Langford v. Irgau, M.D.

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: April 1, 2025
• Docket: N24C-09-184 DJB
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DENISE M. LANGFORD ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) ISAIAS IRGAU, M.D., ) C.A. No. N24C-09-184 DJB CHRISTIANA INSTITUTE ) OF ADVANCED SURGERY, P.A., ) JEFFREY P. CRAMER, M.D., ) AND DELAWARE FAMILY CARE ) ASSOCIATES, P.A. ) ) Defendants. )

Date Submitted: January 3, 2025 Date Decided: April 1, 2025

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On Defendant Isaias Irgau, M.D. and Christiana Institute of Advanced Surgery, P.A.’s Motion to Dismiss – DENIED

Joseph J. Farnan, Esquire, Brian E. Farnan, Esquire, and Michael J. Farnan, Esquire, Farnan LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, and Dion G. Rassias, Esquire, (admitted pro hac vice) The Beasley Firm, Philadelphia, PA, attorneys for Plaintiff

Gregory M. Mckee, Esquire, and Zoe Plerhoples, Esquire, Wharton Levin, Wilmington, Delaware, attorneys for Defendants Isaias Irgau, M.D. and Christiana Institute of Advanced Surgery, P.A.

Stephen J. Milewski, Esquire, and Deborah S. Flippen, Esquire, Balaguer, Milewski and Imbrogno LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, attorneys for Defendants Jeffrey P. Cramer, M.D. and Delaware Family Care Associates

BRENNAN, J.

1 This medical malpractice action alleges a series of failures to diagnose lung

cancer following CAT scans. Plaintiff was eventually diagnosed in 2024 with Stage

IV lung cancer after two prior alleged separate missed diagnoses by both Defendant

Drs. Irgau and Cramer in 2015 and 2023, respectively. Defendants Dr. Irgau and

Christiana Institute of Advanced Surgery, P.A. (hereinafter “Moving Defendants”)

move for dismissal pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 6856, claiming the statute of limitations

has run on this claim. Plaintiff opposes, arguing dismissal is premature, the date of

the injury tolls the statute of limitations rather than the date of the alleged negligence,

and that at a minimum, discovery needs to be conducted before the date of injury

can be determined.

It may be possible that the statute of limitations did not begin to run in 2015

when Dr. Irgau failed to inform Plaintiff of the results of her CAT scan, therefore

dismissal is premature. A period of discovery will be allowed to develop the record

on this issue. For the reasons fully discussed below, Plaintiff’s Complaint sets forth

reasonably conceivable circumstances under which she may be entitled to recover,

therefore Moving Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.

2 I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Dr. Irgau ordered a CAT scan of Plaintiff’s abdomen in June of 2015 before

undergoing gallbladder surgery (hereinafter “the 2015 scan”).1 The report was faxed

to Dr. Irgau with the header:

“!!! ATTENTION!!!” The attached findings on your patient requires !!! ATTENTION!!! 2

The scan’s finding noted a “visualized lung base demonstrating a mild focal opacity”

and the CAT “Impression” section specifically noted:

…mild focal opacity partially visualized in the lingula on the first image. This may represent active pneumonitis but follow up correlation with chest radiographs or CT is suggested for further evaluation to exclude carcinoma.3

Dr. Irgau sent a courtesy copy of this scan to Plaintiff’s primary care

physician, Dr. Cramer.4 However neither doctor ordered further testing nor shared

the 2015 scan’s findings with Plaintiff.5 Additionally, the 2015 scan was never

uploaded to Plaintiff’s patient portal.6

1 Denise M. Langford vs. Isaias Irgau, MD, Christiana Institute of Advanced Surgery, P.A., Jeffrey P. Cramer, MD, and Delaware Family Care Associates, P.A; N24C-09- 184 DJB, Plaintiff’s Complaint, Docket Item (“D.I.”) 1, ¶ 9 2 Id. at ¶ 15. 3 Id. at ¶ 16. 4 Id. at ¶ 12. 5 Id. at ¶ 17. 6 Id. at ¶ 22. 3 Eight years went by before Plaintiff obtained another CAT scan in 2023. Dr.

