NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0802-25
LAKEVIEW REALTY INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES, LP,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANWAR SABREE,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
MARIE MONTEIL-SABREE,
Defendant. _____________________________
Submitted May 28, 2026 – Decided July 29, 2026
Before Judges Mawla and Marczyk.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. DC-010069-25.
Giordano Halleran & Ciesla, PC, attorneys for appellant (Steven W. Ward, of counsel and on the briefs). Anwar Sabree, self-represented respondent.
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Lakeview Realty Investment Associates, LP appeals from the
Special Civil Part's September 30, 2025 judgment against defendant Anwar
Sabree in the amount of $3,032.26.1 We affirm in part, and reverse and remand
in part, for the reasons expressed in this opinion.
I.
Plaintiff owns an apartment complex. In June 2024, plaintiff and
defendant executed a renewed one-year lease agreement, to begin on July 1, for
the unit he had been renting since 2020. The lease established the rent at $1,533
per month. If defendant did not pay the rent in full by the fifth day of each
month, he was subject to an additional late charge of ten percent of the total rent
due as additional rent. The lease also included a utility addendum, which
required defendant to pay a $28 monthly sewer charge.
Paragraph twenty-five of the lease addressed abatements and, in pertinent
part, provided:
You must promptly notify us in writing of: water leaks; electrical problems; malfunctioning lights; broken or missing locks or latches; and other conditions that pose
1 Defendant Marie Monteil-Sabree was dismissed from this case in October 2025 and did not participate in this appeal. A-0802-25 2 a hazard to property, health, or safety. . . . Air conditioning problems are not emergencies. If air conditioning or other equipment malfunctions, you must notify our representative as soon as possible on a business day. We'll act with customary diligence to make repairs and reconnections. Rent will not abate in whole or in part.
[(Emphasis added).]
Prior to moving out, the lease required defendant to "thoroughly clean the
apartment," or otherwise be subject to "reasonable cleaning charges." The lease
stated defendant was also liable for the following charges upon moving:
unpaid rent; unpaid utilities; unreimbursed service charges; repairs or damages caused by negligence, carelessness, accident, or abuse, . . . scratches, tears, burns, stains, or unapproved holes; . . . repairs or cleaning; . . . late-payment and returned-check charges; a charge (not to exceed $100) for [plaintiff's] time and inconvenience in any valid eviction proceeding against [defendant], plus attorney's fees[,] costs, and filing fees actually paid; and other sums due under this [l]ease . . . .
Additionally, paragraph thirty-one, which governed default, provided, in
pertinent part:
If you default and move out early, you will pay us any amounts stated to be owed[,] including rent, additional rent[,] and damages. Upon your default, we have all other legal remedies, including [l]ease . . . termination. You are responsible for all rent and fees under the [l]ease . . . until the termination of the [l]ease . . . , or until the unit is re-rented. You shall also pay all
A-0802-25 3 attorney['s] fees and filing costs. Attorney['s] fees and filing costs shall be considered as additional rent.
IF THE TENANT IS SUCCESSFUL IN ANY ACTION OR SUMMARY PROCEEDING ARISING OUT OF THIS LEASE, THE TENANT SHALL RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES OR EXPENSES, OR BOTH[,] FROM THE LANDLORD TO THE SAME EXTENT THE LANDLORD IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES OR EXPENSES, OR BOTH[,] AS PROVIDED IN THIS LEASE.
[(Boldface omitted).]
A supplemental provision of the lease stated:
[S]hould [r]ent not be paid by the [six]th of the month, a court action may be instituted and [r]esident will be responsible for all legal costs incurred. Any such [a]ttorney's fees and court costs shall be due and payable as additional [r]ent. . . . In the event such proceeding is started, [r]esident agrees to pay [a] $135[] attorney fee, [a] $9[] pre-litigation letter[ fee], [a] $58[] court cost for [one] person [and] $5[] for each additional person, [and a] $43[] warrant of removal cost for all fees incurred with this proceeding for nonpayment of rent. These fees are to be part of any rent due and owing. Resident is responsible for any and all legal fees and court costs for any court proceeding[,] which shall be due as additional rent.
