Langer v. 6830 La Jolla Blvd., LLC

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 21, 2020
• Docket: 3:19-cv-01790
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Chris Langer, Case No.: 3:19-cv-1790-GPC-NLS

12 Plaintiffs, ORDER 13 v. ECF No. 5. 14 6830 La Jolla Blvd., LLC; MLT Encinitas, LLC; Does 1–10, 15 Defendant. 16

17 On October 31, 2019, Defendant 6830 La Jolla Blvd., LLC1, moved the Court for 18 an order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of standing, denying supplemental 19 jurisdiction over the state law claim, and instructing Plaintiff to file a more definite 20 statement. (ECF No. 5.) On December 2, 2019, Plaintiff Chris Langer filed an opposition. 21 (ECF No. 10.) On December 13, 2019, Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 11.) 22 23 24

25 26 1 Plaintiff makes his allegations with respect to both Defendants, 6830 La Jolla Blvd., LLC and MLT Encinitas, LLC. However, because the Court entered a Default Judgment against Defendant MLT 27 Encinitas, LLC, (ECF No. 8), and Defendant 6830 La Jolla Blvd., LLC, filed the instant motions separately (ECF No. 5), any subsequent reference to “Defendant” applies to 6830 La Jolla Blvd., LLC, 28 1 Having reviewed the papers and caselaw, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motions 2 to dismiss the complaint and for a more definite statement. The Court GRANTS 3 Plaintiff’s motion on supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses Plaintiff’s state law claim. 4 I. Allegations in the Complaint 5 Plaintiff Chris Langer is a California resident and paraplegic who cannot walk. 6 (ECF No. 1, Complaint at ¶ 1.) He uses a wheelchair for mobility. (Id.) His van requires 7 special equipment to deploy his wheelchair out of the passenger side door. (Id.) The State 8 of California has given him a Parking Placard reserved for people with disabilities. (Id.) 9 In September 2019, Plaintiff went to the Nautilus Tavern, a “Restaurant” located at 10 6830 La Jolla Blvd and owned by Defendant. (ECF No. 1, Complaint at ¶¶ 2–5, 10.) The 11 Restaurant “failed to provide accessible parking” on that date. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff 12 personally encountered this barrier, causing him “difficulty and discomfort.” (Id. at ¶ 16.) 13 Plaintiff believes that Defendant’s parking lot still does not provide accessible parking. 14 (Id. at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff further alleges that he believes the Restaurant creates a second 15 barrier by not providing accessible restrooms. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Plaintiff admits he did not 16 encounter the restrooms himself. (Id.) 17 Plaintiff asserts that these two barriers are easily replaced. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Plaintiff 18 offers that he “will return to the Restaurant . . . to determine compliance with disability 19 access laws” once Defendant informs him it has fixed these barriers. (Id. at ¶ 20.) 20 Plaintiff further asserts that he “seeks to have all barriers related to his disability 21 remedied,” whether or not they are named in the complaint at this time. (Id. at ¶ 21.) 22 Plaintiff asserts two causes of action based on these facts. First, Plaintiff alleges 23 that Defendant’s failure to provide accessible parking and accessible restrooms 24 constitutes a failure to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 25 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (ECF No. 1, Complaint at ¶¶ 22–30); see also 42 U.S.C. § 26 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), (iv); 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2). Second, Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s 27 conduct likewise violates California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, et 28 seq., because “a violation of the ADA is a violation of the Unruh Act.” (ECF No. 1, 1 Complaint at ¶ 32.) Plaintiff seeks (1) injunctive relief compelling Defendant to comply 2 with the ADA and the Unruh Act; (2) damages for $4,000, at a minimum, per offense, 3 under the Unruh Act; and (3) reasonable attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs of 4 suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205 and Cal. Civ. Code § 52. (ECF No. at 7, Complaint at 5 Prayer.) 6 II. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing. 7 “It goes without saying that those who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal 8 courts must satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution 9 by alleging an actual case or controversy.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 10 (1983). “[T]o satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirement, [a plaintiff] needs to 11 show that he has suffered an injury in fact, that the injury is traceable to the challenged 12 action of [the defendant], and that the injury can be redressed by a favorable 13 decision.” Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004) 14 (quoting Bird v. Lewis & Clark College, 303 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002)). An ADA 15 “plaintiff who has encountered or has personal knowledge of at least one barrier related 16 to his or her disability when he files a complaint and who has been deterred from 17 attempting to gain access to the public accommodation because of that barrier, has 18 suffered an injury in fact for the purpose of Article III.” Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 19 1034, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008). If a “court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter 20 jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 21 Here, only the first factor, injury-in-fact, is contested. Defendant argues that 22 Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to properly plead an injury from the allegedly 23 inaccessible parking and bathrooms. (ECF No. 5-1 at 4) (“Plaintiff alleges that the 24 parking is not accessible, but provides no facts as to how it is accessible, not how it 25 relates to his disability. . . [Plaintiff] alleges that the bathrooms do not comply, but states 26 he has not encountered barriers.”) Defendant’s argument relies primarily on Chapman v. 27 Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). In Chapman, 28 plaintiff “attached to his complaint an ‘Accessibility Survey,’ which listed barriers known 1 to him that he claim[ed]” violated the ADA and relate statutes. Id. Plaintiff, however, 2 failed to “allege[] what those barriers were and how his disability was affected by them.” 3 Id. Plaintiff responds that Defendant misreads Chapman, which holds that “encounters 4 with the noncompliant barriers related to one’s disability are sufficient to demonstrate an 5 injury-in-fact for standing.” (ECF No. 10 at 11 (quoting Chapman, 631 F.3d at 948)), and 6 that his complaint adequately pleads his standing. (Id. at 7–16). 7 The Court agrees with Plaintiff and finds that Plaintiff’s complaint is unlike the 8 complaint in Chapman because it alleges the necessary facts to show standing. Plaintiff 9 states that he travels by wheelchair, and that his van uses special equipment to permit him 10 to enter and exit the van on his wheelchair. (ECF No. 1, Complaint at ¶ 1.) Instead of 11 relying on an attached, general list of regulatory violations, Plaintiff states that he 12 personally encountered parking at the Restaurant that was not accessible to him given his 13 specific disability, thus causing him “difficulty and discomfort” and “deter[ing him] from 14 returning.” (Id. at ¶¶ 12–16.) Consequently, Plaintiff highlights Defendant’s barrier and 15 explains how that barrier “deprived him of the same full and equal access that a person 16 who is not wheelchair bound would enjoy when shopping at” the Restaurant, namely, its 17 lack of accessible parking. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 955. 18 Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiff’s allegations lack specificity fail. (ECF No. 19 11 at 7–8). Under the more relaxed pleading standards of the ADA, Plaintiff need not 20 articulate how the Restaurant’s parking specifically violated the ADA Accessibility 21 Guidelines (“ADAAG”), see, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § Pt. 1191, App. B at § 208.21 (number of 22 parking spaces); 36 C.F.R. § Pt. 1191, App. B at § 502.4 (rules on the height of access 23 aisles), because it is sufficient, “[a]s a matter of law,” for Plaintiff to state that he 24 “encountered barriers to access” and that he “was deterred by accessibility barriers from 25 visiting [the Restaurant].” See Skaff v. Meridien N. Am. Beverly Hills, LLC, 506 F.3d 832, 26 841 (9th Cir. 2007); Schutza v. Alessio Leasing, Inc., No. 18-CV-2154-LAB, 2019 WL 27 1546950, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2019) (“Federal Rules do not permit dismissal of an 28 ADA complaint based on such formalities”). This kind of pleading adequately “notifies 1 defendant that discovery is needed to determine the exact barriers” causing Plaintiff’s 2 injury. See Sharp v. Islands California Arizona LP, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1106–07 (S.D. 3 Cal. 2012); Griffin v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 4 And, while other ADA complaints have contained more detailed allegations, a higher 5 degree of specificity is not required, and may, in fact, preclude Plaintiff “from later 6 alleging another defect with respect to the [parking lot or bathroom.]” Sharp, 900 F. 7 Supp. 2d at 1107 (citing Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2011)). 8 Consequently, as in Sharp, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s “barrier allegations fall 9 somewhere between Skaff and Oliver,”2 and are thus sufficiently specific to meet the 10 ADA pleading standard for standing. Id. 11 Lastly, that Plaintiff did not personally encounter an inaccessible bathroom does 12 not deprive him of standing. (ECF No. 1, Complaint at ¶ 17); Chapman, 631 F.3d at 951 13 (permitting standing to sue for unencountered barriers). Afterall, an “ADA challenge to 14 unencountered barriers does not implicate the prohibition on generalized grievances, or 15 violate prudential standing principles, by raising the rights of third parties rather than the 16 rights of the individual plaintiff.” Id. And, by permitting Plaintiff to sue for all barriers in 17 the same action, the court discourages “piecemeal compliance with the ADA” and better 18 achieves “the ADA’s remedial goals of eliminating widespread discrimination against the 19 disabled and integrating the disabled into the mainstream of American life.” Id. at 952. 20 III. Motion for a More Definite Statement. 