Cramer, for an independent reason, ordered the scan, which reported: “a 23 mm

LINGULAR opacity is seen. Malignancy cannot be excluded. Follow up enhanced

CT of the chest is recommended for more thorough evaluation of the thorax.”7 Once

again, Dr. Cramer did not upload the 2023 results to Plaintiff’s patient portal or

discuss with her its findings.8

Plaintiff did not learn about any of the findings until June of 2024, after being

admitted to Christiana Emergency Room for chest pain and a lingering cough.9

Emergency room staff first conducted an X-Ray and compared those results to the

2015 scan.10 After the initial X-Ray, Plaintiff underwent another CAT scan revealing

a 60 mm mass in the left lung.11

Once discharged, Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Cramer who confirmed her

diagnosis as Stage IV lung cancer that had metastasized to her brain and lymph

nodes.12 According to Dr. Cramer, he “totally missed the [prior] reports about the

mass” and acknowledged the mass had “doubled in size” between the 2023 and 2024

CAT scans.13 Plaintiff brings negligence claims against both Drs. Irgau and Cramer,

7 Id. at ¶ 27. 8 Id. at ¶ 28. 9 Id. at ¶ 30. 10 Id. at ¶ 32. 11 Id. at ¶ 33. 12 Id. at ¶ 37. 13 Id. at ¶ 35. 4 individually, for failing to timely diagnose her cancer, and against Christiana

Institute of Advanced Surgery and Delaware Family Care Associates, P.A. under

respective theories of agency liability, corporate negligence and corporate willful

and wanton conduct.14

In lieu of an Answer, on October 17, 2024, Moving Defendants filed the

instant Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. Their motion alleges Plaintiff’s

claims against them are time barred under 18 Del. C. § 6856, as it was not filed

within two years of the injury.15 Plaintiff responded in opposition on November 7,

2024.16 Leave was granted for Defendants to file a Reply to Plaintiff’s opposition.17

On November 18, 2024, Defendants’ Reply was filed.18 Oral argument was held on

January 3, 2025.19 This is the Court’s decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must decide whether

there are any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof under

14 Id. at ¶¶ 43, 45-53, 55-63, 65-72, 74-87. 15 Defendants Isaias Irgau, M.D. and Christiana Institute of Advanced Surgery, P.A.’s Motion to Dismiss, D.I. 8. 16 D.I. 12. 17 D.I. 15. 18 D.I. 20. 19 D.I. 23. 5 the complaint under which a Plaintiff may be entitled to recovery.20 Under that Rule,

the Court will:

(1) accept all well pleaded factual allegations as true, (2) accept even vague allegations as “well pleaded” if they give the opposing party notice of the claim, (3) draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and (4) not dismiss the claims unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances.21 “The Court, however, need not accept conclusory allegations unsupported by

specific facts or … draw unreasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving

party.”22 But if there is any reasonable conception that can be formulated allowing

for Plaintiff’s recovery, the motion must be denied.23

III. ANALYSIS

The issue before the Court is whether the date of the alleged negligence is the

same as the date of the alleged injury for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations.

If those dates do not coincide, the question becomes whether Plaintiff’s Compliant

sufficiently pled facts that support a finding that the date of the injury is within the

20 Vinton v. Grayson, 189 A.3d 695, 700 (Del. Super. 2018) (quoting Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6)). 21 Id. (quoting Central Mortgage Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del. 2011)). 22 Intermec IP Corp. v. TransCore, LP, 2021 WL 3620435, at *11 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 2021) (citing Prince v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 166 (Del. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Ramsey v. Ga. S. Univ. Advanced Dev. Ctr., 189 A.3d 1255, 1277 (Del. 2018)). 23 Vinton, 189 A.3d at 700 (citing Cent. Mortg. Co., 27 A.3d at 535). 6 statute of limitations. Prior to the Delaware Supreme Court’s 2021 decision in GI

Associates of Delaware, P.A., et. al. v. Anderson,24 it was reasonably settled that the

“date of injury” for statute of limitations purposes in a medical negligence action

was the date of the alleged negligence.25 However, in Anderson, the Court

established that the date of negligence and the date of injury may not necessarily

coincide for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations under 18 Del. C. § 6856.26

The Anderson Court thus remanded the case to Superior Court to make a finding of

fact as to when the alleged injury occurred to make a determination regarding the

statute of limitations.27

Moving Defendants argue Plaintiff’s injury occurred on June 11, 2015, the

date when Dr. Irgau failed to inform Plaintiff of her 2015 scan findings. As a result,

they claim Plaintiff’s Complaint is time barred.28 Plaintiff conceptualizes the injury

under 18 Del. C. § 6856 differently. Plaintiff argues the Moving Defendants

incorrectly assume the date of injury as the date of Defendant Dr. Irgau’s negligence.

