Lámar v. Kern

349 F. Supp. 222, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11872
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedSeptember 25, 1972
DocketCiv. A. 72-H-539
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 349 F. Supp. 222 (Lámar v. Kern) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lámar v. Kern, 349 F. Supp. 222, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11872 (S.D. Tex. 1972).

Opinion

FINAL ORDER

SINGLETON, District Judge.

Plaintiffs have brought this class action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 on behalf of all prisoners similarly situated under the custodianship of the Harris County *224 Sheriff. This cause is filed under the jurisdiction of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2201, and 2202. Plaintiffs are challenging certain customs and policies that have been developed and followed by the Harris County Sheriff’s department as violative of their civil rights. The Texas Legislature has provided for the establishment of county jails in Vernon’s Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 5115 (1957). Said article does provide for segregation of prisoners by sex and age but not by race. Accordingly, this statute is in no way in question here or under attack. This § 1983 action is based upon the custom or usage of policies regarding racial segregation and censorship of the mails at the defendant institutions.

Plaintiffs are Negro inmates incarcerated at the Harris County Rehabilitation Center; one plaintiff, Allen B. Lamar, is no longer incarcerated there, but the class is properly represented by the remaining plaintiffs who appeared in court at the comprehensive hearing in this cause. Washington v. Lee, 263 F.Supp. 327 (N.D.Ala.1966), aff’d 390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1968). The first allegation raises the issue of racial segregation in the county jail system. After hearing evidence on the method whereby prisoners are placed in cells at the Rehabilitation Center, this court finds that the system whereby one wing (3-D) of the unit consistently is filled with black inmates only is not a color-blind system and, therefore, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This court agrees with the Washington v. Lee, supra,, 263 F.Supp. at 331, court when it wrote:

“We recognize that there is merit in the contention that in some isolated instances prison security and discipline necessitates segregation of the races for a limited period. However, recognition of such instances does nothing to bolster the statutes or the general practice that requires- or permits prison or jail officials to separate the races arbitrarily. Such statutes and practices must be declared unconstitutional in light of the clear principles controlling.”

The practice of segregating the prisoners by race must be immediately halted and only practices that implement in desegregation of the races will be permitted. See McClelland v. Sigler, 327 F.Supp. 829 (D.Neb.1971).

Plaintiffs have also alleged that the defendants are practicing a policy of mail censorship with regard to all mail to and from the county jails. In an attempt to establish what the jail rules were at the prison, a set of correspondence rules for the Rehabilitation Center effective July 7, 1972, was introduced at the hearing. (See Appendix I). However, the jail officials testified on the stand that these rules were no longer being followed at the jail. Instead, a set of oral regulations was being given to the prison employees. Exactly what the prison employees were being instructed to do was never clearly established. What was established, as a matter of fact, is that the defendants are censoring, or withholding, mail to and from courts and attorneys, as well as other personal and general correspondence.

This court finds that the defendants have infringed upon the plaintiffs’ First Amendment free speech rights and right to petition the government for redress of grievances and their Sixth Amendment effective assistance of counsel rights for the reasons and policies abundantly explained by this court in the case of Guajardo v. Beto, 349 F.Supp. 211, filed this day. In accord with the reasoning set forth there, this court hereby enjoins the defendants and their agents from further censorship or withholding of the mails to Special Correspondents that is to: any court of the United States or of the State of Texas; any member of the Congress of the United States or any member of the Legislatures of the States of the United States; the President of the United States or the Governors of the States of the United States; the Attorney General of the United States or the Attorney Generals of the States of the United *225 States; the Director or any agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Director of any Bureau of the Department of Public Safety, State of Texas or other State Police Agencies; any licensed attorney in any state; any federal or state governmental agency; and any television station, radio station, or newspaper.

If there is a question as to whether or not an addressee is an attorney, the letter may be held no longer than twenty-four (24) hours to determine this. It it is determined the addressee is not a member of the Special Correspondents the letter will be withheld from the inmate, but the inmate will be told of its rejection. The prisoner may appeal this determination in the same manner that will be discussed later with regard to other rejected mail. The defendants are further enjoined from limiting the length or number of sealed mailings prisoners make to Special Correspondents. It must be firmly stated, however, that all mailings, special or general, are at the sole expense of the inmate for both postage and stationery.

As to incoming mail from Special Correspondents, the prison officials may open the mail in the presence of the inmate, check the envelope for physical contraband, disposing of the envelope if they wish, and check the signature of the correspondent to assure that it is indeed a Special Correspondent. But the letter’s content itself may not be read. If the letter is not passed on to the prisoner’s hands, the decision of rejection may be appealed by the prisoner in the same manner as other appeals discussed later.

With regard to outgoing general mail, that is, nonspecial mail, the inmate may write uncensored mail to anyone at his own expense without restriction as to length or volume.

The court is not unmindful that abuses may be made of this privilege. 'Therefore, if any report is made by a recipient of abusive prison mail to the county jail officials, a hearing should be held to investigate the incident and administer any appropriate discipline. However, at no time may such disciplinary action suspend the prisoners’ right to write uncensored mail to Special Correspondents.

However, with regard to incoming mail, the inmate may receive only letters from those five (5) persons listed on his approved correspondence and visiting list. These incoming letters may be opened by the prison authorities, but only in the presence of the inmate, inspected for physical contraband and censored.

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Bluebook (online)
349 F. Supp. 222, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11872, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lamar-v-kern-txsd-1972.