OPINION
McFEELEY, Chief Judge.
The Debtor-Defendant, Marcia McQuar-rie Lang (“Debtor”), appeals the order and judgment of the bankruptcy court for the district of Utah in favor of her ex-husband, Robert F. Lang (“Plaintiff’), which found that the Debtor committed fraud under Utah law and that the resulting debt was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). First, the Debtor argues that a successor judge erred by not complying with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 63. Second, the Debtor argues that the bankruptcy court erred when it found that the Debtor had violated Utah state fraud law, the debt was nondischargeable in bankruptcy, and the Plaintiff was entitled to compensatory and punitive damages.
We find no error in the successor judge’s application to the proceedings below of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 63. We affirm on the issue of whether the Debtor incurred a debt under Utah law that was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). We reverse and remand on the issue of the amount of compensatory damages, and we reverse on the issue of punitive damages.
I. Background
The Debtor and the Plaintiff married in 1969. Two children were born during the marriage: a daughter on May 1, 1972, and a son on June 5,1978. Although the Debt- or and the Plaintiff had separated for a period of years in the early 1970s, the Plaintiff assumed that he had fathered both children.
In 1980, the Debtor and the Plaintiff divorced. Because the Plaintiff was presumed to have fathered the children and no issues concerning paternity were raised by either party during the divorce proceedings, the Utah state court ordered the Plaintiff to pay child support.
In 1991, eleven years after their divorce, the Debtor told the Plaintiff that he had not fathered either child and that the children’s biological father was probably James E. Pickens (“Pickens”), with whom, it was later revealed, she had a sexual relationship during her marriage for approximately six to seven years.
Soon after, on October 9, 1992, the Plaintiff brought an eight-count complaint against Debtor and Pickens in the Utah, state district court, alleging, among other things, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, interference with filial relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“state court Complaint”). The state court Complaint asked for general and compensatory damages, punitive and exemplary damages, future child support, and costs.
On October 7, 1993, the Debtor filed under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. On October 26, 1993, the Plaintiff sought and obtained relief from the automatic stay for the sole purpose of permitting the state court to determine paternity. After ordering a paternity test, the state court determined that Pickens was 99% likely to be the father of both children.
On January 7, 1994, the Plaintiff timely filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court for the district of Utah, making the same claims he had made in the Utah state court and further alleging that any resulting debt was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), [506]*506(a)(6).1 The adversary proceeding went to trial on February 15 and 16, 1995.2 In the adversary proceeding, the Debtor represented herself.
During the trial, the Plaintiffs divorce attorney, Brian Florence (“Florence”), testified about statements the Debtor made at a deposition taken on March 20, 1980, and at the state court divorce trial. The deposition at issue was not produced. Florence testified that when he deposed the Debtor he asked her “if she had had any extramarital affairs during her marriage” and the Debtor said “no.” Adversary Trial Transcript at 26, in Appellant’s App. at 1048. Florence further testified that at the state court divorce trial, the Debtor’s attorney asked the Debtor if the two children were the issue and the result of the marriage, and the Debtor said yes. Id. at 29, in Appellant’s App. at 1052. At the adversary proceeding trial, the Debtor raised no objections to Florence’s testimony, and she had an opportunity to cross-examine him.
On February 17, 1995, the bankruptcy judge (“trial judge”) made oral findings on the record and found that the Debtor had deceived the Plaintiff, but in the absence of any intent to hurt the Plaintiff, she had not committed fraud. The trial judge made the additional finding that because of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2 (2001), which provides that children born during a marriage are legally the issue of the marriage, that the Debtor did not lie in the divorce complaint. Ruling Transcript at 6, in Appellant’s App. at 1184. The trial judge concluded that there was no cause of action under §§ 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), or (a)(6).
