BOYLE, Justice.
This case involves an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission which denied unemployment compensation to Debra Ann Lang. An appeals examiner for the Department of Employment found Lang had been discharged for misconduct and denied her claim for unemployment compensation benefits. The Industrial [546]*546Commission conducted a de novo review of the record pursuant to I.C. § 72-1368(g), and no additional evidence was admitted. The Commission held that claimant was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits because she had been discharged for misconduct. We affirm.
I.
FACTS
Lang was employed by the Ustick Dental Office as an office manager. Her primary duties entailed collecting accounts receivable and supervising the office staff. Lang was discharged from her employment on January 27, 1987, and thereafter filed for unemployment compensation benefits. In opposing Lang’s claim for benefits, the employer asserted that claimant was discharged for employment related misconduct. The Department of Employment appeals examiner agreed and denied Lang’s claim for unemployment compensation benefits. After de novo review on appeal the Industrial Commission made factual findings based on the record and likewise denied Lang’s claim for unemployment benefits. The Commission found:
It appears that the Claimant’s work was satisfactory to the two dentists who operated Ustick Dental Office until the fall of 1986.
II
In September, October and November of 1986 Claimant and her employers were negotiating a change in her compensation. Claimant was dissatisfied with the proposals made by her employers. No agreement was reached between them. She rejected the final proposal by written rejection, making it clear that she was dissatisfied with the proposal and indicating that she may not continue her employment. She did, however, continue to work for the Employers but she did not receive the compensation she desired.
III
Subsequent to the unsatisfactory resolution of the negotiations, the Employers became dissatisfied with the Claimant’s work performance. Several patients were lost due to the Claimant’s abrasive personal contacts with the patients. She called patients at their places of employment, though she was asked not to do so. She was rude to one patient in connection with an insurance claim and also rude to that patient’s supervisor who was, incidentally, also a patient at the dental office. Dr. Reynolds, one of Claimant’s employers, began to receive complaints.
IV
Written complaints were sent by patients to the dental office. These complaints were intercepted by Claimant and not shown to Dr. Reynolds. Dr. Reynolds also received complaints from employees whom Claimant supervised concerning Claimant’s treatment of them.
R., pp. 51-52. The Commission concluded Lang was ineligible for unemployment benefits because,
Claimant’s conduct was in some respects willful and intentional. Even if it was not, however, it was clearly a disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of its employees. Employer’s expectations in this ease were objectively reasonable and Claimant’s conduct fell below that standard.
R., at 53.
II.
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
This Court’s review of Industrial Commission decisions is limited by the Idaho Constitution and our prior cases which limit review only to questions of law. Idaho Constitution, art. 5 § 9; Jensen v. Siemsen, 118 Idaho 1, 794 P.2d 271 (1990); Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277, 787 P.2d 263 (1990); Puckett v. Idaho Dept. of Corrections, 107 Idaho 1022, 695 P.2d 407 (1985); Parker v. St. Maries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 614 P.2d 955 (1980); Harris v. Green Tree, Inc., 100 Idaho 227, 596 P.2d 99 (1979); Simmons v. [547]*547Department of Employment, 99 Idaho 290, 581 P.2d 336 (1978); Booth v. City of Burley, 99 Idaho 229, 580 P.2d 75 (1978); Hutchinson v. J.R. Simplot Co., 98 Idaho 346, 563 P.2d 404 (1977). Further, our review in cases involving factual disputes is restricted to determining whether findings of fact by the Industrial Commission are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Jensen v. Siemsen, 118 Idaho 1, 794 P.2d 271 (1990); Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277, 787 P.2d 263 (1990); Burnside v. Gate City Steel Corp., 112 Idaho 1040, 739 P.2d 339 (1987); Ullrich v. Thorpe Elec., 109 Idaho 820, 712 P.2d 521 (1985); Booth v. City of Burley, 99 Idaho 229, 580 P.2d 75 (1978). As we recently reaffirmed in Spruell and Jensen, quoting from Booth v. City of Burley, we decline to “independently adopt findings of fact at variance with those of the Industrial Commission where such findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Pri- or decisions suggesting a contrary result are, to this extent, hereby expressly overruled.” 99 Idaho at 232, 580 P.2d at 78. Similarly, where the factual findings of the Industrial Commission are sustained by substantial and competent, though conflicting evidence, they will not be reversed on appeal. Jensen v. Siemsen, 118 Idaho 1, 794 P.2d 271 (1990); Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277, 787 P.2d 263 (1990); Kyle v. Beco Corp., 109 Idaho 267, 707 P.2d 378 (1985); Wood v. Quali-Dent Dental Clinics, 107 Idaho 1020, 695 P.2d 405 (1985); Cornwell v. Kootenai County Sheriff 106 Idaho 823, 683 P.2d 859 (1984). It is well established that we will defer to the findings of the Industrial Commission when those findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Idaho Constitution art. 5 § 9; Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277, 787 P.2d 263 (1990); Guillard v. Department of Employment, 100 Idaho 647, 603 P.2d 981 (1979).
