NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0010n.06
Nos. 22-2050/2122
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
) LAMARR MONSON, ) FILED Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jan 08, 2024 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk v. ) ) CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN, et al., ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED Defendants, ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF JOAN GHOUGOIAN and CHARLES ) MICHIGAN BRAXTON (23-2050); BARBARA ) SIMON and VINCENT CROCKETT (22- ) OPINION 2050/2122), ) ) Defendants-Appellants. ) )
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; STRANCH and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Lamarr Monson brings this § 1983 case following
his 2017 release from prison after serving 20 years for murder. In 1997, a jury convicted Monson
of murdering 12-year-old Christina Brown, and the court sentenced him to 30 to 50 years in prison.
In 2012, the Michigan Innocence Clinic undertook a review of Monson’s case that continued
through 2017 and uncovered a series of irregularities in the police investigation along with
evidence implicating a different perpetrator. In 2017, a Michigan state circuit court judge granted
Monson’s motion for a new trial, the county prosecutor decided not to retry Monson, and the circuit
court entered an order dismissing the case. Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
On February 23, 2018, Monson filed this § 1983 case against the City of Detroit, the Detroit
Police Department, and individual named officers, alleging violations of his constitutional right in
their actions leading to his conviction for murder. The district court narrowed the parties and
issues leaving as defendants Officers Vincent Crockett, Charles Braxton, Barbara Simon, and Joan
Ghougoian. The parties ultimately filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court
largely granted Monson’s motion, and largely denied the Officers’ motion, precluding a grant of
qualified immunity. The Officers filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s
denials of qualified immunity. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM IN PART AND
REVERSE IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background1
This appeal centers on a 1996 murder. In late 1995, Lamarr Monson began regularly
selling drugs out of an abandoned apartment (Apartment 7A) on West Boston Street. Monson
resided with his parents, not at Apartment 7A. He sometimes went by the name “Marc Mason.”
In June of 1996, 14-year-old Cynthia Stewart, sometimes known as Paris Thompson, introduced
Monson to Christina Brown, a runaway 12-year-old girl who, at five-feet, ten-inches tall,
reportedly appeared grown. Brown, who ran away from home in early January 1996, began
spending time with Monson at the apartment, and she became involved in his drug sales.
On January 19, 1996, the day before she was murdered, Brown was at Apartment 7A when
Monson left to spend the night at the home of his daughter’s mother, Tawanna Crawford. Monson
returned to the apartment building the next day around 1:30 or 2 p.m. When he arrived, Linda
1 This background includes information as developed by the Detroit police at the time of the 1996 murder. As noted, the Michigan Innocence Clinic began an investigation in 2012 that uncovered other significant evidence. The latter evidence is also included with reference to the later dates of its disclosure.
-2- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
Woods, a resident of the building, and Robert Lewis, who also went by his brother’s name,
Raymond, informed him that the door to 7A was open, but no one answered when they called.
Monson, Lewis, and Woods entered the apartment and found Brown on the bathroom floor with a
swollen head, face, and neck; hands covered in cuts; face covered in dried blood; and blood
covering the surface of the shower, bathroom walls, and a shattered window. Brown waved her
arms at Monson but could not speak.
“Hysterical,” Monson immediately ran to the apartment next door and banged on the door,
seeking help. When the occupant of that apartment opened the door, Monson asked him to call
emergency services (EMS). Because the apartment lacked a telephone, Monson drove to his
sister’s house two blocks away and called EMS, and then returned to Apartment 7A, where he
placed a blanket around Brown. When Brown appeared to stop breathing, Monson began
performing chest compressions.
Around 2:10 p.m., Officers Crockett and Wilson arrived at the apartment building, and
Monson met them at the entrance and directed them to Apartment 7A, where a few other building
tenants, including Woods and Lewis, remained. Robert Lewis identified himself as Raymond
Lewis. Crockett and Wilson instructed everyone at the scene to remain, and Monson complied.
EMS arrived at the scene and transported Brown to the hospital, where she was pronounced dead
on arrival. Her cause of death was listed in the preliminary police complaint and emergency room
records as “stabbing.”
Before 3:00 p.m., officers transported Monson, Lewis, and Woods to the Homicide
Department Headquarters of the Detroit Police Department. Around 3:25 p.m., Barbara Simon,
an officer with the Homicide Department, informed Monson of his constitutional rights, including
his right to an attorney, and gave him a constitutional rights certificate of notice, which Monson
-3- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
signed “Marc Mason.” While Simon read Monson his rights, Monson asked, but was not allowed,
to use the telephone. Simon questioned Monson for over four hours and repeatedly asked about
the nature of Monson’s relationship with Brown. Around 7:45 p.m., Simon drafted a statement
for Monson to sign, which included a statement that Monson once had sex with Brown. It omitted,
however, that Monson had spent the preceding night with Crawford. Only after Monson signed
the statement did he get access to a telephone to call his parents.