21 Rule 12(e) provides that a party may move for “a more definite statement of a 22 pleading” if it “is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a 23 response.” Such motions are “viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted.” See Sagan v. 24 25 2 Compare Skaff, 506 F.3d at 836 (“In addition to the problems with the shower described above, 26 paragraph 14 of Skaff’s complaint alleged more generally that ‘during the course of his stay at the Hotel, Plaintiff encountered numerous other barriers to disabled access, including ‘path of travel,’ guestroom, 27 bathroom, telephone, elevator, and signage barriers to access, all in violation of federal and state law and regulation.’”) with at Oliver, 654 F.3d at 906 (listing 18 architectural defects specific to Defendants’ 28 1 Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 1994). “A motion for a more 2 definite statement attacks intelligibility, not simply lack of detail.” Morales v. Truss, No. 3 15-CV-01241-BAS, 2015 WL 5331616, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2015) (quoting 4 Gregory Vill. Partners v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 888, 896 (N.D. Cal. 5 2011)). “For this reason, the motion fails where the complaint is specific enough to 6 apprise the defendant of the substance of the claim being asserted.” Id. Also, “[i]f the 7 facts sought by a motion for a more definite statement are obtainable by discovery, the 8 motion should be denied.” Lunger v. Witt, No. 2:15-CV-00486-MCE, 2015 WL 4460813, 9 at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2015). 10 Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff “does not adequately describe what the 11 barriers are that give rise to the Complaint.” (ECF No. 5-1 at 5.) In light of the breadth of 12 Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendant is “unable to respond without prejudice” because it 13 would have to “generally deny all allegations.” (Id. at 5–6.) Defendant may then “miss 14 the opportunity for other” motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, (id. at 6), or 15 inadvertently waive affirmative defenses. (ECF No. 11 at 8–9.) Plaintiff might, “[b]y way 16 of example,” waive (1) a motion to dismiss the claims on the basis that “the barriers 17 Plaintiff alleges may already be fixed,” (ECF No. 5-1 at 6), or (2) the affirmative defense 18 that Plaintiff’s alleged barriers are not “easily removeable.” (ECF No. 11 at 8–9.) 19 Defendant also asserts that it owns a building (presumably at the same address) 20 containing “multiple tenants, covenants, and structurally different parking lots,” such that 21 it “cannot adequately respond” until Defendant identifies “the operate lot.” (Id. at 9.) 22 Plaintiff maintains that the complaint is sufficiently pled but does not otherwise contest 23 Defendant’s specific arguments as to a more definite statement. (ECF No. 10 at 7–16.) 24 The Court denies Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement. As discussed, 25 Plaintiff’s complaint is specific enough to put Defendant on notice as to the claims raised 26 under the ADA – a failure to provide accessible parking and accessible bathrooms – and 27 the Court finds that discovery is a more appropriate vehicle to resolve any remaining 28 ambiguities. Sharp, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1106–07; cf. Levy v. FCI Lender Servs., Inc., No. 1 18-CV-2725-GPC, 2019 WL 6877596, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2019) (granting motion 2 for more definite statement where plaintiff’s 49-page complaint was devoid of any factual 3 allegations against a particular defendant). In addition, the Court sees no reason why 4 Defendant cannot both deny each allegation and assert, in the alternative, an affirmative 5 defense that any existing defects are not easily removable. Lastly, to the extent that there 6 is currently any doubt as to which portion of the parking lot at issue allegedly violates the 7 ADA, the Court is confident that this will be quickly resolved through discovery such 8 that a more definite pleading is not necessary. Lunger, 2015 WL 4460813, at *3. 9 IV. Supplemental Jurisdiction over State Law Claim. 10 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a court can decline to assert supplemental jurisdiction 11 over a pendant claim if one of the following four categories applies: (1) the claim raises a 12 novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the 13 claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court 14 has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional 15 circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. The Court 16 DECLINES to adopt jurisdiction pursuant to the second and fourth factors. 17 First, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s state law claim predominates 18 over his ADA claim under 29 U.S.C. 1367(c)(2). As Defendant notes, Plaintiff has 19 brought this suit “primarily for monetary damages rather than injunctive relief.” (ECF 20 No. 5-1 at 3); see Schutza v. Alessio Leasing, Inc., No. 18-CV-2154-LAB (AGS), 2019 21 WL 1546950, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2019) (finding plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim 22 substantially predominate over his ADA claim where “the money damages available to 23 him [were] open-ended”). Plaintiff’s complaint contains two violations, which if found to 24 be true would entitle Plaintiff to at least $8,000 in damages, and expressly notes that 25 “there are other violations and barriers on the site.” (ECF No. 1, Complaint at ¶ 21, 25, 26 27). And, as Plaintiff explains, any “serial litigator is motivated by the right to recover 27 statutory penalties.” (ECF No. 10 at 23.) It thus seems likely that Plaintiff’s sought-after 28 recovery (1) may increase substantially after an investigation of the Restaurant, and (2) 1 animates the instant filing. Consequently, as has been the case with some of Mr. Langer’s 2 prior ADA suits, this Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the Unruh claim because 3 it substantially predominates over the ADA claim. See Langer v. Deddeh, No. 19-CV- 4 1879-CAB, 2019 WL 4918084, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2019); Langer v. Petras, No. 19- 5 CV-1408-CAB, 2019 WL 3459107, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 31, 2019). 