Lamar Dionn Williams v. Credit Acceptance Corporation

• Court: District Court, E.D. Michigan
• Decided: January 5, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-14113
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

LAMARR DIONN WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff, Case No. 25-14113 v. Hon. Jonathan J.C. Grey

CREDIT ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION,

Defendant. _____________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS (ECF No. 2) AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT (ECF No. 1)

I. BACKGROUND On December 22, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Lamarr Dionn Williams filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action and an application to proceed without prepaying fees and costs. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) Williams alleges Defendant Credit Acceptance Corporation (“CAC”) violated his due process rights in an “underlying state-court action giving rise to this suit” by not complying with Michigan Court Rules 2.108(A) and 2.603(A)(1) and (D). (ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 2.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Williams’ application to proceed without prepaying fees and costs and DISMISSES the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief

may be granted. II. LEGAL STANDARDS Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court may allow a person to proceed

without prepayment of fees or costs, i.e., in forma pauperis. However, the Court is required to review each case for summary dismissal if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). To determine whether this matter states a claim on which relief

may be granted, the Court applies the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard. Therefore, the Court must assess whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 570 (2007)). When assessing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt and must accept all the

complaint’s factual allegations as true. Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012). However, the Court will not presume the truth of any legal conclusions stated in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If the pleaded facts do not raise a right to relief, the

Court must dismiss the complaint. Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc., 553 F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 2009). III. ANALYSIS

The Court finds that Williams is unable to pay the filing fee (see ECF No. 2) and GRANTS his application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Thus, the Court must consider whether the

action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). As discussed below, the Court

finds that plaintiffs fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted. It is well-established under the Younger abstention doctrine that federal courts should refrain from interfering with the functions of state

courts. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger initially operated to prevent federal courts from interfering with criminal prosecutions in order to preserve equity and comity. Id. at 44. However,

the Younger doctrine also applies to ongoing “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions[.]” Doe v. University of Kentucky, 860 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v.

Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989) (citations omitted)). Here, Williams states that this case is based on a state court case

(Case No. CK-3329002025-CK, Macomb County Circuit Court (see ECF No. 1, PageID.4)), claiming that CAC was not adhering to the state court rules. In the complaint, Williams indicates that all his factual allegations

“are supported by documentary exhibits preserved in the state-court record attached hereto” (id. at PageID.1), but he did not attach any state- court record to the complaint or otherwise file one on the docket. As such,

it is not clear whether the state court action has terminated or remains pending. To the extent that the state court action remains pending, this Court will abstain from interfering with the functions of the Wayne

County Circuit Court pursuant to the Younger doctrine.1 Further, in the event the state court action has concluded, the Court

1 The Colorado River abstention doctrine also may preclude the Court’s consideration of the issues Williamsrais es in his complaint. See PaineWebber, Inc. v. Cohen, 276 F.3d 197, 206 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)) (“a federal district court may abstain from exercising its subject matter jurisdiction due to the existence of a concurrent state court proceeding, based on ‘considerations of wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.’”). does not have jurisdiction to review or reverse orders issued in the state

court action pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.2 See Raymond v. Moyer, 501 F.3d 548, 550–551 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lance v. Dennis, 26 S. Ct. 1198, 1199 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)) (the lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction “over cases brought by ‘state-court losers' challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings

commenced’” under what has come to be known as “the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.”); see also Gilbert v. Ill. Bd. of Educ., 591 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 2010) (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prevents a state-court loser from

bringing suit in federal court in order to effectively set aside the state- court judgment”). For all the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that

Williams’ allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted in this Court, and his cause of action must be DISMISSED. IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Williams’

2 See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). application to proceed without prepaying fees and costs (ECF No. 2) is

GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Williams’ complaint is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. s/Jonathan J.C. Grey Jonathan J.C. Grey Date: January 5, 2026 United States District Judge Certificate of Service

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First-Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on January 5, 2026.

s/ S. Osorio Sandra Osorio Case Manager