearings at which the recommendations of the commission are considered by the governing body. I.C. § 67-6511. Thus new residents are given a forum in which to offer advice and criticism.

Appellant argues that the classification is arbitrary and irrational and therefore must fall to a due process challenge. It is contended that the irrational nature of the classification is apparent when the five-year residency requirement is compared with the shorter residency requirement established for the elective offices of the governor, state senator, and county commissioner. However, we see a very basic difference between the position of planning and zoning commissioner and the other articulated offices. The first is an appointive position and the later group are elective offices which necessarily implicate the right of the electorate to vote. It is our conclusion that the classification does not violate the precepts of due process.

III.

Attorney fees and costs denied.

Affirmed.

BAKES, C.J., and SHEPARD, J., and SCOGGIN, J. Pro Tem., concur.

1 . The “Local Planning Act of 1975,” Title 67, Ch. 65, I.C., provides for the creation of a planning and zoning commission by governing boards (city councils or boards of county commissioners). The commission may exercise all of the powers required and authorized by the Act excluding the authority to adopt ordinances. I.C. § 67-6504. Alternatively, the governing board, may choose not to create such a commission and itself perform the functions of the commission. Id The commission is investigative and advisory in nature. E.g., I.C. §§ 67-6507, -6508, -6509. The commission’s principal functions are to investigate and prepare recommendations for a comprehensive plan (concerning land use) and any subsequent amendments to such a plan to the governing board. I.C. §§ 67-6508, -6509. The commission is tasked to recommend a comprehensive plan, I.C. § 67-6509, which “shall consider previous and existing conditions .... ” I.C. § 67-6508 (emphasis added). The commission recommends approval or denial of permits to the governing board. I.C. § 67-6519. In performing their duties, the members of the commission may receive mileage and per diem compensation as provided by the governing board. I.C. § 67-6504(a).