Monson told his parents that he needed a lawyer, and was then escorted to a holding cell
on the ninth floor. At approximately 5:30 a.m. the next morning, after sleeping approximately
four hours, officers removed Monson from the holding cell and took him to the office of the Chief
Inspector of the Homicide Department, Joan Ghougoian. At this point, Monson had not had
anything to eat since the day prior and had little sleep. Ghougoian told Monson that police “had a
stack of evidence against [him],” and were “going to charge [Monson] with first degree murder.”
She then said that “she wanted to help [Monson],” and stated that if Monson “were to do another
statement, or sign a[n] information summary . . . she could have [him] home by that time
tomorrow.” Ghougoian raised “the need for a self-defense scenario,” asking Monson, “do you
want to get charged, or do you want to go home[?]” Monson responded that he “want[ed] to go
home,” and agreed to sign Ghougoian’s proposed statement.
Around 8:25 a.m., Charles Braxton, a sergeant with the Department, arrived at
Ghougoian’s office to take a second statement from Monson. While Braxton typed the statement,
he read from another piece of paper. Ghougoian also came “in and out of the room” and spoke
with Braxton while he prepared Monson’s statement. Monson sat “there [a]sleep, half [a]sleep,
laying on the desk.” Braxton questioned Monson and typed his responses. This second statement
reflected the “scenarios” Ghougoian discussed with Monson. In this second statement, Monson
-4- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
said he came home early the morning of January 20 after a night of drinking and got into a lovers’
quarrel with Brown, which culminated in Brown charging at Monson with a knife, Monson
grabbing Brown and pushing her head through the window, and Monson inadvertently pushing the
knife in Brown’s hand away from himself and into Brown’s neck. Once Braxton finished the
statement, he handed it to Monson, who signed his name and initialed where Braxton indicated.
The next day, January 22, Monson was arraigned in Michigan state court on a charge of first-
degree murder.
Evidence subsequently uncovered included a 2012 statement given by Shellena Bentley,
who lived in the apartment building. Bentley recounted that on January 19, 1996, she and her
boyfriend, Robert Lewis, decided to use drugs. Lewis made several trips to Apartment 7A to
purchase drugs from Brown. After the last trip, early in the morning “between 4 and 5 AM” on
January 20, Lewis returned to Bentley’s apartment with his arm “scratch[ed]” and “covered in
blood,” and “his clothes were bloody.” When Bentley asked him what happened, Lewis responded
that he “had to kill that b----h” because she scratched [him].” Bentley said that Lewis forced her
to leave their apartment, took her to her mother’s house, and threatened to kill her and her children
if she ever told anyone what happened. She said that she was coming forward in-person in July
2012 because she had learned that Lewis and his brother had moved out of state. In December
2014, an officer from the City’s Homicide Department conducted a telephone interview with
Bentley, during which Bentley again stated that on January 19, 1996, Lewis returned from
attempting to procure drugs at Apartment 7A with “blood” on his body and clothes, and stated “he
th[ought] he killed the girl.” During her 2018 deposition in this case, Bentley stated that she called
the police at least twice within the first year after the murder to attempt to report what she observed
on January 20, 1996.
-5- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
On January 20, the day of Brown’s death, Simon, Crockett, and other unknown officers
questioned other potential witnesses, including Brown’s young friend, Cynthia Stewart. Stewart
signed a statement saying that Monson and Brown were living together and that Brown sold drugs
for Monson. The statement also said that Monson had threatened Brown’s life about a month
before her death after someone stole drugs from Brown while Monson was away from the
apartment, and that Monson regularly carried a knife.
Evidence obtained from the scene included the bloody top of the toilet tank wrapped in a
mattress cover on the bedroom floor, on which investigators found Brown’s fingerprint and other
unidentified—but usable—fingerprints, as well as a palm print. Simon received these results on
January 25, 1996. When asked during her 2019 deposition for this case whether she informed the
prosecutor of “the fingerprint on the probable murder weapon that was not [Monson’s],” Simon
responded, “I don’t recall.”
On February 1, 1996, the medical examiner released his report on Brown’s death,
determining that injuries to Brown’s skull and brain, not stabbing, caused her death. Monson
moved to suppress his second statement, and on May 17, 1996, the state trial court held a hearing
where Monson testified that Ghougoian told him he could go home if he signed the statement, and
Braxton testified that Monson’s statement was voluntary. The court denied the motion.