The Plaintiff appealed the bankruptcy court’s ruling to the United States District Court for the District of Utah. On appeal, the Plaintiff argued that the trial judge had erred because Florence’s testimony was conclusive evidence that the Debtor had made a false representation during the divorce. After considering the Plaintiffs argument, the district court concluded that Florence’s testimony during the bankruptcy proceeding was inadmissable as hearsay and under the best evidence rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 1002, and affirmed the bankruptcy court.
On further appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the Plaintiff prevailed in part. Lang v. Lang (In re Lang), No. 95-4198, 1997 WL 26585 (10th Cir. Jan. 24, 1997). The Tenth Circuit held that the district court had erred when it found that Florence’s testimony was not admissible because the testimony was admissible as an admission of a party-opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). Id. at *3. When considering the Plaintiffs fraud claims, the Tenth Circuit found that the trial judge had erred in its delineation of the elements of fraud under Utah state law. Id. at *2. Referring to a Utah state case, Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct.App.1989), which held [507]*507that intent to harm is not an element of fraud, the Tenth Circuit remanded to the district court “with instructions that it remand to the bankruptcy court for consideration of the applicability of Masters” and “for further consideration in light of our reversal of the district court’s holding as to the admissibility of the divorce counsel’s testimony.” Id. Finally, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s finding that the Debtor had no intent to harm the Plaintiff and so had no cause of action under § 523(a)(6).3 Id. at *1.
After remand, no action was taken in the case for more than two years. The bankruptcy court entered an Order to Show Cause in May 1999, as to why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. In response, the Plaintiff filed proposed findings of facts and conclusions. The Debtor objected.
Because the first trial judge was no longer available, the case was reassigned to another bankruptcy' judge (“successor judge”). The successor judge held a hearing on the Debtor’s objection to the proposed findings and conclusions in October 2001, allowed the parties to file briefs, and held a final hearing on November 7, 2001. The successor judge stated his conclusions orally at the final hearing, finding that the Debtor had committed fraud under Utah state law and the judgment was nondis-chargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). The successor judge awarded the Plaintiff $156,231.00 in compensatory and $10,000 in punitive damages plus prejudgment and post-trial interest.
On December 10, 2001, the successor judge entered an Order and Judgment. This appeal timely followed.
II. Appellate Jurisdiction
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has jurisdiction over this appeal. The bankruptcy court’s judgment disposed of the adversary proceeding on the merits and is a final order subject to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996). The Debtor timely filed her notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002. The parties have consented to this Court’s jurisdiction by failing to elect to have the appeal heard by the United States District Court for the District of Utah. 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1); Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8001.
III. Standard of Review
“For purposes of standard of review, decisions by judges are traditionally divided into three categories, denominated questions of law (reviewable de novo), questions of fact (reviewable for' clear error), and matters of discretion (reviewable for ‘abuse of discretion’).” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988); see Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8013.
A successor judge’s actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 63 are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Semaan v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc. (In re Allied Supermarkets, Inc.), 951 F.2d 718, 727 (6th Cir.1991). “Under the abuse of discretion standard: ‘a trial court’s decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circum[508]*508stances.’ ” Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting McEwen v. City of Norman, 926 F.2d 1539, 1553-54 (10th Cir.1991) (further quotation omitted)).
A bankruptcy court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. Phillips v. White (In re White), 25 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir.1994); see also Fowler Bros. v. Young (In re Young), 91 F.3d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir.1996). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948).
IV. Discussion
As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute the precise issues that are before this Court on appeal. In January 2002, the Debtor filed a Designation of Record and Statement of Issues, which listed ten separate issues.4 After the parties filed their appellate briefs, the Debtor filed an Amended Statement of Issues and Amended Designation of Record (“Amended Record”), which listed seven issues.5 The Plaintiff objected to the Debtor’s Amended Issues and Amended Record (“Plaintiffs Objection”), arguing that he should be allowed to brief the Amended Issues6 and that the Debtor’s Amended [509]*509Record, which contains more than eighteen hundred pages of documents, improperly included items never presented to the bankruptcy court. We will construe the Plaintiffs Objection as a Motion to Strike the Amended Issues and Amended Record (“Motion to Strike”).