Plaintiff argues that Anderson allows for either the date of injury or the date of the

negligent act to toll 18 Del C. § 6856, and in viewing the Complaint with all

24 247 A.3d 674 (Del. 2021). 25 Id. at 685; see also Dunn v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 401 A.2d 77 (Del. 1979), Meekins v. Barnes, 745 A.2d 893 (Del. 2000), and Dambro v. Meyer, 974 A.2d 121 (Del. 2009). 26 Anderson, 247 A.3d at 685. 27 Id. 28 Id. 7 reasonable inferences in her favor, the date of the negligent act – June 11, 2015 –

does not control. Plaintiff argues that a period of discovery should be allowed so the

true triggering date of the statute of limitations can be determined.29 Plaintiff

distinguishes the cases upon which Moving Defendants rely, arguing the record here

likewise needs to be developed as discovery has not been afforded.30

Moving Defendant’s Reply submits that the Complaint alleges injury in 2015,

arguing the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint set forth that “there was an abnormal

finding suggesting cancer in 2015, and because Defendants failed to advise her, the

cancer worsened over time.”31 They argue the Complaint establishes Plaintiff’s

cancer existed as of 2015, therefore the date of the negligent act and the injury both

occurred in 2015. Therefore, Moving Defendants argue a plain reading of § 6856

and the timelines set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint show the claim is time barred,

and no additional discovery is warranted.32

Prior to Anderson, the date of injury for statute of limitations purposes

typically meant the date of the negligent act, even if the actual injury and the

29 Plaintiff’s Opposition, D.I. 12. 30 Id. 31 Def. Reply, p. 6, D.I. 20. 32 Id. Moving Defendants alternatively argue that even if there is no allegation that the cancer was present in 2013 in Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Complaint fails to establish causation. D.I. 20 at ¶ 13. A plain reading of the Complaint alleges a prima facie case of negligence, under the standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6). This alternative argument is not availing. 8 negligent act did not occur on the same day.33 Therefore, if Plaintiff’s injury

occurred in 2015 when Dr. Irgau learned of the scan’s results, ignored the

recommendation for follow up testing to exclude carcinoma, and failed to provide

those results to Plaintiff, the two-year statute of limitations began to run at that time.

Section 6856 of Title 18 of the Delaware Code states:

No action for the recovery of damages upon a claim against a health- care provider for personal injury … arising out of medical negligence shall be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the date upon which such injury occurred; provided, however, that: (1) solely in the event of personal injury the occurrent of which, during such period of 2 years, was unknown to and could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence have been discovered by the injured person, such action may be brought prior to the expiration of 3 years from the date upon which such injury occurred, and not thereafter. 34

Regardless of whether the two or three-year limitation applies, Plaintiff’s

Complaint was not filed until September 19, 2024. In Anderson, the Delaware

Supreme Court endeavored a careful evaluation and analysis of prior decisional case

law before concluding the “text of § 6856 does not mandate that that date of

negligence and the occurrence of injury must be deemed to coincide, even where the

facts of the case do not support such a finding.”35 In doing so, Anderson meticulously

33 Meekins v. Barnes, 745 A.2d 893, 898 (Del. 2000); see also Dunn v. St. Francis, 401 A.2d 77, 79 (Del. 1979). 34 18 Del. C. §6856. If the injury was unknown to Plaintiff and “could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence have been discovered by the injured person,” the action may be brought within three years. 35 Anderson, 247 A.2d at 685. 9 reviewed the cases Moving Defendants cite, therefore a full analysis of that prior

decisional law is not now required. Anderson established the new landscape of the

statute of limitations in medical negligence claims; the question presented here is

whether Plaintiff’s Complaint survives in this new realm.