Trial commenced on March 3, 1997. The prosecution called Stewart as a witness, and she
testified that Monson and Brown lived together and that Brown sold drugs for Monson. When the
prosecution recalled Stewart to the stand, she initially testified that she was not aware of Monson
threatening Brown. The prosecution refreshed Stewart’s recollection with her 1996 statement, at
which point, Stewart said that Brown “did tell [her] that [Monson] had threatened her after the
-6- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
robbery.” The jury found Monson guilty of second-degree murder on March 7, and the trial court
sentenced Monson to 30 to 50 years in prison.
Based on the Innocence Clinic’s work, on September 27, 2016, the state court ordered
police to analyze the toilet tank top; the report determined that the two unidentified fingerprints
belonged to Lewis, and none of the prints matched Monson’s. On January 30, 2017, the trial court
judge granted Monson’s motion for a new trial. On August 25, 2017, the county prosecutor
dropped the case against Monson, and the court entered an order dismissing the case. After
spending more than 20 years in jail, Monson was released.
B. Monson’s § 1983 Case
On February 23, 2018, Monson filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City
of Detroit, the Detroit Police Department, and individual named officers alleging violations of his
constitutional rights. Defendants moved to dismiss, and in 2019, the district court granted the
motion as to the City and the Department, but denied it as to the individual defendants: Officers
Charles Braxton, Vincent Crockett, Barbara Simon, Joan Ghougoian, and Jerome Wilson.2
Discovery commenced. Cynthia Stewart was deposed regarding here statement and
testimony in Monson’s case and explained that on the day of Brown’s murder she was drunk, and
two or three male police officers handcuffed her and transported her to the station. Two or three
male officers—Stewart could not recall whether they were the same officers who drove her to the
station—showed her a clear bag containing Brown’s bloodied clothes, threatened her with “jail
maybe or [that she would] end up like that, like [her] friend”; and told her that Brown and Monson
had been selling drugs together—which Stewart denied having known at the time because she and
Brown “had not seen each other for so long.” She described the experience as “really, really
2 The court subsequently granted Wilson’s motion for summary judgment, removing him from this case.
-7- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
scary,” and “very terrifying,” and said that the officers “intimidated” her. Stewart testified that
during the state court trial, police told her what to say on the stand, and Stewart complied because
she understood that “if I did not want to go to jail or end up like [Brown], I needed to say that I
s[aw] things that I didn’t.” Additionally, Stewart stated that she did not recall Brown ever telling
her that Monson threatened to kill Brown. She also described Monson and Brown’s relationship
as a friendship, not romantic or sexual. Stewart denied that the handwriting and signature on the
1996 statement were hers.
The parties filed cross-motions for partial and complete summary judgment. At argument,
the court held that triable issues of genuine fact precluded granting qualified immunity on claims
against Officers Crockett, Simon, Ghougoian, and Braxton. The court also memorialized its
determinations in a written order. Monson responded to the court’s invitation to provide record
citations to support his fabrication of evidence claims related to Stewart’s statement. The court
found that:
[T]he following claims survive [summary judgment]: (1) a federal malicious- prosecution claim and a fabrication-of-evidence claim against Crockett; (2) a federal malicious-prosecution claim, a claim for violations of Brady v. Maryland, and a fabrication-of-evidence claim against Simon; (3) a federal malicious- prosecution claim, a coerced-confession claim, and a fabrication-of-evidence claim against Ghougoian; and (4) a federal malicious-prosecution claim and a fabrication- of-evidence claim against Braxton.
R. 397 at PageID 22387. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified
immunity.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
This court has jurisdiction over appeals from “final decisions of the district courts[.]”
28 U.S.C. § 1291. “Interlocutory appeals of the denial of qualified immunity at the summary
-8- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
judgment stage are considered ‘final decision[s]’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”
Raimey v. City of Niles, 77 F.4th 441, 447 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 530 (1985)). “Our jurisdiction, however, is limited to legal questions because ‘circuit courts
can review a denial of qualified immunity only to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.’” Id.
(quoting Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 436, 444 (6th Cir. 2016)).
We review a district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo. See Peterson v. Heymes,
931 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 2019). As to the facts, “‘we follow the same path as did the district
court’ by ‘drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor—and, ideally . . . look[ing] no
further than the district court’s opinion for the pertinent facts and inference.’” Raimey, 77 F.4th
at 445 (quoting Bunkley v. City of Detroit, 902 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir. 2018)). “Where the parties
ask us to resolve factual disputes, we set those issues aside for resolution by the trial court.”
Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 371 (6th Cir. 2009). We lack jurisdiction over “the
district court’s determination of ‘evidence sufficiency,’ i.e., which facts a party may, or may not,
be able to prove at trial,” as the fact-bound nature of that inquiry means it is “not an appealable
‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Thompson v. City of Lebanon, 831 F.3d
366, 370 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995)). “[W]e do not
ourselves make any findings of fact or inferences for purposes of any subsequent proceedings.”
Bunkley v, 902 F.3d at 561 (collecting authorities).
B. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity protects governmental officials from suit as long ‘as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’” Raimey, 77 F.4th at 448 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)). To overcome qualified immunity at summary judgment, a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 case
-9- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
against state officials must demonstrate that “(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and
(2) that right was clearly established.” Thompson, 831 F.3d at 369. “[T]he only issues appropriate
for review are those that are ‘strictly legal.’” Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598,
602 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dep’t, 389 F.3d 167, 172 (6th Cir.
2004)). “Nonetheless, we may decide a challenge ‘with any legal aspect to it,’ even if the appellant
makes improper fact-based arguments.” Raimey, 77 F.4th at 448. Summary judgment is proper
only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[W]e view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in [his] favor.” Hicks v.
Scott, 958 F.3d 421, 430 (6th Cir. 2020).
A two-step analysis applies. First, we determine “whether the facts, ‘when taken in the
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutional right.’” Raimey, 77 F.4th at 448 (quoting Mullins v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d 760, 765
(6th Cir. 2015)). We then ask “whether the right was ‘clearly established’ such ‘that a reasonable
officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001)). We may “exercise [our] sound discretion in deciding which of the
two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Defendants appeal the denial of qualified immunity on the following claims: (1) federal
malicious prosecution against Officers Crockett, Simon, Ghougoian, and Braxton; (2) fabrication
of evidence against the same four officers; (3) a Brady claim against Simon; and (4) a coerced
confession claim against Ghougoian.
-10- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
1. Probable cause and federal malicious prosecution
Our jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity is limited to
“defendants’ claims to qualified immunity”; in this posture, we cannot exercise supplemental
jurisdiction “over the remainder of the defendants’ claims on appeal.” Bunkley, 902 F.3d at 561.
Defendants argue that the district court erred in determining that, “as a matter of law, there was no
probable cause to arrest [] Monson.” Because probable cause operates as “an absolute defense to
a malicious prosecution claim,” Defendants argue that the court improperly denied qualified
immunity on Monson’s federal malicious prosecution against Officers Crockett, Simon,
Ghougoian, and Braxton. Monson responds that this “ruling was an evidentiary ruling, not the
denial of a qualified immunity motion for summary judgment.”
As a threshold matter, Monson moved for judgment as a matter of law on his claims that
Crockett seized Monson at the murder scene and transported him to police headquarters without
Monson’s consent or probable cause, where he was detained without probable cause at police
headquarters. Defendants asserted a qualified immunity defense, submitting that Monson failed
to demonstrate a lack of probable cause to arrest or continue to detain him. The district court found
that Monson was “detained at the scene” because he “was not free to leave,” and held that
Defendants arrested Monson without probable cause because “[t]hough [D]efendants continue to
argue in the briefing that Monson’s mere presence at the scene [provided] probable cause to arrest
him, [t]he Court has already ruled that it [did] not.” See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)
(holding that an individual’s mere presence at a site where law enforcement possess probable cause
that a crime has occurred does not, on its own, supply probable cause to search or seize that person,
because “a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with
respect to that person”). The district court decided that “the jury will be advised that Monson was
-11- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
arrested without probable cause.” This holding was not a direct ruling on Defendants’ motion for
qualified immunity—it established a certain fact as supported by the evidence, rather than
adjudicating whether Defendants violated clearly established law. The district court clarified that
“a limiting instruction will also be given that this finding is not relevant to any of the remaining
claims and is being shared merely to give the jury the full factual background of Monson’s
prosecution.”
If simply a challenge to the district court’s evidentiary ruling, we would lack jurisdiction
to consider the Defendants’ argument that Monson voluntarily went to the police station. See 28
U.S.C. § 1291. But they argue that this issue bears on the malicious prosecution claim.
Analogizing to false arrest cases, Defendants argue that if Monson voluntarily went to the station
and officers had probable cause to arrest him there for a different crime, then Monson’s malicious
prosecution claim becomes significantly weaker. While the Supreme Court has said that malicious
prosecution is a kind of Fourth Amendment claim, Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 42 (2022),
the question here is whether officers had probable cause to charge Monson, not to arrest him, see
id. at 43 (malicious prosecution claim requires showing “the wrongful initiation of charges without
probable cause”); Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 660 (6th Cir. 2015) (malicious prosecution
concerns probable cause for “the crime charged”) (quoting MacDermid v. Discover Fin. Servs.,
342 F. App’x 138, 146 (6th Cir. 2009)). Neither Monson’s transport to the station nor his
detainment for unrelated crimes bears on that question.