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8006 requires the appealing party to file a statement of issues and designation of the record. The purpose of those requirements is “to provide the reviewing court with an adequate basis for evaluating the appellant’s claims on appeal” and “ ‘to identify the portions of testimony below that should be included in the record on appeal.’ ” In re CPDC, Inc., 221 F.3d 693, 698 (5th Cir.2000) (quoting Editor’s Comment, Norton Bankruptcy Rules Pamphlet 559 (1999-2000 ed.)). “Rule 8006 exists to ensure the adequacy of the record, and does not affect the ability of any party to appeal findings or conclusions of the bankruptcy court.” In re Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham & Wong, Inc., 104 F.3d 1147, 1148 (9th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (citing 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 8006-10 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.1996)); see also Norton Bankruptcy Rules Pamphlet 594 (1996-97 ed.) (“The requirement of a statement of the issues is not intended to bind either party to the appeal as to the issues that are to be presented to the appellate court.”).
In this case, we conclude that the Amended Issues and Amended Record have neither obscured nor changed the Debtor’s argument. The Debtor’s original ten issues do not differ in substance from the Amended Issues. While the Amended Record filed by the Debtor was largely irrelevant to the issues presented in this appeal, the Debtor provided both the relevant transcripts of the hearings below and the pertinent written rulings. Because the Plaintiff has alleged no inaccuracies in the record, and the purpose of Rule 8006 is to ensure accuracy during the appellate process and not to restrict the appellant’s appeal to particular issues, the Plaintiffs Objection, construed as a Motion to Strike, is denied.
The Debtor’s first arguments focus on the proper interpretation and implementation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 63, which applies in cases under the Bankruptcy Code through Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9028. Rule 63 delineates the procedure to be followed by a successor judge who replaces a judge at any point after a trial or á hearing begins. Pursuant to Rule 63:
If a trial or hearing has been commenced and the judge is unable to proceed, any other judge may proceed with it upon certifying familiarity with the record and determining that the proceedings in the case may be completed without prejudice to the parties. In a hearing or trial without a jury, the successor judge shall at the request of a party recall any witness whose testimony is material and disputed and who is available to testify again without undue burden. The successor judge may also recall any other witness.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 63. Successor judges must only certify familiarity with the parts of the record that are relevant to the successor judge’s role in the case. Mergentime Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 166 F.3d 1257, 1265 (D.C.Cir.1999); Canseco v. United States, 97 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.1996). Express certification by the successor judge of a record is not required as long as the successor judge uses the procedure and language indicating that he has complied with the requirements of Rule 63. Mergentime, 166 F.3d at 1265. If the successor judge assumes a case after judgment has entered and is required to consider a [510]*510narrow issue, he or she “need only review the portion of the record relevant to that particular issue.” Id.; see also Canseco, 97 F.3d at 1227 (finding that when ruling on post judgment motion for a new trial under Rule 63, “the successor district judge [must] read and consider all relevant portions of the record.... ”).
In accordance with the instructions from the Tenth Circuit about how to proceed on remand, the issues before the successor judge were to determine whether the evidence presented met the legal standards for fraud under Utah state law, specifically the applicability of Masters, and to evaluate whether any resulting debt was nondis-chargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). The Tenth Circuit also directed the successor judge to consider Florence’s testimony concerning the Debtor’s deposition in the divorce case.
The Debtor argues that the successor judge erred by proceeding without certifying his familiarity with the record. We disagree. The record indicates that the successor judge indicated _ his familiarity with the relevant parts of the record several times. At the beginning of the October 2001 hearing, the successor judge stated that he was “familiar” with the issues before him on remand. Hearing Transcript at 3, in Appellant’s App. at 1399. When the successor judge orally announced his findings, he stated that he had “consider[ed] the evidence produced, the arguments of counsel, and ... applicable case law....” Transcript of Findings, in Appellant’s App. at 1451. In his written judgment the successor judge stated that the Court “carefully considered the evidence presented, the arguments of counsel, and the directives from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and the United States District Court for the District of Utah.... ” Final Order and Judgment at 2, in Appellant’s App. at 1486. Although the successor judge never directly referred to Rule 63, on each occasion, the successor judge used a procedure and language indicating that he was familiar with the dictates of Rule 63. We conclude that the successor judge satisfied the requirements of Rule 63.
