Lamar v. State

33 S.E.2d 263, 199 Ga. 1, 1945 Ga. LEXIS 254
Supreme Court of Georgia·Decided January 6, 1945·No. 15049.·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinions

Where the solicitor general declines the offer of one indicted for murder to plead guilty on condition that the accused shall receive a recommendation of mercy and a life sentence, and thereupon the defendant agrees to a stipulation of facts, including every element necessary to prove the crime as charged, expressly stating his desire to go to the jury on the question of punishment only, and makes a confession containing a plenary admission of guilt, the only question he is entitled to have submitted to the jury is the one of punishment, including a proper definition of the crime charged.

No. 15049. JANUARY 6, 1945. REHEARING DENIED FEBRUARY 17, 1945.
Nathaniel Lamar and David Watkins were indicted for murder. The defendant Lamar was convicted, without a recommendation, and sentenced to death by electrocution. He moved for a new trial upon the general grounds, and by amendment added two special grounds, as follows: "1. . . The court, notwithstanding the plea of not guilty to the indictment, erroneously failed to charge the jury that they would have the right to acquit the defendant. 2. The court erred in charging the jury as follows: `Now, gentlemen of the jury, there has been admitted in evidence a statement, a statement as made and agreed to by the State's attorney and the defendant's attorneys which is admitted to be the true facts of the case, and which you will consider as evidence in this case.'" The trial court overruled the motion for a new trial; the exception is to this judgment. *Page 2

When the case was called for trial, the following happened: The solicitor-general: "May it please the court, the defendant has proposed to the solicitor-general that he would enter a plea of guilty, provided the solicitor would recommend that the defendant be recommended for mercy; this the solicitor declined. The defendant therefore stands mute on arraignment, but upon trial will make his full and plenary confession, and ask the jury to recommend him to the mercy of the court. Therefore the court instructed the solicitor-general to enter a plea of not guilty." After the solicitor-general had made an opening statement to the jury, the following occurred: The defendant's attorney: "At this point the defendant offers to make a statement in which he will make a full and plenary confession of the guilt of the crime charged, as alleged in the indictment, and further of the material charges made by the solicitor-general in the statement of what the State expects to prove. In so doing, we obviated the necessity of further introduction of evidence by the State to prove these allegations. Upon so doing, further, we object to the introduction by the State of such evidence." The solicitor-general: "The position of State's counsel, as I started to say about it in the statement, is that the question of punishment in murder cases is entirely one for the jury. It is not the business of State's counsel to assume the responsibility of fixing that punishment. In fact, I don't think it lies in his power to do it; he would in any event only be permitted to make a recommendation to the jury about it. In this case, in all of its aspects, State's counsel doesn't feel it incumbent on him to make any recommendation to this jury at all in the defendant's favor, but puts it squarely up to the jury trying the case as to the question of what punishment should be meted out. For this reason we construe what my friend's answer is, standing mute; it is a question of guilt or innocence. Certainly this jury is entitled to know the gross aspects of this case and weigh it themselves, and for such reason as seems to them to be adequate to determine what the punishment should be. We don't know of any other way to handle it, sir, except to make out our case before this jury." The court: "You don't agree to let the defendant make a statement to the jury and admit all that has been said by the State and shift the responsibility to the jury as fixing the punishment?" The solicitor-general: "Well now, what has been *Page 3 said by me to the jury has not been reported." The court: "He says he will admit that." The solicitor-general: "I think the only fair thing for the jury is, let them hear the evidence." The court: "All right." The defendant's attorney: "I understand your honor ruled on that? I didn't know." The court: "The defendant objects to it, that they be permitted to introduce the evidence." The defendant's attorney: "Now may I make this statement? May it be understood by the court and by the solicitor-general that this objection goes to each witness and to all of the testimony, so there will be no necessity for my bothering the court and the solicitor by repeating that objection." The embalmer who handled the body of the deceased was then introduced by the State, and he simply testified as to the nature and extent of the wounds which caused death. The court then recessed for lunch, and upon reconvening, the following occurred: The solicitor-general: "We have reached a stipulation, if your honor please, which we have completed for your honor, and our understanding is that our stipulation, along with the evidence of Mr. Stewart which has been introduced, will not require any further introduction of any evidence for the State. We have done this to shorten the trial and get the issue to the jury. That would constitute the evidence, except your honor will observe that the State may introduce some evidence in rebuttal of the defendant's statement, evidence to establish admissions which would not conflict with this agreement and which would contradict his statement. In other words, it must be material to this case." Thereupon the following stipulation was submitted to the court: "The following is a statement of the facts of the case as made by the solicitor-general as an opening statement:

"Mrs. J. J. Connell was an elderly lady about sixty-seven or sixty-eight years of age, and she was an aunt of Mr. Jesse Bush. Mr. Bush was operating a place of business known as the Green Lawn Grill, which is located on the North side of the Columbus Road and on the corner where the new Columbus Road comes into the old Columbus Road. Mrs. Connell was the housekeeper and she lived in the residence occupied by herself and Mr. Jesse Bush and Mrs. Jesse Bush. This residence was located about three-quarters of a block behind the place of business known as the Green Lawn Grill, which was a restaurant. Both the residence and the *Page 4 place of business are outside the city of Macon, but they are both in Bibb County, and all that territory around them is in Bibb County. Mr. and Mrs. Bush opened up this place of business in June, 1939, and they have been operating it continuously since then. Mrs. Connell did little or no work about the matter of conducting the place of business; she stayed at home and looked after the affairs around the house.

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Lamar v. State, 33 S.E.2d 263, 199 Ga. 1, 1945 Ga. LEXIS 254 (Ga. 1945).

33 S.E.2d 263 (Lamar v. State) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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