We turn next to the malicious prosecution claims on which Defendants moved for summary
judgment. A malicious prosecution claim requires a plaintiff to demonstrate:
(1) the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute the plaintiff; (2) there was no probable cause for the prosecution; (3) as a consequence of the legal proceedings, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from
-12- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
the initial arrest; and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.
France v. Lucas, 836 F.3d 612, 625 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308–
09 (6th Cir. 2010)). “To demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution” in
satisfaction of the claim’s final element, “a plaintiff need only show that his prosecution ended
without a conviction.” Thompson, 596 U.S. at 39. Plaintiffs must also “provide evidence that each
defendant personally violated their rights.” France, 836 F.3d at 625.
At the summary judgment hearing, the parties agreed that “the only elements at issue are
the probable cause to prosecute Monson and the individual officers’ participation in the decision
to prosecute.” The court determined that “a reasonable jury could conclude that there was no
probable cause to believe that Monson had committed Brown’s murder.” The court then found that
genuine issues of material fact remain regarding Officers Crockett, Simon, Ghougoian, and
Braxton’s influence on the decision to prosecute, foreclosing a grant of qualified immunity.
Defendants argue that even accepting the facts as Monson alleges, they still had probable
cause to charge him with murder. They point to medical evidence that Brown’s head trauma
occurred shortly before her death, and to evidence that Monson was in the apartment with her
shortly before her death. Yet none of the evidence as to the true cause or timing of Brown’s death
was known when the officers charged Monson. Sykes, 625 F.3d at 311 (explaining that a malicious
prosecution claim looks at “whether probable cause existed to initiate the criminal proceeding”)
(emphasis added). The officers’ medical evidence that Brown died from trauma to her head
inflicted shortly before death came to light at Monson’s preliminary examination, well after
Monson was charged. In fact, when police sent the prosecutor their investigation report, they still
identified the cause of death as “multiple stab wounds.” What remains for probable cause are
Monson’s own statements and the statement of Linda Woods. But Monson provided evidence that
-13- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
none of these statements presented a reliable picture. Crediting that evidence, the district court
correctly concluded that a reasonable jury could find the officers lacked probable cause to charge
him with murder.
2. Fabrication of evidence
“It is well established that a person’s constitutional rights are violated when evidence is
knowingly fabricated and a reasonable likelihood exists that the false evidence would have affected
the decision of the jury.” Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 737 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing
Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 872 (6th Cir. 1997)). “An officer violates a person’s
constitutional rights when he knowingly fabricates evidence against them and a reasonable
likelihood exists that the false evidence would have affected the jury’s decision.” France, 836
F.3d at 629. “A plaintiff does not need to show that the government lacked probable cause to
prevail on a fabrication of evidence claim.” Id. (citing Stemler, 126 F.3d at 872).
This standard is not new. Rather, as Stemler recognized, “[u]nder law that was clearly
established in 1994, [an officer] would have violated [a defendant’s] right to due process if he
knowingly fabricated evidence against [the defendant] and if there is a reasonable likelihood that
the false evidence could have affected the judgment of the jury.” 126 F.3d at 872; see id.
(collecting authorities); see also Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 826 (6th Cir. 2019)
(amended opinion) (same). We have also recognized that a law enforcement official was “on
notice in 1975 that it was unlawful for him to fabricate evidence” where such false evidence served
“to procure testimony in conformance with it” at trial. Jackson, 925 F.3d at 826.
Defendants appeal the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Monson’s
fabrication of evidence claims against Officers Simon, Ghougoian, and Braxton, based on the
statements they allegedly drafted and had Monson sign. They also challenge the denial of qualified
-14- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
immunity on Monson’s claim that Officers Simon and Crockett knowingly fabricated Stewart’s
statement. We address each set of claims.
The Defendants contend that the court erred when it allowed Monson to claim Simon
fabricated portions of his first statement. Invoking judicial estoppel and the sham affidavit
doctrine, they point to an earlier hearing where Monson said his first statement was true and
voluntarily given. The officers failed to raise this point below, forfeiting the argument. In any
event, the sham affidavit doctrine applies when a party files an affidavit after a motion for summary
judgment, which does not apply here. Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 460 (6th Cir.
1986). As for estoppel, no prior court ever “accepted or relied upon” Monson’s claim that his first
statement was voluntary. Pennycuff v. Fentress Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 404 F.3d 447, 453 (6th Cir.
2005).