Next, the Debtor argues that the successor judge erred under Rule 63 by refusing to recall Florence to testify. The language of Rule 63 mandates that on a party’s request a successor judge “shall” recall any available witness whose testimony is material and disputed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 63. Under limited circumstances, a successor judge may make findings of fact based on evidence heard by a predecessor judge. Mergentime, 166 F.3d at 1266. Such limited circumstances may include testimony that is undisputed or immaterial.7 Id.
In this case, the successor judge found that Florence’s testimony concerning events that occurred during the divorce proceedings was material under Rule 63, but it determined that Florence’s testimony was not in dispute and so did not recall him. Transcript of Findings at 8-9, in Appellant’s App. at 1455-56. Subsequently, the successor judge orally made findings of fact based on the record before him.
The Debtor claims that Florence’s testimony was material and disputed, his credibility was at issue, and the successor judge erred in finding otherwise. First, the Debtor claims that when a 1994 deposition [511]*511transcript8 was published in the adversary-proceeding trial and used by the plaintiffs attorney for impeachment purposes, it was substantive trial evidence. Whether the 1994 deposition was substantive trial evidence is significant because the Debtor contends that in the 1994 deposition she denied telling Florence that she never had extramarital affairs.
If properly presented to the court, and admitted by the judge, a deposition may be used as substantive trial evidence. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7032 refers to the use of depositions in adversary proceedings and provides that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32 applies. Pursuant to Rule 32, at trial, a party may use a deposition “so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and testifying, [and a deposition] may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof....” Fed. R.Civ.P. 32(a). The Tenth Circuit has found that under Rule 32, a party may introduce “ ‘as a part of his substantive proof, the deposition of his adversary, and it is quite immaterial that the adversary is available to testify at trial or has testified there.’ ” Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165 F.3d 767, 773 (10th Cir.1999) (quoting King & King Enters. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 657 F.2d 1147, 1163-64 (10th Cir.1981)). The admission of such deposition testimony is “subject to the sound discretion of trial court.” Id. at 773 (citing Reeg v. Shaughnessy, 570 F.2d 309, 316 (10th Cir.1978)).
At the post-remand hearing, the Debtor, who was then represented by counsel, argued that the 1994 deposition testimony placed Florence’s trial testimony and his credibility in dispute and so asked that Florence be recalled to testify. The successor judge concluded that the 1994 deposition had not been admitted into evidence, nor had the Debtor used any part of the 1994 deposition to impeach Florence’s credibility.9 On these grounds, the successor judge denied the Debtor’s motion to recall Florence. The successor judge’s conclusions are supported by the record.
There is nothing in the record that indicates that the Debtor sought to have the 1994 deposition admitted as substantive evidence at trial. The Plaintiffs attorney used the 1994 deposition transcript during [512]*512his direct examination of the Debtor at trial, and limited portions of the 1994 deposition were used solely to impeach her, but it was never admitted as an exhibit or read into the record as substantive evidence. Adversary Trial Transcript at 23-24, in Appellant’s App. at 626-27. Furthermore, at trial, the Debtor never denied that the deposition had occurred in the divorce proceedings, and she never used any part of the 1994 deposition to impeach Florence.10
Next, the Debtor argues that Florence should have been recalled because Florence’s credibility was at issue. According to the Debtor, the trial judge did not find Florence credible. Although the Debtor admits that there is nothing in the record indicating what the trial judge thought about Florence’s testimony, she infers that the trial judge did not find Florence credible from the fact that the trial judge made no specific findings about the testimony or the 1994 deposition and that the trial judge did not find that she had committed fraud. The successor judge disagreed, finding nothing in the record to indicate that the trial judge had not found Florence credible.
