Landon v. S & H Marketing Group, Inc.

82 S.W.3d 666, 2002 WL 1292023
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedSeptember 12, 2002
Docket11-00-00249-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by41 cases

This text of 82 S.W.3d 666 (Landon v. S & H Marketing Group, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Landon v. S & H Marketing Group, Inc., 82 S.W.3d 666, 2002 WL 1292023 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

Opinion

W.G. ARNOT, III, Chief Justice.

This appeal involves disputes dating back several years between some affiliated corporations and their former president. Carl D. Landon is the former president of S & H Marketing Group, Inc. (S & H), and Direct Merchandising, Inc. (DMI). S & H and DMI were direct mail marketing businesses affiliated by common ownership operating out of the same facility located in Dallas. S & H and DMI were acquired in 1984 by Hamilton Farrar Richardson, a New York investor. Richardson formed NCF, Inc. (NCF) as a holding company to purchase S & H and DMI. As a result of the purchase, NCF owned all of the stock of S & H and DMI. Richardson owned the majority of the stock of NCF.

Landon was an employee of S & H and DMI at the time of the 1984 purchase. He served as the president of S & H and DMI from 1987 to 1996. He also served on the board of directors of S & H and DMI during this period. 1 From 1987 until January 1995, Richardson and Landon were the only directors of S & H and DMI. Landon controlled the companies’ day-today operations during this period. Richardson described his role as that of a passive investor. The record reflects that Richardson rarely traveled to Dallas to oversee the companies and that he had placed control of the companies in Landon’s hands.

Harvey J. Lippman and Michael Joseph Sullivan, two associates working in Richardson’s New York office, became involved with the companies in 1994 at Richardson’s request. Richardson sought their involvement because of his concern over the companies’ declining revenue. Lippman and Sullivan initially served as consultants to Richardson with respect to the companies’ operations. They became directors of the companies in January of 1995. As of January 1996, Lippman had become active in *672 participating in the day-to-day operations of the companies. Lippman, Sullivan, and Richardson eventually grew dissatisfied with Landon’s performance as president of the companies. They ultimately decided to terminate Landon in April 1996. Lippman subsequently obtained ownership of S & H and DMI after he foreclosed upon the stock of the companies. The companies’ stock had been pledged as security to him for a loan that he made to NCF in 1992.

Landon initiated this litigation in July 1996 by filing suit against Lippman, S & H, and DMI to collect on a $100,000.00 loan that he had purportedly made to the companies in 1995. Landon also sought damages for personal property that he asserted had been converted by Lippman and the companies. Landon additionally sought reimbursement for expenses which he alleged had been incurred on behalf of the companies. S & H and DMI filed a counterclaim against Landon in September 1996 which sought to set aside several transactions between Landon and the companies dating back to 1986 on the basis that Landon had breached his fiduciary duty as an officer and director of the companies. 2 Most of the challenged transactions concerned situations wherein Landon was personally involved on both sides of a particular transaction in both his individual capacity and in his capacity as an officer and director of the companies. For example, S & H and DMI challenged bonuses of several thousand dollars paid by Landon as the president of the companies to himself. S & H and DMI also asserted that Landon had inappropriately usurped corporate opportunities for his own personal benefit.

The parties tried the matter to the trial court over several non-consecutive days. Neither side was entirely successful in prosecuting their claims for affirmative relief. Both sides have appealed the trial court’s judgment. We modify the trial court’s judgment in part, affirm in part, reverse and render in part, and reverse and remand in part.

The Duty Owed by a Corporate Officer/Director

We begin our analysis by discussing the duty owed by a corporate officer/director to the corporation. The Texas Supreme Court in International Bankers Life Insurance Company v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex.1963), noted that corporate officers and directors owe a strict fiduciary obligation to their corporation. Three broad duties stem from the fiduciary status of corporate officers and directors: namely the duties of obedience, loyalty, and due care. Gearhart Industries, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 719 (5th Cir.1984)(addressing Texas law); see General Dynamics v. Torres, 915 S.W.2d 45, 49 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, writ den’d). This ease concerns the duty of loyalty which Landon owed to the corporations. The duty of loyalty dictates that a corporate officer or director must act in good faith and must not allow his or her personal interest to prevail over the interest of the corporation. The duty of loyalty requires an extreme measure of candor, unselfishness, and good faith on the part of the officer or director. International Bankers Life Insurance Company v. Holloway, supra at 577. Under common law, contracts between a corporation and its officers or directors are voidable for unfairness and fraud. International Bankers Life Insurance Company v. Holloway, supra at 576. A corporate fiduciary *673 is under an obligation not to usurp corporate opportunities for personal gain. Transactions in which a corporate fiduciary derives personal profit are subject to the closest examination. International Bankers Life Insurance Company v. Holloway, supra at 577.

Whether an officer or director is “interested” with respect to a particular transaction is a question of fact. International Bankers Life Insurance Company v. Holloway, supra at 577; Gearhart Industries, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc., supra at 719. An officer or director is considered “interested” if he: (1) makes a personal profit from a transaction by dealing with the corporation or usurps a corporate opportunity; (2) buys or sells assets of a corporation; (3) transacts business in his officer’s or director’s capacity with a second corporation of which he is also an officer or director or is significantly financially associated; or (4) transacts business in his officer’s or director’s capacity with a family member. Gearhart Industries, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc., supra at 719-20. The burden of proof is on the interested officer or director to show that the action under consideration is fair to the corporation. International Bankers Life Insurance Company v. Holloway, supra at 576; Gearhart Industries, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc., supra at 720.

“Interested Director” Legislation

It should be noted that the Texas Legislature has enacted legislation with respect to interested director transactions. TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Felipe N. Gomez v. Alan Braid
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2023
Wesley Roemer v. Edd Haskins
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2018
Engenium Solutions, Inc. v. Symphonic Technologies, Inc.
924 F. Supp. 2d 757 (S.D. Texas, 2013)
Wooley v. Lucksinger
61 So. 3d 507 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2011)
Algerian D. Harris v. State
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2009
Gary Wayne Lawrence v. State
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2009
Floyd v. Hefner
556 F. Supp. 2d 617 (S.D. Texas, 2008)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
82 S.W.3d 666, 2002 WL 1292023, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/landon-v-s-h-marketing-group-inc-texapp-2002.