Lander v. People

104 Ill. 248, 1882 Ill. LEXIS 292
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 28, 1882
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 104 Ill. 248 (Lander v. People) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lander v. People, 104 Ill. 248, 1882 Ill. LEXIS 292 (Ill. 1882).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Mulkey

delivered the opinion of the Court:

At the December term, 1881, of the Macon county circuit court, George Lander, plaintiff in error, was tried and convicted of the crime of rape upon the person of Mary Sturgis, and was duly sentenced to the penitentiary for a period of twenty-five years, in pursuance of the verdict of the jury,' and the accused brings the case here for review,- and asks a reversal on several grounds, but chiefly because the evidence does not, as is alleged, sustain the conviction.

It is first objected the court erred in the giving, refusing and modification of instructions. It is seldom instructions prepared in the hurry and excitement of a trial are drawn with perfect accuracy, and it is conceded they were not in the present ease. We are of opinion, however, none of the .errors complained of are of such a character as to have possibly prejudiced the rights of the accused. To reverse for every trivial error, without regard to whether it exerted an improper influence over the jury or not, would render our Criminal Code practically inoperative. The office of instructions is to inform the jury what the law is relating to the case in hand, and to assist them in applying it to the evidence before them, and it is the duty of courts of review, in criminal cases, to see that no substantial error is committed, in attempting to accomplish these objects, which may possibly prejudice the rights of the accused, and this is all the law requires. Without going into details, we may say, in general terms, that we have carefully examined the instructions, and the several objections urged against them, and the action of the court with respect to them, and are unable to perceive anything which, in our judgment, requires a reversal of the ease. Taking the instructions as a whole, we think they fairly present the law applicable to the case, and that there is no just cause to complain on the grounds suggested.

The real and vital question in the case is, as is conceded by counsel for plaintiff in error, does the evidence sustain the conviction. That a rape was committed by some one upon Mary Sturgis, as charged in the indictment, is proved by the positive testimony of Minnie Blentz, Hattie Moore, Charlie Gouker, Warren Marthland, and Mary Sturgis herself, all of whom were, as they testify, eye witnesses to the fact. Indeed, there is no contention on this question.' It is conceded the corpus delicti is fully established, the only controversy being as to whether the perpetrator of the offence and the accused are the same person, and to this question of identity most of the evidence is directed. The offence was committed at a place called the “Levee, ” near the Wabash railroad track, in the city of Decatur, about five o’clock of the afternoon of the 3d of June, 1881. As the evidence offered on behalf of the accused is embraced in a small compass, we will, for the sake of convenience, consider it first.

Joseph Siegler, who resides about nine miles south-west of Decatur, testifies that the accused, who had previously been working for him, left his house early on the morning of the day the offence was committed; that he left because he did not need a hand by the month; that he had been harvesting for him two days; that the defendant wore about the same chin-whiskers then that he did at the time of the trial; that the defendant’s hat and clothes were the same that were worn by him at witness’ house. Mrs. Robert Cullen testified : “I was at Mrs. Sturgis’ house when the prisoner was brought here by Dave Sturgis, and heard Mrs. Sturgis say then, that if this (pointing to the prisoner) was the same man, he had cut off and colored his whiskers, and changed his overalls, since yesterday. She said the man who outraged her wore striped overalls. I had the prisoner brought back into the house, and we searched for striped overalls, but did not find any.” On cross-examination she further says: “I can not prove the exact words used by. Mrs. Sturgis, and don’t remember just all she said about the whiskers and striped overalls. The conversation I refer to was not when Dave Sturgis brought the prisoner to the house, but was on the evening of the rape, when Kate Mitchell and myself were present. ” • Mrs. Mitchell testifies that Mrs. Sturgis stated, on the evening of the rape, that the man who ravished her wore striped overalls, and had light, sandy whiskers, with some gray hairs in them. Sandy Rogan and Isaac Rogan, who are barbers, swear that the accused was at their shop about eleven o’clock A. M. of the day the offence was committed, and that his whiskers were then about as short and dark as they were on the following day, when he was under arrest. The accused was also examined in his own behalf. He denies all connection with the offence, and gives rather a lengthy account of himself and of his whereabouts, both before and after the perpetration of the crime, and of the particulars of the arrest, and what occurred while in charge of Sturgis, who" arrested him, which requires no special notice, as it has no material bearing on the vital question of identity. Some evidence was also offered in his behalf with the view of establishing an alibi, but it is so manifestly insufficient for that purpose we attach no importance to it. It is clear, from the weight of testimony,’ the accused was in the immediate vicinity of the place where the offence was committed, about the time of its perpetration, and that he was not therefore without an opportunity of committing the crime, provided he had the inclination to do so.

It will be perceived the whole of the testimony on the part of the accused was offered with the view of showing the description which Mrs. Sturgis gave, on the day of the occurrence, of the whiskers and overalls of the party who committed the assault upon her, does not correspond with the whiskers and overalls of the accused as they were shown to be on the trial, both before and after the commission of the offence, and upon this question,—if we include the accused,—the weight of evidence, so far as it depends upon the number of witnesses, is clearly with the plaintiff in error. Yet we do not attach the same importance to this fact, even if it had been established beyond all question, that counsel for the accused does. It does not necessarily or logically follow the accused is innocent, because the prosecutrix’s description of him or his clothing turned out to be incorrect. In view of her extreme age,—she being then seventy-one years old,—and the suddenness and violence of the assault made upon her, which, as the evidence shows, greatly stunned' her, and almost deprived her of her senses, we can well see how her recollection might be at fault about a matter of this kind. And if the identity of the accused depended upon her testimony alone, although she positively identified him, we should, under the circumstances stated, feel great hesitancy in sustaining the conviction, if, indeed, we could do so at all. But the identity of the accused does not depend upon her testimony alone,—far from it. The account which she gives of the affair is as follows: “My name is Mary Sturgis. I am seventy-one years of age. On the afternoon of June 3, 1881,1 was going out home, and got on the Wabash railroad track at or near a-place in Decatur called the ‘Levee.’ A man passed by me, and brushed against me as he passed. He was going west on the track, and he went on until he got past Blentz’ house, and there sat down upon the track. Just as I came up to where he was, a train came up rapidly, going east.

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Bluebook (online)
104 Ill. 248, 1882 Ill. LEXIS 292, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lander-v-people-ill-1882.