If the credibility of a witness is not at issue, a successor judge may decide a case based on a transcript. Henry A. Knott Co. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 772 F.2d 78, 85-86 (4th Cir.1985); accord Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 819 F.2d 1199, 1204 n. 6 (1st Cir.1987) (recognizing that prejudice may exist if the successor judge is required to determine credibility of witnesses whom he or she did not observe at the original trial, but concluding that successor judge may determine issues on the record that depend “not on witness credibility, but on the legal sufficiency of largely uncontradicted ... evidence.... ”). First, we note that the record reflects no findings as to whether the trial judge found Florence credible; in fact, the trial judge made no findings about Florence’s testimony.11 Second, the Debtor never impeached Florence or controverted his testimony.12 We conclude that the successor judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to rehear the testimony of Florence after remand.
Finally, the Debtor argues that her briefs and her closing argument at trial were substantive evidence that con[513]*513troverted Florence’s testimony. While the Debtor appears to acknowledge that neither briefs nor closing argument is normally valid evidence, she apparently urges this Court to construe it as evidence because, although she is a licensed attorney, prior to trying the dischargeability action pro se, she never had practiced law as a litigator. This we cannot do. Counsel’s statements in a brief or during a trial are not evidence. See Exeter Bancorporation, Inc. v. Kemper Sec. Group, Inc., 58 F.3d 1306, 1312 n. 5 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Fetlow, 21 F.3d 243, 248 (8th Cir.1994), for the proposition that “ ‘[Statements of counsel are not evidence’ and do not create issues of fact.”); see also In re Nielsen, 211 B.R. 19, 22 n. 3 (8th Cir. BAP 1997) (stating that statements of counsel are not evidence unless “expressly stipulated as admissible evidence”). While courts will give some leeway to a pro se litigant, they cannot take unsubstantiated statements as factual evidence. In the absence of any evidence that Florence’s testimony was controverted, or that his credibility was at issue, the successor judge did not abuse his discretion by declining to recall Florence.
Moreover, the Debtor was represented by counsel when the bankruptcy court proceeded after remand. The Debtor’s attorney stated plainly that “the court might — I say it can, I think, consider all of the testimony about that deposition [in the divorce case] including [the Debtor’s] statements and come to its own conclusion now or as we have also urged in our papers consider rehearing the issue.” Hearing Transcript at 12, in Appellant’s App. at 1408. Thus, in presenting the court with an alternative means of proceeding, the Debtor’s attorney conceded that the bankruptcy court could render a decision without rehearing the testimony and waived any objection to the procedure employed by the bankruptcy court. See Higginbotham v. Corner Stone Bank (In re Higginbotham), 917 F.2d 1130, 1132-33 (8th Cir.1990) (concluding that litigant waived right to new trial under Rule 63 because he failed to object to the procedure that the successor judge employed; a litigant “ ‘has no right to sit back and await a decision of the case before objecting to the procedure.’ ”) (quoting Townsend v. Gray Line Bus Co., 767 F.2d 11, 18 (1st Cir.1985)); Milbrew, Inc. v. Commissioner, 710 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1983) (concluding that litigant waived right to object to successor judge deciding case on the existing record by agreeing to reassignment).
The Debtor’s next set of arguments focus on whether the successor judge erred when he found that she was liable under the Utah state law for fraudulent misrepresentation, and that the resulting debt was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). The state law of fraud controls with respect to whether fraud has occurred, while bankruptcy law controls with respect to the determination of nondischargeability. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 283-84, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991). Here, the alleged fraud occurred in Utah. Under Utah law, fraudulent misrepresentation is established when a party demonstrates that the other party made “a false representation concerning a presently existing material fact which the representor either knew to be false or made recklessly without sufficient knowledge, or the omission of a material fact when there is a duty to disclose, for the purpose of inducing action on the part of the other party, with actual, justifiable reliance resulting in damage to that party.” Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1980).
