Langdon v. Swain

29 F. App'x 171

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: March 12, 2002
• Docket: 01-1975, 01-2019
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated appeals, Christopher Langdon appeals the district court’s dismissal of his two civil actions against the Appellees, seeking 1) to invalidate the state statutes of limitations relied on as defenses to his previous state actions against the Appellees arising from a 1995 landslide on his property, and 2) monetary damages for a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Having reviewed the parties’ filings, the district court’s opinion and orders, and the record on appeal, we affirm. Additionally, we grant the Appellees’ motion to file supplemental materials, deny Langdon’s motions for sanctions, deny Langdon’s motion to strike Appellees’ informal brief, and deny Langdon’s motion for default judgment.

Turning to the merits of Langdon’s appeal, we find his actions were properly dismissed by the district court. As the district court noted, Langdon’s prior state actions named the North Carolina Department of Transportation (“NCDOT”) as defendant and addressed issues arising from the same incidents at issue here. However, in federal court Langdon named only the NCDOT in the first complaint and four employees of the NCDOT in the separate complaint alleging an improper taking. We find Langdon’s first action was properly subject to dismissal on the basis of res judicata. Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 428 S.E.2d 157, 161 (N.C.1993); Caswell Realty Assoc. I, L.P. v. Andrews Co., 128 N.C.App. 716, 496 S.E.2d 607, 610 (N.C.Ct.App.1998). Further, because takings actions sound against governmental entities rather than individual state employees in their individual capacities, see Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 687, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985), Langdon’s second federal suit was properly subject to dismissal either based on res judicata, in light of the complete identity of the parties and issues involved, see Bockweg, 428 S.E.2d at 161; Caswell, 496 S.E.2d at 610, or for failure to state a claim. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s dismissal of Langdon’s actions as frivolous or malicious under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2) (West Supp.2001). *

Langdon also raises two additional assignments of error, which we also find to be meritless. First, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Langdon’s motion to recuse the district court judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994). See United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 283 (4th Cir.1998). Second, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s granting Appellees’ motion to reopen the period for filing their answer pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. See Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 392, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); Mendez v. Elliot, 45 F.3d 75, 79 (4th Cir.1995).

For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of Langdon’s civil actions and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.

* We reiterate the district court’s warning that continuing to file frivolous or malicious pleadings in this Court or the district court could lead to the imposition of sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.