The Industrial Commission’s responsibility and scope of review in employment matters is set forth in I.C. § 72-1368(g) which provides in pertinent part:
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BOYLE, Justice.
This case involves an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission which denied unemployment compensation to Debra Ann Lang. An appeals examiner for the Department of Employment found Lang had been discharged for misconduct and denied her claim for unemployment compensation benefits. The Industrial [546]*546Commission conducted a de novo review of the record pursuant to I.C. § 72-1368(g), and no additional evidence was admitted. The Commission held that claimant was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits because she had been discharged for misconduct. We affirm.
I.
FACTS
Lang was employed by the Ustick Dental Office as an office manager. Her primary duties entailed collecting accounts receivable and supervising the office staff. Lang was discharged from her employment on January 27, 1987, and thereafter filed for unemployment compensation benefits. In opposing Lang’s claim for benefits, the employer asserted that claimant was discharged for employment related misconduct. The Department of Employment appeals examiner agreed and denied Lang’s claim for unemployment compensation benefits. After de novo review on appeal the Industrial Commission made factual findings based on the record and likewise denied Lang’s claim for unemployment benefits. The Commission found:
It appears that the Claimant’s work was satisfactory to the two dentists who operated Ustick Dental Office until the fall of 1986.
II
In September, October and November of 1986 Claimant and her employers were negotiating a change in her compensation. Claimant was dissatisfied with the proposals made by her employers. No agreement was reached between them. She rejected the final proposal by written rejection, making it clear that she was dissatisfied with the proposal and indicating that she may not continue her employment. She did, however, continue to work for the Employers but she did not receive the compensation she desired.
III
Subsequent to the unsatisfactory resolution of the negotiations, the Employers became dissatisfied with the Claimant’s work performance. Several patients were lost due to the Claimant’s abrasive personal contacts with the patients. She called patients at their places of employment, though she was asked not to do so. She was rude to one patient in connection with an insurance claim and also rude to that patient’s supervisor who was, incidentally, also a patient at the dental office. Dr. Reynolds, one of Claimant’s employers, began to receive complaints.
IV
Written complaints were sent by patients to the dental office. These complaints were intercepted by Claimant and not shown to Dr. Reynolds. Dr. Reynolds also received complaints from employees whom Claimant supervised concerning Claimant’s treatment of them.
R., pp. 51-52. The Commission concluded Lang was ineligible for unemployment benefits because,
Claimant’s conduct was in some respects willful and intentional. Even if it was not, however, it was clearly a disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of its employees. Employer’s expectations in this ease were objectively reasonable and Claimant’s conduct fell below that standard.
R., at 53.
II.
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
This Court’s review of Industrial Commission decisions is limited by the Idaho Constitution and our prior cases which limit review only to questions of law. Idaho Constitution, art. 5 § 9; Jensen v. Siemsen, 118 Idaho 1, 794 P.2d 271 (1990); Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277, 787 P.2d 263 (1990); Puckett v. Idaho Dept. of Corrections, 107 Idaho 1022, 695 P.2d 407 (1985); Parker v. St. Maries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 614 P.2d 955 (1980); Harris v. Green Tree, Inc., 100 Idaho 227, 596 P.2d 99 (1979); Simmons v. [547]*547Department of Employment, 99 Idaho 290, 581 P.2d 336 (1978); Booth v. City of Burley, 99 Idaho 229, 580 P.2d 75 (1978); Hutchinson v. J.R. Simplot Co., 98 Idaho 346, 563 P.2d 404 (1977). Further, our review in cases involving factual disputes is restricted to determining whether findings of fact by the Industrial Commission are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Jensen v. Siemsen, 118 Idaho 1, 794 P.2d 271 (1990); Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277, 787 P.2d 263 (1990); Burnside v. Gate City Steel Corp., 112 Idaho 1040, 739 P.2d 339 (1987); Ullrich v. Thorpe Elec., 109 Idaho 820, 712 P.2d 521 (1985); Booth v. City of Burley, 99 Idaho 229, 580 P.2d 75 (1978). As we recently reaffirmed in Spruell and Jensen, quoting from Booth v. City of Burley, we decline to “independently adopt findings of fact at variance with those of the Industrial Commission where such findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Pri- or decisions suggesting a contrary result are, to this extent, hereby expressly overruled.” 99 Idaho at 232, 580 P.2d at 78. Similarly, where the factual findings of the Industrial Commission are sustained by substantial and competent, though conflicting evidence, they will not be reversed on appeal. Jensen v. Siemsen, 118 Idaho 1, 794 P.2d 271 (1990); Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277, 787 P.2d 263 (1990); Kyle v. Beco Corp., 109 Idaho 267, 707 P.2d 378 (1985); Wood v. Quali-Dent Dental Clinics, 107 Idaho 1020, 695 P.2d 405 (1985); Cornwell v. Kootenai County Sheriff 106 Idaho 823, 683 P.2d 859 (1984). It is well established that we will defer to the findings of the Industrial Commission when those findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Idaho Constitution art. 5 § 9; Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277, 787 P.2d 263 (1990); Guillard v. Department of Employment, 100 Idaho 647, 603 P.2d 981 (1979).