In Masters, the Utah appellate court found -that a husband had a cause of [514]*514action for fraudulent misrepresentation against his wife on the grounds that he was not the biological father of three of their five children. Masters, 777 P.2d. at 502. Specifically, the court found that a state district court had erred when it granted summary judgment to the wife because there was a fact issue as to whether the wife had lied in divorce proceedings when she denied that she had a relationship with another man during the marriage. Id. As observed by the Tenth Circuit, under the Utah state law of fraudulent misrepresentation, there is no intent to harm requirement. Lang, 1997 WL 26585, at *2 (citing Masters, 777 P.2d at 501-02).
Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor will not be discharged from any debt “for money, property, services ... to the extent obtained by — (A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud....” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Under this subsection a claim will be nondischargeable if the following elements are proven: “[1] the debtor made a false representation; [2] the debtor made the representation with the intent to deceive the creditor; [3] the creditor relied on the representation.... ” Fowler Bros. v. Young (In re Young), 91 F.3d 1367, 1373 (10th Cir.1996). The creditor’s reliance must have been justifiable, Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 74-75, 116 S.Ct. 437, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995), and the creditor must have sustained a loss as a result. Young, 91 F.3d at 1373. “False pretenses” or “representations” are representations knowingly and fraudulently made that give rise to the debt.13 Driggs v. Black (In re Black), 787 F.2d 503, 506 (10th Cir.1986), abrogated in part on other grounds, Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 283, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991); see also Missouri v. Audley (In re Audley), 275 B.R. 383, 388 (10th Cir. BAP 2002) (finding debtor must knowingly make a false representation). The creditor bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that all elements are present. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287, 111 S.Ct. 654.
The successor judge found that the Debtor had violated state law, resulting in damages to the Plaintiff that were nondis-chargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). The trial judge reasoned as follows: 1) the Debtor had a duty to her ex-husband to reveal her suspicions about paternity; 2) the Debtor lied during the divorce proceedings when she denied having extramarital affairs; 3) the Plaintiff had justifiably relied on all of these representations and so had not questioned paternity. With respect to damages, the successor judge determined that the Plaintiff had “sustained a loss in an amount equal to the costs of prenatal care, labor, delivery, visitation expenses and pre and post divorce support and other expenses for the children.” Ruling Transcript at 11-12, in Appellant’s App. at 1458-59.
The Debtor argues that the successor judge erred on the four following points: 1) whether there is a general duty to disclose infidelities under Utah state law based on the marital relationship; 2) whether the Plaintiff has a duty to support “his children”; 3) whether the law'supported awarding a reimbursement of child support by the mother to the legal father; 4) whether it was within the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to award punitive damages. We will address each argument in turn.
[515]*515The first issue raised by the Debtor is whether the trial judge erred by imposing upon the Debtor a duty to disclose her infidelities to the Plaintiff during the divorce proceeding. The Debtor argues that the important policy implications regarding the legitimacy of children and the disruption of paternity preclude a duty to disclose doubts about parentage.14 Therefore, the successor judge erred when he determined that the resulting debt was nondischargeable.
The successor judge made two findings with respect to the issue of whether the Plaintiff had established that the Debtor made a fraudulent misrepresentation under Utah state law. First, the successor judge determined that, in accordance with the marital relationship and the statutory presumption of paternity in Utah, the Debtor “had a duty to disclose her suspicions [concerning paternity].” Ruling Transcript at 10, in Appellant’s App. at 1457. Second, the trial judge found that “during the course of the divorce proceedings [the Debtor] affirmatively denied having an extramarital affair.” Id. at 14, in Appellant’s App. at 1461. The successor judge concluded that the Debtor’s “false misrepresentations of fidelity” in her deposition in the divorce case, separate and apart from her “omissions concerning paternity in light of her duty to disclose” supported the Plaintiff’s claim for nondis-chargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A). Id. at 10, in Appellant’s App. at 1457. The successor judge further concluded that the Plaintiff had justifiably relied on this misrepresentation and had incurred money damages.
