Lamb v. Interstate Commerce Commission

259 F.2d 358, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 5461
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 2, 1958
Docket5838
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 259 F.2d 358 (Lamb v. Interstate Commerce Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lamb v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 259 F.2d 358, 1958 U.S. App. LEXIS 5461 (10th Cir. 1958).

Opinion

259 F.2d 358

William Reid LAMB and Glen C. Poynor, doing business as
Poynor and Lamb Trucking; Utah Wholesale Grocery
Company, a corporation; and Load
Service, Incorporated, a
corporation, Appellants,
v.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Appellee.

No. 5838.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

Sept. 2, 1958.

Harold N. Wilkinson, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellants.

George W. Howard, Denver, Colo. (A. Henry Walter and A. J. Merrill, Washington, D.C., were with him on the brief), for appellee.

Before PHILLIPS, PICKETT and LEWIS, Circuit Judges.

LEWIS, Circuit Judge.

Utah Wholesale Grocery Company1 is a corporation engaged in the business its name describes throughout Utah, Nevada, Washington, Idaho and Montana. Large volume purchases of merchandise are made by the company in California and its principal transportation problem lies in the one-way haul of groceries from California to points of distribution in the other western states. This appeal searches the question of whether or not Utah Wholesale is functioning as a private carrier in accomplishing the interstate haul through contractual relations with the other appellants, William Reid Lamb and Glen C. Poynor, d/b/a Poynor & Lamb Trucking,2 and Load Service, Incorporated.3 The action was initiated by the Interstate Commerce Commission in the District Court for the District of Utah upon allegation that the Trucking Co. was unlawfully engaged as a carrier in interstate commerce. Jurisdiction is admitted under 49 U.S.C.A. 322(b) and Utah Wholesale and Load Service are parties under the authority of 49 U.S.C.A. 42. The trial court, having concluded that the arrangements between appellants constituted an unlawful subterfuge to evade regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission, granted injunctive relief. The entire matter was submitted to the District Court upon a written stipulation of facts. The trial court's conclusions and findings of ultimate fact are therefore based entirely upon consideration of the stipulated operative facts. In recognition of the importance of the question involved and the necessity of a complete consideration of the operative facts we set out in full the material paragraphs of the stipulation as Appendix A.

The parties agreed at pre-trial that the determinative and only question to be submitted to the trial court was:'Who, in truth and in fact, was doing the transportation, Poynor and Lamb, who owned the trucks, or Utah Wholesale Grocery, who wanted its goods shipped?'

The trial court found from the stipulated facts that the purpose of defendants in entering into the agreements was to attempt to avoid application of Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act.4 It held that defendants' acts were an unlawful subterfuge; that the agreed facts of their manner of operation contradicted the written instruments and agreements; that Utah Wholesale was not a private carrier under the Act; that Load Service was not a bona fide agent of Utah Wholesale; that the drivers were not Utah Wholesale employees; that the trucks were never in its possession and control; that the parties had not changed the manner of their operation sufficient to avoid application of the Act; and that Poynor and Lamb were in fact engaged in transporting goods in interstate commerce for compensation in violation of the Act.

Upon appeal, the issue remains the same. Simply stated, it is who was transporting the goods in question. Since the legal classification of appellants as typed carriers under the Interstate Commerce Act is a question of law, Scott v. I.C.C., 10 Cir., 213 F.2d 300, 302, to be determined by the factual answer to that question we must first consider the effect to be given in this court to a finding of ultimate fact made by the trial court which is dependent entirely upon consideration of stipulated and undisputed basic facts. It is immediately apparent that in the instant case this court is in as good a position as the trial judge to evaluate the stipulated facts and we have oft-times stated that in such case it is our duty to do so. See United States v. Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 10 Cir., 101 F.2d 156; British America Assur. Co. of Toronto, Canada v. Bowen, 10 Cir., 134 F.2d 256, and cases cited. But our duty to evaluate the facts does not extend to the right or duty to make an independent evaluation without regard to the findings below. Such would be, in cases such as the instant one, a trial de novo and would effectively destroy a paramount function and responsibility of the trial court. Rather, Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. contemplates that the scope of appellate review is enlarged in such cases to the extent, and only to the extent, that no regard need be given to the opportunity of the trial court to observe the witness. Skinner v. Parnell, 10 Cir., 257 F.2d 345. Although the findings of the trial court and the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom are not entrenched with finality, Rule 52(a) is applicable to our review, United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746, and the findings should not be disturbed unless found to be 'clearly erroneous.' To be so disturbed the reviewing court must be 'left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., supra. We thus must affirm the trial court unless our evaluation of the stipulated facts leaves us with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

In order to effectuate the regulatory purposes of the Interstate Commerce Act the provisions of that Act should be liberally construed. In A. W. Stickle & Co. v. I.C.C., 10 Cir., 128 F.2d 155, 160, certiorari denied317 U.S. 650, 63 S.Ct. 46, 87 L.Ed. 523, this court stated:

'A carrier may not avoid the requirements of Part II, supra, by subterfuge or device, or ny posing as a private carrier when, in substance and reality, he is engaged under individual contracts in transportation by motor vehicle of property in interstate commerce for compensation. Ownership of the commodity transported is not the sole test. The primary test in 203(a)(14) and 203(a) (15)(49 U.S.C.A. 303(a)(14, 15)) is transportation for compensation.' 128 F.2d 160.

The court further stated:

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