6 Second, the Court finds that there is an exceptional reason here to defer to 7 California state courts in deciding the instant case.3 On October 10, 2015, California 8 raised the pleading standards for high frequency litigants: (a) plaintiffs who filed 10 or 9 more complaints alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12- 10 month period immediately preceding a lawsuit, and (b) attorneys who represented 10 or 11 more high-frequency litigant plaintiffs in actions that were resolved within the 12-month 12 period immediately preceding a lawsuit. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(1)–(2). This 13 law was passed to “limit” the filings of a “very small number of plaintiffs” responsible 14 for “a disproportionately large number of the construction-related accessibility claims in 15 the state, from 70 to 300 lawsuits each year.” Id. at § 425.55(1)(b). Since the passage of 16 this law, federal courts have repeatedly declined to seek jurisdiction over state law claims 17 in lawsuits where the plaintiff or attorney might fall into this category. See, e.g., Theroux 18 v. Mar-Con Prod., Inc., No. 19-CV-1810-H, 2019 WL 6829096, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 19 2019); Rutherford v. Ara Lebanese Grill, No. 18-CV-01497-AJB, 2019 WL 1057919, at 20 *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019); Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1031 (S.D. 21 22 23 3 Notably, Defendant also asks that the Court decline jurisdiction under the first factor – that this suit “raises novel issues of state law.” (ECF No. 5-1 at 3.) As Defendant notes, Plaintiff is a “high frequency 24 litigator” in the parlance of California law, and would thus be subject to a higher pleading standard in 25 California state court. (Id. at 3–4); see Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1031 (S.D. Cal. 2017). Here, however, the applicable pleading standard is derived from the Federal Rules of Civil 26 Procedure and federal common law, Oliver v. In-N-Out Burgers, 286 F.R.D. 475, 477 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (“state pleading standards do not apply in federal court”), and thus Plaintiff’s status in California state 27 court has no bearing here. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not require this Court to interpret or adjudicate “a novel or complex issue of State law,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), and thus the 28 1 Cal. 2017). Doing so comports with the twin aims of “discourage[ing] forum shopping” 2 and respecting comity, i.e., permitting “California courts [to] interpret California law.” 3 Org. for Advancement of Minorities with Disabilities v. Brick Oven Rest., 406 F. Supp. 2d 4 1120, 1132 (S.D. Cal. 2005). 5 Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is one such litigant, and thus the Court should 6 decline jurisdiction. (ECF No. 5-1 at 3; ECF No. 11 at 5–6.) Plaintiff does not deny being 7 a serial litigant, and responds instead by asserting that Defendant’s assertions unfairly 8 discredit Plaintiff, that serial litigation is a legitimate means of enforcing the ADA, and 9 that Plaintiff’s motives for choosing federal court as its forum are irrelevant. (ECF No. 10 10 at 20–24.) In considering these arguments, the Court recognizes that a Plaintiff’s 11 selection of the most advantageous forum is neither an improper nor an “unusual 12 circumstance.” White v. Wisco Restaurants, Inc., No. 17-CV-103-L, 2018 WL 1510611, 13 at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2018). Afterall, the plaintiff is “the master of the claim.” Id. 14 (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). 15 Nonetheless, the Court ultimately finds Defendant’s arguments more persuasive. 16 Plaintiff is free to pursue his ADA claim here in federal court, and to seek damages for 17 the Unruh claim in state court. Alternatively, Plaintiff may take both claims to state court. 18 Regardless, the Court finds that either arrangement, though somewhat duplicative, better 19 accommodates the passage of California’s statute on high frequency litigants and 20 appropriately discourages serial litigants from “us[ing] the federal court system as a 21 loophole to evade California’s pleading requirements.” Rutherford, 2019 WL 1057919, at 22 *5; see also Theroux, 2019 WL 6829096, at *4; Schutza, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 1031. 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 Conclusion 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss for 3 || lack of standing and for a more definite statement. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s 4 || motion to decline supplemental jurisdiction. 5 The hearing on this matter set for January 24, 2020 is hereby VACATED. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: January 21, 2020 Casto CL 8 Hon. athe Coke 9 United States District Judge 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10