Next, Defendants claim that Monson failed to present specific facts that Braxton knowingly
fabricated the second statement. The district court did not err in concluding the opposite. Monson
alleged that Braxton typed up a statement by reading off another piece of paper and speaking with
Ghougoian—not simply by interrogating Monson. And the statement Braxton produced matched
the self-defense scenario allegedly offered by Ghougoian. From this, a jury could reasonably
conclude that Braxton knowingly fabricated Monson’s second claim.
Defendants also challenge the denial of qualified immunity on Monson’s claims that Simon
and Crockett fabricated Stewart’s statement. In addition to disputing the facts, Defendants urge
that the district court improperly denied qualified immunity on Monson’s claim of fabrication of
evidence claims regarding Stewart’s statement on the basis that Monson failed to demonstrate that
Simon or Crockett violated his rights. And they argue that Stewart’s inability to identify Simon
or Crockett by name or discrete physical features renders Monson unable to prove that either
-15- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
officer violated his rights. They also contend that the prosecutor’s “[i]ndependent decisions,”
including speaking with Stewart “about her statement and testimony on the morning of trial”
constituted “break[s]” in “the chain of causation,” which doom Monson’s fabrication of evidence
claims.
First, Defendants are incorrect that the record fails to provide specific evidence of Crockett
and Simon’s involvement. Crockett admitted he took information from Stewart. And Simon
signed Stewart’s statement. That provides a sufficient evidentiary foundation for a reasonable jury
to infer their involvement with any alleged fabrication.
A plaintiff may raise a fabrication of evidence claim where “the statement coerced [a
witness] to testify in conformance with it.” Jackson, 925 F.3d at 817. When initially recalled to
the stand during the state court trial, Stewart denied knowing that Monson threatened Brown due
to a robbery. The prosecutor then refreshed Stewart’s recollection with the fabricated statement.
After reading the statement, Stewart testified that Brown “did tell [her] that [Monson] had
threatened [Brown] after the robbery,” and that Monson told Brown he would “kill her if she didn’t
get out of his face.” This scenario parallels Jackson. See 925 F.3d at 804–05. As explained by
the district court, here “a reasonable jury could conclude that the fabricated statement—which
recounted Monson explicitly threatening Brown’s life a few weeks before her murder—affected
the decision of the [murder trial] jury.” Accordingly, the court correctly denied qualified immunity
on the fabrication of evidence claim related to Stewart. See id. at 825–26.
Defendants also urge that the prosecutor’s charging decision broke the chain of causation
between the alleged fabrication and Monson’s conviction. But this argument ignores Jackson.
The district court ruled that Defendants’ argument regarding the prosecutor’s role was “not
relevant here” because Monson’s fabrication of evidence claims against Simon and Crockett stem
-16- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
from the false statement’s coercion of Stewart’s testimony at trial, not the prosecutor’s charging
decision. This determination coheres with Jackson. See 925 F.3d at 817. Defendants fail to
identify a legal infirmity with this conclusion, and so we affirm.
3. Coerced confession
“In determining whether a confession is compelled, the constitutional inquiry is whether ‘a
defendant’s will was overborne in a particular case,’ considering ‘the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances.’” Peterson, 931 F.3d at 555 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
226 (1973)). The Supreme Court has explained that “the constitutional inquiry is not whether the
conduct of state officers in obtaining the confession was shocking, but whether the confession was
‘free and voluntary,’” meaning not “extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by
any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.”
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542–43
(1897)). Coercion, moreover, can include “so mild a whip as the refusal, under certain
circumstances, to allow a suspect to call his wife until he confessed.” Id.
In response to the district court’s ruling, Defendants point out that Monson voluntarily
endorsed a notification of his constitutional rights and that he had “not been threatened or promised
anything.” This, they argue, defeats any coercion claim. A waiver can be voluntary, however,
and a subsequent confession can still be coerced. We have held as much in the past. See Williams
v. Withrow, 944 F.2d 284, 289 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding a confession involuntary even after
Miranda warnings), rev’d on other grounds, 507 U.S. 680 (1993). The same is true here. Monson
alleged that Ghougoian induced him to sign the statement based on false promises. Even if he
chose to endorse this constitutional notification, his resulting statement may still qualify as
coerced.
-17- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
Monson’s statements at an earlier hearing do not alter this analysis. Defendants submit
that because of minor differences between Monson’s earlier and later statements about
Ghougoian’s conduct, he should be prevented from arguing that Ghougoian promised him
anything. But here, too, judicial estoppel does not apply—there is no evidence any court relied on
the minor differences between Monson’s testimony, and in any event, Monson lost the earlier
proceeding. Pennycuff, 404 F.3d at 453.
Defendants also argue that Ghougoian’s conduct did not violate clearly established law.