Here, the pertinent finding with respect to whether the debt was nondischargeable was the successor'judge’s second finding, that the Debtor intentionally misrepresented her fidelity during the divorce proceedings. That finding is enough to support the successor judge’s conclusion that the Debtor knowingly made a fraudulent misrepresentation with the intent to deceive as required under § 523(a)(2)(A).15
Next, the Debtor argues that the successor judge erred in awarding compensatory and punitive damages because once the Plaintiff acknowledged the children as his own, he had a duty to support them. Utah law does not corroborate this argument. In fact, Utah case law is clear, once the issue of non-paternity is established, a non-biological father has no duty to support any children that are not biologically related to him. Masters, 777 P.2d at 501 (finding “[c]hildren born during the parties’ marriage are presumed legitimate, but that presumption, if rebutted, means [516]*516that the non-biological father has no financial responsibility toward the child.”).
Similarly, Debtor’s argument that the Plaintiff adopted the children by acknowledgment fails. In this argument the Debtor appears to be making an equitable estoppel argument that because the Plaintiff has called the children his, he is es-topped from now denying parentage and terminating child support.16 However, this argument has been specifically rejected by the Utah courts. See Masters, 777 P.2d at 502-503 (finding that a biological mother alleging equitable estoppel cannot establish the necessary elements of representation, reliance, and detriment, so as to prevent the non-biological parent from denying liability for support when the non-biological parent had no knowledge that he was not the biological father).
The Debtor’s next argument is that the successor judge erred in awarding damages; she contends that neither the compensatory damages nor the punitive damages were supported by law. As a preliminary matter, we must discuss an issue of current controversy in our circuit, that is whether a bankruptcy judge has the jurisdiction to award money damages in a § 523(a) proceeding.17 We note that all circuit courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that bankruptcy courts do have jurisdiction to enter money judg[517]*517ments.18 In accordance with these other circuits, we conclude that under the broad congressional grant of jurisdiction given to bankruptcy courts under 28 U.S.C. § 157, bankruptcy courts have the jurisdiction to award money damages in a § 528(a) proceeding.19
With respect to the damages, the Debtor contends that the trial judge improperly awarded compensatory damages to the Plaintiff in an amount that approximated the pre-divorce and post-divorce child support he had paid. As grounds for this argument, the Debtor cites public policy and contends that the Plaintiff should have to pay because he had “all the privileges and enjoyment of having custody of the children, of being their legal father....”20 Appellant’s Brief at 34.
The Plaintiff counters that the proper remedy for fraud is restitution of the benefit received and that therefore, the damage award was correct. He cites St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah 1982), for the proposition that restitution of an award granted in a divorce proceeding that was procured by fraud was found appropriate. In St. Pierre, the Utah Supreme Court found that an equitable remedy may be proper in a divorce [518]*518case when a property settlement is obtained by duress or fraud. Id. at 618-19. Here, unjust enrichment is the equitable remedy the Plaintiff requested, and it is a mixed question of law and fact.21 Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto Inc., 12 P.3d 580, 582 (Utah 2000). Unjust enrichment is established when three elements are present: 1) a benefit conferred on one person by another; 2) the recipient must appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit; 3) the retention of the benefit by the recipient must be under such circumstances as to make it inequitable to retain it without payment of its value. Id. at 582-83.