Delaware law still requires a sufficient evidentiary basis showing the date of

injury.36 Moving Defendants argue Plaintiff’s case is akin to Meekins v. Barnes,37

Dambro v. Meyer,38 and Dunn v. St. Francis.39 In each of these cases, the record

evidence set forth the required information to determine the date of the injury was

also the date of the negligent act. Moving Defendants argue that because Plaintiff’s

Complaint alleges the possibility that the cancer was present in 2013, it establishes

that the date of the injury coincides with the date of the alleged negligence here.

Further, Moving Defendants distinguish Anderson because Anderson’s cancer

definitively had not developed at the time of the negligent act.40

36 Anderson v. GI Associates of Delaware, 2022 WL 3696776, at *5 (Del. Super. Aug. 24, 2022). 37 745 A.2d 893 (Del. 2000). 38 974 A.2d 121 (Del. 2009). 39 401 A.2d 77 (Del. 1979). 40 In Anderson, the negligent act was the Defendant Doctor’s failure to recommend a colonoscopy repeat within 3 years but instead recommended a repeat in 3-5 years. No cancer was found at the time of the negligent recommendation, but by the time Anderson returned in five years, cancer had developed and to such an extent that a colonoscopy was unable to have been performed. 10 The Anderson decision was based upon its particular facts. Moving

Defendants are correct that in Anderson, the plaintiff’s cancer was not present at the

time of the negligent act. The Anderson Court used this fact to distinguish itself

from Meekins, Dambro and Dunn. In finding the Anderson plaintiff’s circumstance

“unique,” the Court noted that the previous cases were ones in which the evidence

supported a finding that the date of the injury coincided with the negligent act.41

The Plaintiff at bar may be similarly unique.

The procedural posture of all the previously decided cases is of import.

Moving Defendants argue that Dambro and Meekins were decided on the pleadings,

therefore the procedural posture of this case is not relevant.42 As in Anderson, it is

not clear from the pleadings when the Plaintiff’s alleged injury actually occurred.

Therefore, it is consequential that Plaintiff has not yet been afforded the opportunity

to explore this area in discovery; Dambro, Dunn and Meekins were decided with a

complete record. In fact, Anderson was remanded for Superior Court to review the

then-completed factual record to determine the date of injury and “apply § 6856

accordingly.”43 That was not necessary in Dambro, Dunn and Meekins. Here, the

factual record has not been fully developed, which distinguishes Plaintiff’s case from

41 Anderson, 247 A.2d at 685. 42 Def. Reply at ¶ 14, D.I. 20. 43 Id. 11 Dambro, Dunn and Meekins where “[the] rulings [ ] that the injury coincided with

the negligence were all grounded in and supported by the evidence in those cases.”44

The current record alleges Plaintiff’s 2015 scan recommended follow up

testing to rule out carcinoma, not that carcinoma definitively existed at the time.45

The record lacks evidence as to where and when Plaintiff’s ultimate cancer was

detected, such that this Court cannot make a finding as to when cancer was

definitively present for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations. Any conclusion

regarding when the injury occurred is mere speculation at this point, yet the

Complaint sufficiently sets forth facts under which recovery is reasonably

conceivable.

Moving Defendants’ concerns regarding prejudice in the cost of discovery is

duly acknowledged, but when weighing the lost opportunity for Plaintiff to explore

this issue so that the Court can make an informed determination as to the statute of

limitations, the cost concern is substantially outweighed. Additionally, Defendant

Cramer filed a cross-claim in his Answer,46 for which the statute of limitations has

yet to run. Therefore, Moving Defendants costs will not end even should this motion

be granted, as that cross-claim remains to be litigated.

44 Anderson, 247 A.3d 685. 45 D.I. 1 at ¶ 15. 46 D.I. 16, ¶ 94. 12 IV. CONCLUSION

Reviewing the Complaint in the favorable light afforded to Plaintiff under

Rule 12(b)(6), there are reasonably conceivable grounds for recovery. Plaintiff is

entitled to engage in discovery to determine whether the injury occurred within 18

Del. C. §6856’s statute of limitations period. Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

________________________________ Danielle J. Brennan, Judge

cc: All parties via File&Serve