Lancaster v. George

172 A. 686, 315 Pa. 232, 1934 Pa. LEXIS 594
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 30, 1934
DocketAppeal, 86
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 172 A. 686 (Lancaster v. George) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lancaster v. George, 172 A. 686, 315 Pa. 232, 1934 Pa. LEXIS 594 (Pa. 1934).

Opinion

Per Curiam,

The use-plaintiff’s claim against a surety bond was based on the rent due for a ditcher scoop leased to Frank George, who bad a contract to complete sewer improvements in Lancaster. the bond insured the faithful and prompt payment of labor and material: Act of June 23, 1931, P. L. 932, section 1905. the part of the bond in question being, “......for material furnished and labor supplied or performed in the prosecution of the work......in aid of or auxiliary to the prosecution of the said work, whether or not the said material or labor enter into and become component parts of the work or improvement contemplated by the said contract or any modification thereof......” the bond in substance follows the act.

Notwithstanding this comprehensive language, the subject of liability is labor and materials. It was held some years ago the word “material” did not include machinery, tools, or appliances used for the purpose of facilitating the work: Com. v. Nat. Surety Co., 253 Pa. 5, *234 13; Phila. v. Jackson & Co., Inc., 280 Pa. 319. This determination of the interpretation of “material,” though under a different situation, embodied its full meaning as applied to the statute and bond in question.

Rental is not a labor claim. This was decided in Com., to use of Read Corp., v. Stryker, 109 Pa. Superior Ct. 137, where the claim and condition of the bond is almost identical with the one now under consideration, and the wording of the acts similar. With this conclusion we agree.

As a matter of policy, it is necessary to confine the word “labor” in this connection to its primary meaning, and not to permit it to be so broadened as to carry the liability of a surety under these bonds to indefinite and uncontemplated lengths. Phila. v. Stange, 306 Pa. 178, as may be readily noted, does not apply.

Judgment affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)
172 A. 686, 315 Pa. 232, 1934 Pa. LEXIS 594, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lancaster-v-george-pa-1934.