By 1996, courts, including this one, recognized “that a promise of lenient treatment or of
immediate release may be so attractive as to render a confession involuntary.” United States v.
Wrice, 954 F.2d 406, 411 (6th Cir. 1992). The district court pointed to Monson’s contention “that
the second statement [he signed] was coerced because Ghougoian, with Braxton’s help, made an
illusory promise that Monson could go home if he signed the second statement[,] which admitted
to stabbing Brown in self-defense.” Monson testified that he did not voluntarily give the
information in the second statement to Braxton. He signed the statement, rather, because the “only
thing [he was] looking for [was] the release” from detention. Taking “the facts that the district
court assumed,” as we must, see Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319, “early [on January 20], Ghougoian
interrogated Monson and promised him that he could go home if he signed a Second Statement.”
“[Monson] agreed to the deal, and Braxton typed up the self-defense story that Ghougoian had
contrived.” The court held that “the evidence amply supports Monson’s allegations that
Ghougoian made false promises of leniency to Monson which Ghougoian knew would not be
fulfilled.” Defendants’ arguments do not undermine this legal conclusion, and we therefore affirm.
-18- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
4. Brady violation
Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, a state cannot “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), recognized “that the suppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment.” Brady violations can occur where “undisclosed evidence
demonstrates that the prosecution’s case includes perjured testimony[,]” “the prosecution knew,
or should have known, of the perjury,” and the prosecution withheld the material evidence
requested by the defense. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976). The Supreme
Court has long held that Brady obligations extend beyond prosecutors “to preclude other
governmental ‘authorities’ from making a ‘calculated effort to circumvent the disclosure
requirements established by Brady [] and its progeny.’” Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 379 (quoting
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984)) (alteration in Moldowan). “[E]ven though the
state’s obligation under Brady is managed by the prosecutor’s office, that obligation ‘applies to
relevant evidence in the hands of the police, whether the prosecutors knew about it or not, whether
they suppressed it intentionally or not, and whether the accused asked for it or not.’” Id. at 378
(quoting Harris v. Lafler, 553 F.3d 1028, 1033 (6th Cir. 2009)).
A Brady violation consists of “three components”: (1) “[t]he evidence at issue must be
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching;” (2) “that
evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently;” and
(3) “prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). Prejudice
requires demonstrating “that the allegedly suppressed evidence was ‘material.’” Jackson, 925 F.3d
at 815 (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280). “Evidence is material when ‘there is a reasonable
-19- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.’” France, 836 F.3d at 630 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433–34
(1995)). “A ‘reasonable probability’ is ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
Defendants contend that the district court erred in denying Simon qualified immunity on
Monson’s Brady claims. The only material relevant for qualified immunity purposes is the
fingerprints on the toilet tank. Monson has consistently identified Simon’s failure to turn over the
usable, unidentified latent prints on the toilet tank’s top as the source of his Brady violation. And
the district court expressly confined its analysis of the Brady claim to that issue at both the motion
to dismiss, and summary judgment stages. This issue, then, bears on the legal qualified immunity
analysis—and we can exercise jurisdiction over it on interlocutory review. See Bey v. Falk, 946
F.3d 304, 316 (6th Cir. 2019).
“[T]he loss”—which can include both “destruction or concealment”—of “‘materially
exculpatory’ evidence directly threatens the fundamental fairness of a criminal trial, and thus
undoubtedly implicates the Due Process Clause.” Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 385. Under such
circumstances, “[Arizona v.] Youngblood [488 U.S. 51 (1988)] says, ‘the interests of justice’
simply impose a higher burden on state actors, including the police.” Id. (quoting Youngblood,
488 U.S. at 58). What matters here is Simon’s alleged failure to disclose the unidentified print on
the toilet tank top to the prosecution. As stressed by the district court, the key is that “once Simon
learned Brown died as a result of a blunt force trauma to the head, sitting on the unidentified
fingerprints meant she was hiding evidence that, at the very least, contradicted the state’s” theory
of the case. The fingerprint evidence on the toilet tank “undercut the state’s theory of a stabbing
precipitated by a lover’s quarrel” and therefore, a jury could find that “Simon violated Brady
-20- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
because she sat on evidence that could have exculpated Monson.” Simon’s inability to “recall”
whether she informed the prosecutor about the unidentified fingerprints “on the probable murder
weapon” provides grounds for a reasonable jury to conclude that she failed to disclose this fact to
the prosecution, because the potential “‘exculpatory value’ of the evidence” was “apparent.”
Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 388. These prints could—and, in fact, did—belong to another suspect:
Robert Lewis. Moreover, the report indicated that none of the prints matched Monson’s.
“[E]vidence that someone else was in the room was more than neutral,” the district court aptly
observed, “when coupled with phone calls from a tipster”—Bentley—“that another resident
committed the murder.”
