Lamphere v. Brown University

491 F. Supp. 232, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1580
CourtDistrict Court, D. Rhode Island
DecidedApril 22, 1980
DocketCiv. A. 75-0140
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 491 F. Supp. 232 (Lamphere v. Brown University) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lamphere v. Brown University, 491 F. Supp. 232, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1580 (D.R.I. 1980).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PETTINE, Chief Judge.

A complaint against Brown University and certain officers, alleging that they were engaged in employment discrimination based upon sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended, was resolved by a consent decree entered on September 12, 1977. This decree became a final judgment on March 6, 1978.

The consent decree sets up an Affirmative Action Monitoring Committee, par. 2(L) [which is responsible for monitoring all future hiring, contract renewal, promotion, and tenure decisions] and a Hearing Panel, par. 2(MX2)(b) [which is charged with hearing claims of class members who may have been discriminated against in hiring, contract renewal, promotion, tenure, and other terms and conditions of employment].

This is an appeal by the claimant, Professor Susanne Woods, from a decision of the Hearing Panel, alleging she has been the victim of sex discrimination since 1972 when she was hired by the English Department. The specific grievance is that males who were not as qualified by experience and training were paid the same salary as she was receiving. For reasons which follow the appeal is denied.

This being the first case reaching this Court for a de novo hearing on an appeal from the Hearing Panel, it is appropriate that certain guidelines be established for similar cases that may follow the same path.

Although appeals from the Hearing Panel are de novo, requiring the Court to examine the factual allegations of each case, it is not the purpose of these appeals to try the class action which was resolved by the consent decree. Accordingly, these appeals should focus on specific instances of discrimination rather than on evidence of a broad pattern and practice of discrimination at the University. I suspect that these appeals will often turn on the defendant’s articulation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, and the complainant’s rebuttal that this reason is pretextual. Consequently, the presentation of massive statistical evidence encompassing the entire University, more appropriate to establishing a prima facie case in a class action, will usually not be helpful.

The consent decree specifically provides that in proceedings before the Affirmative Action Monitoring Committee, the Department or Division (i. e., the defendant) will have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that its practices were nondiscriminatory. The decree also provides that there may be a de novo consideration of any decision of the Committee by appropriate motion to the Court; and in hearing such motion the Court will apply *234 the same burden of proof as required before the Committee. 1

The decree is silent, however, as to who has the burden of proof on a de novo appeal from a Hearing Panel Decision. It merely states that if dissatisfied with the action of the Hearing Panel, the claimant or the University may petition the Court for a de novo hearing on all the issues. In the absence of specific guidance from the consent decree, I will adopt the standard of proof common to discrimination cases. 2 See Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 604 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1979). In Sweeney, the First Circuit articulated this standard: the plaintiff first establishes a “prima facie case” of discrimination by proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that she is a member of the protected class, that she was qualified for the position, and that she was paid a lesser salary than similarly situated males, or a salary equal to males of lesser qualifications; this then requires the defendant to “articulate” a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action regarding the plaintiff; to prevail the plaintiff must ultimately prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the reason articulated is a pretext for discrimination. As the First Circuit emphasized in Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979), the defendant’s burden is merely “a burden of production — i. e., a burden to articulate or state a valid reason,” id. at 1011; the burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff.

The Prima Facie Case

I find that the complainant has established a “prima facie case.” Quite obviously a member of the protected class, Professor Woods obtained her Ph.D. in English, specializing in the Renaissance, from Columbia University in 1970. She taught part time at Hunter College and California State College, and from 1969 to the date of her appointment at Brown University, was a full time assistant professor at the University of Hawaii. In 1971 she applied to Brown University for an assistant professorship with the English Department. She accepted an appointment as assistant professor at an annual starting salary of $11,-000, even though at the time she was receiving $12,600; she did this because Brown University offered expanded opportunities for research and intellectual growth. She started teaching in the fall of 1972; at this time she met Professors Geoffrey Russom and David Parker, who were appointed when she was, and learned from them that they were also receiving $11,000 a year. Professor Woods thought this was unfair and complained to Professor Spilka, the chairman of the English Department, arguing that they were junior colleagues who had not completed their Ph.D. studies and had no prior teaching experience.

The Articulated Reason

Accepting that a prima facie case has been made, the next step is to determine if the evidence establishes that the defendants have articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for their actions. Professor Spilka testified that each department is autonomous and has its own budget, which is negotiated with the Provost. At the time the claimant was hired, the chairman was given $33,000 to appoint three assistant professors, one each in Medieval studies, American literature, and Renaissance studies. As to why Professors Russum, Parker and Woods were paid the same initial salary, Professor Spilka stated,

These were tight budget years; salary was fixed with the Provost; we were looking for a beginning assistant professor; in a tight market situation many advanced assistant professors were not going to get tenure at the places where they were staying and they were interested in starting over again elsewhere and *235 just taking the loss in salary they had accumulated; that was Woods’ case.

He went on to explain that $11,000 was the “fairly standard salary offering rate” of competing schools and that he could not jeopardize one position for any of the others. He needed three teachers — one in each of three subjects.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Lamphere v. Brown University
613 F. Supp. 971 (D. Rhode Island, 1985)
Rudolf Winkes v. Brown University
747 F.2d 792 (First Circuit, 1984)
Hosemann v. Technical Materials, Inc.
554 F. Supp. 659 (D. Rhode Island, 1982)
Pilkington v. Bevilacqua
522 F. Supp. 906 (D. Rhode Island, 1981)
McAloon v. Bryant College of Business Administration
520 F. Supp. 103 (D. New Hampshire, 1981)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
491 F. Supp. 232, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1580, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lamphere-v-brown-university-rid-1980.