The successor judge found that the Debtor had been benefitted to the extent that the Plaintiff supported the children .and that the support was a result of the Debtor’s misrepresentation. The successor judge stated plainly that it was “not retroactively modifying a [state court child] support order, rather, damages are awarded based on [§] 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy [Code and] based on tortious conduct.” Transcript of Findings at 13, in Appellant’s App. at 1460. The successor judge awarded Plaintiff $156,231 in compensatory damages, which represented $80,797 in child support payments, $91,064 for additional out-of-pocket expenses incurred up to 1991, and $5,000 in trip expenses plus interest. Of this amount, $20,630 was offset for the period of time during the marriage that the daughter was in the Debtor’s sole custody. Id. at 15-16, in Appellant’s App. at 1462-63. While child support payments the Debtor made following the divorce may be compensable under Utah law, we can find no support for an award of damages prior to the misrepresentation that gave rise to the cause of action, which in this case was the Debtor’s intentional misrepresentation of her fidelity during the divorce proceedings. Additionally, we can find nothing in the record to support the award of $91,064, as it appears to be for undocumented expenses22 both prior to and following the divorce and is entirely separate from any child support paid by the Plaintiff.23 We [519]*519conclude that the case must be remanded on this issue for a determination of an appropriate award of damages based on child support actually paid following the misrepresentation made by the Debtor.
Debtor’s final argument is that the successor judge erred when he awarded punitive damages of $10,000, as it exceeded the scope of the remand. We agree.
In Utah, “punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.” Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(a) (1992). Punitive damages are awarded only in limited circumstances. Orr v. Brigham Young University, 960 F.Supp. 1522, 1531 (D.Utah 1994), aff'd without published opinion, 108 F.3d 1388, 1997 WL 143600 (10th Cir.1997). Ordinary negligence will not support an award of punitive damages. Boyette v. L.W. Looney & Son, 932 F.Supp. 1344, 1349 (D.Utah 1996). Punitive damages may therefore be awarded under Utah law when the tortfeasor has the specific intent to harm or a reckless indifference toward the harm that might occur. An award of punitive damages under state law is part of the nondischargeable debt delineated in § 523(a)(2)(A). Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 216-19, 118 S.Ct. 1212, 140 L.Ed.2d 341 (1998).
The successor judge found by clear and convincing evidence that the Debtor intended the wrong. The successor judge found the intent of the Debtor was as follows:
to conceal from [the Plaintiff] the extramarital affair and the resulting facts which gave rise to her strong suspicion that the children were a product of that affair.... [D]uring the course of the divorce proceedings she affirmatively denied having an extramarital affair. Therefore, the court finds that such actions manifest a requisite intent set forth in 78-18-l(a) of the Utah Code....
Ruling Transcript at 14-15, in Appellant’s App. at 1461-62. The successor judge awarded $10,000 in punitive damages. In contrast, the trial judge made the following finding:
As to the fraud, I find that [the Debt- or] deceived [the Plaintiff] by failing to tell him of her affair with Dr. Pickens and that Dr. Pickens was the biological father of both children.
I find, however, that the specific purpose of [the Debtor’s] deception was not to harm [the Plaintiff]. The purpose was to continue to satisfy her own foolish emotional desires.
Ruling Transcript at 6-7, in Appellant’s App. at 1184-85. The trial judge concluded that as there was no specific intent to harm, there had been no willful or malicious injury and therefore no cause of action under § 523(a)(6) and no basis for punitive damages. Id. at 7-8, in Appellant’s App. at 1186-87. Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the finding by the trial judge that the Debtor had no intent to harm the plaintiff and found further that because specific intent to harm is a necessary element of the intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Plaintiff had no cause of action under § 523(a)(6).24 [520]*520Lang, 1997 WL 26585, at *1. Because the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial judge on the issue of specific intent to harm, we conclude that the successor judge exceeded the scope of his remand when he awarded punitive damages. Although The Plaintiff argues, correctly, that a reckless indifference and disregard for the rights of others may also support a claim for punitive damages, that does not appear to be the basis on which the successor judge awarded them. More important, the trial judge had found that there was no basis for punitive damages, and the directions from the Tenth Circuit on remand did not include an instruction to reexamine that issue.
Y. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the bankruptcy court’s determination that the Debtor was liable for fraudulent misrepresentation under Utah state law and that the subsequent debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) is AFFIRMED. However, we REVERSE and REMAND for the entry of a judgment for findings consistent with this order on the issue of compensatory damages, and we REVERSE on the issue of punitive damages.