The murder trial record complicates matters, however. On the one hand, the prosecutor’s
statement that she “had asked Barbara Simon if there had been any prints because I knew prints
had been taken, and her representation was that there were no usable prints” could support a
reasonable trier-of-fact’s finding that Simon failed to disclose the latent print report to the
prosecution. “Brady obliges a police officer to disclose material exculpatory evidence only to the
prosecutor”; therefore, if Simon never informed the prosecutor of the existence of a usable,
unidentified print on the probable murder weapon, then she violated her duties under Brady.
D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 389 (6th Cir. 2014). Such a failure to inform prosecutors
of potentially exculpatory evidence frustrates criminal courts’ central purpose to effectuate “the
truth-seeking function of trial.” Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 69 (2000) (quoting Perry v.
Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 282 (1989)). It was only through the work of the Michigan Innocence Clinic,
after Monson had spent more than a decade incarcerated for Brown’s murder, that investigators
conducted tests matching the print on the toilet tank top to another suspect, Lewis.
-21- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
Absent a showing of prejudice so great that it “prevented [the defendant] from receiving
his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial,” however, “[t]he government will fulfill its constitutional
obligation by disclosure at trial.” United States v. Farley, 2 F.3d 645, 654 (6th Cir. 1993).
Although Monson’s defense counsel at the murder trial objected to the introduction of Monson’s
fingerprint on the mirror, he later stipulated to the introduction of the latent print report into
evidence. Defense counsel’s acquiescence to introduction of the prints recovered at the scene,
including the unidentified, usable print on the toilet tank lid, precludes a finding of prejudice. Due
to the parties’ stipulation at trial, this set of facts does not satisfy the third requirement of Brady.
We therefore reverse the denial of qualified immunity to Simon on Monson’s Brady claim.
C. Motion for Sanctions
Monson also moves for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. That rule authorizes this court to “award just damages and single or double costs to
the appellee” if we “determine[] that an appeal is frivolous.” Fed. R. App. P. 38. “An appeal is
frivolous if it is obviously without merit and is prosecuted for delay, harassment, or other improper
purposes.” Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Smith, 714 F.3d 932, 944 (quoting Vic Wertz Distrib. Co. v.
Teamsters Loc. 1038, 898 F.2d 1136, 1143 (6th Cir. 1990)). Features that may indicate a frivolous
appeal include untimeliness, see id.; “when the result is obvious or when the appellant’s argument
is wholly without merit,” Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 433 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Pieper v.
Am. Arb. Ass’n, 336 F.3d 458, 465 (6th Cir. 2003)); or where an appeal is “clearly futile and
apparently prosecuted for improper purposes,” McDonald v. Flake, 814 F.3d 804, 817 (6th Cir.
2016). A case that “may indeed be quite weak” does not, absent some indicators of impropriety,
merit sanctions. Uhl v. Komatsu Forklift Co., Ltd., 512 F.3d 294, 308 (6th Cir. 2008).
-22- Nos. 22-2050/2122, Monson v. City of Detroit, et al.
The parties essentially restate their merits arguments in their briefing on sanctions.
Monson also references Sanford v. City of Detroit, 815 F. App’x 856 (6th Cir. 2020), for the
proposition that Defendants’ counsel here (who represented the defendants in Sanford, as well as
“the City of Detroit, [] and other municipalities in” § 1983 cases) filed this appeal for improper
purposes. Monson points to our affirmance of the denial of qualified immunity on the fabrication
of evidence, coerced confession, and malicious prosecution claims in Sanford, 815 F. App’x at
859, for the proposition that counsel “filed the present appeal knowing it was without merit
and with no reasonable expectation of prevailing.” Referencing the other side’s “experienced . . .
counsel,” Monson argues that Defendants filed this appeal to “delay and to increase the cost of this
litigation.” The filing of an appeal necessarily increases costs and delays resolution of litigation.
See Yates v. City of Cleveland, 941 F.2d 444, 448 (6th Cir. 1991) (discussing the reality that
“Forsyth appeals [of denial of qualified immunity] can be employed for the sole purpose of
delaying trial”). This record is insufficient, however, to establish an improper motive for
Defendants’ appeal. Absent such facts, we decline to award sanctions, and DENY the motion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court denying
qualified immunity as to the federal malicious prosecution claims against Crockett, Simon,
Ghougoian, and Braxton, the fabrication of evidence claims against Crockett, Simon, Ghougoian,
and Braxton, and the coerced confession claim against Ghougoian. We REVERSE as to the Brady
claim against Simon; DENY the motion for sanctions; and REMAND the case to the district court
for trial.
-23-