The Industrial Commission’s responsibility and scope of review in employment matters is set forth in I.C. § 72-1368(g) which provides in pertinent part:
(g) The commission shall decide all claims for review filed by any interested party in accordance with its own rules of procedure not in conflict herewith. The record before the commission shall consist of the record of proceedings before the appeals examiner, unless it appears to the commission that the interests of justice require that the interested parties be permitted to present additional evidence. In that event, the commission may, in its sole discretion, conduct a hearing to receive additional evidence or may refer the matter back to the appeals examiner for an additional hearing and decision. On the basis of the record of proceedings before the appeals examiner as well as any additional evidence, if allowed, the Commission shall affirm, reverse, modify, set aside or revise the decision of the appeals examiner or may refer the matter back to the appeals examiner for further proceedings. (Emphasis added.)
The legislature provided for a de novo review before the Industrial Commission based on the record of the appeals examiner. The record demonstrates that the Industrial Commission properly reviewed the record of the appeals examiner in making its findings and correctly applied Idaho law in making its determination regarding Lang’s eligibility to receive unemployment benefits. Idaho Code § 72-1366(e) sets forth the personal eligibility requirements and denies eligibility to receive unemployment benefits to anyone discharged for misconduct in connection with their employment. Misconduct has been defined in our prior cases to mean “willful, intentional disregard of the employer’s interest; a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules; or a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employees.” Jensen v. Siemsen, 118 Idaho 1, 794 P.2d 271 (1990); Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277, 787 P.2d 263 (1990); Johns v. S.H. Kress & Co., 78 Idaho 544, 307 P.2d 217 (1957); Puckett v. Idaho Dep’t of Corrections, 107 Idaho 1022, 695 P.2d 407 (1985); Goolsby v. Life Savers, 107 Idaho 456, 690 P.2d 911 (1984); Roll v. City of Middleton, 105 Idaho 22, [548]*548665 P.2d 721 (1983); Matthews v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 101 Idaho 657, 619 P.2d 1110 (1980).
In Matthews, we held:
There is no requirement in the Johns definition of misconduct that the claimant’s disregard of standards of behavior must be found to have been subjectively willful, intentional or deliberate. Rather, the test for misconduct in standard of behavior cases is (1) whether the employee’s conduct fell below the standard of behavior expected by the employer; and (2) whether the employer’s expectation was objectively reasonable in the particular case. The employee’s subjective state of mind is irrelevant.
101 Idaho at 659, 619 P.2d at 1112. This test has been consistently reaffirmed by this Court on numerous occasions and is well established precedent in Idaho. Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277, 787 P.2d 263 (1990); Puckett v. Idaho Dep’t of Corrections, 107 Idaho 1022, 695 P.2d 407 (1985); Goolsby v. Life Savers, 107 Idaho 456, 690 P.2d 911 (1984).
Whether a claimant has disregarded the standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect from its employees is a factual determination to be made by the Industrial Commission. See Burnside v. Gate City Steel Corp., 112 Idaho 1040, 739 P.2d 339 (1987); Goolsby v. Life Savers, Inc., 107 Idaho 456, 690 P.2d 911 (1984). In this case the Commission determined Lang’s behavior constituted misconduct because “it was clearly a disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer [had] the right to expect of its employee,” and because her “conduct was in some respects willful and intentional.” The Commission reached this determination after reviewing the record of the appeals examiner. We too have reviewed the record and are compelled to uphold the Commission’s findings which we deem to be supported by substantial evidence. Jensen v. Siemsen, 118 Idaho 1, 794 P.2d 271 (1990); Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp., 117 Idaho 277, 787 P.2d 263 (1990); Burnside v. Gate City Steel Corp., 112 Idaho 1040, 739 P.2d 339 (1987); Ullrich v. Thorpe Elec., 109 Idaho 820, 712 P.2d 521 (1985); Kyle v. Beco Corp., 109 Idaho 267, 707 P.2d 378 (1985); Booth v. City of Burley, 99 Idaho 229, 580 P.2d 75 (1978). A review of the record reveals conflicting evidence. However, there is substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission’s findings that the employer became dissatisfied with her work performance after patients were lost due to her making contact at the patients’ places of employment and treating patients in a rude and abusive manner. The record further supports a finding that the employer received complaints about Lang from patients and co-employees, and she intercepted and did not deliver several written complaints about her addressed to the employers. The findings of the Industrial Commission are supported by substantial and competent evidence and will not be disturbed on appeal.
Lang has raised several other issues on appeal which are without merit. The decision of the Industrial Commission is affirmed. Costs to respondent.
BAKES, C.J., and JOHNSON and McDEVITT, JJ. concur.