After defendant fell behind on rent, plaintiff filed a landlord-tenant action,
seeking a judgment of possession based on defendant's non-payment. On
A-0802-25 4 September 10, 2024, the court granted plaintiff a warrant of removal, with a
lock-out date of September 18.
In May 2025, plaintiff filed a complaint, seeking judgment against
defendant in the amount of $6,543.06 plus attorney's fees and costs, representing
unpaid back rent, late fees, utility charges, and court costs from the landlord-
tenant matter. Defendant subsequently filed an answer and counterclaim,
asserting a breach of the covenant of habitability due to inadequate air
conditioning. He sought $17,196, representing rent paid over the summer
months from 2021 through 2024. Prior to trial, plaintiff filed a certification in
support of attorney's fees and costs, seeking an additional $3,095, which
included fees for responding to defendant's counterclaim, trial preparation, and
attendance at trial.
On September 30, 2025, the court held a bench trial, at which plaintiff was
represented by counsel, and defendant was self-represented. Plaintiff's property
manager testified regarding the terms of the lease, outstanding rent, a $28
monthly sewer charge defendant owed for August and September, the damages
assessed after defendant vacated the apartment, and the legal fees and costs
incurred in connection with the eviction and collection actions. Defendant
testified regarding his tenancy, the alleged air conditioning issues during the
A-0802-25 5 summer months, and his communications with management about the problem.
He explained the heat was "unbearable," causing him to "have to sleep
downstairs" where "the temperature was [eighty-five] degrees with the air
conditioning running all day and . . . night." The parties introduced into
evidence the lease agreement, an account ledger, a move-in/move-out condition
report, the warrant of removal, and an HVAC service invoice.
The court found it was undisputed defendant owed two months' rent at the
time of the September 2024 eviction, totaling $3,066 for August's and
September's rent. It further found defendant owed a balance of $704.66 as of
July 2024. The court determined plaintiff was entitled to the legal fees and costs
it sought related to the eviction, bringing the total amount defendant owed
plaintiff to $4,258.06.
However, the court found plaintiff was not entitled to recover its attorney's
fees related to the civil collection action before it, reasoning paragraph thirty-
one of the lease only allowed recovery of attorney's fees and costs related to the
eviction matter, which the court had already addressed. The court further
reasoned, "from a fairness standpoint, arguably[,] the legal fees were . . . almost
. . . half of the entire amount of damages [plaintiff] claimed."
A-0802-25 6 The court also determined plaintiff was not entitled to recover any alleged
damage defendant caused to the property. It reasoned plaintiff had not presented
satisfactory proof of the alleged damage, such as photos depicting the alleged
damage was "something above and beyond normal wear and tear," given
defendant had rented the property since 2020. The court further noted plaintiff
had not presented evidence showing it had to clean the apartment "over and
above what [it would] have [had] to do anyhow" to prepare "the premises for the
next tenant."
As to defendant's counterclaim, the court found he made "numerous
complaints" to plaintiff about the property being too hot during the summers at
issue, which led to an HVAC company being retained in August 2023 to assess
the issue, crediting an invoice presented during the trial. It noted the invoice
stated defendant complained of "a lack of airflow going to the loft," where his
bedroom was located, which was "a common problem" in that building's units,
and the airflow issue resulted from "no return in the loft[,] . . . so the heat just
rises[,] and it gets trapped up there." The court also credited defendant's and the
property manager's testimony regarding the "ongoing problem," which had made
the bedroom "uncomfortable to the point of being impossible to sleep up there
A-0802-25 7 because of the heat." However, it noted neither party had offered proof of the
property's exact temperature during those summers.
The court found defendant sought "essentially a set off" against the
outstanding rent owed to plaintiff, such that the lease's non-abatement clause did
not apply under the presented facts. It explained:
[A]n argument could [be] made . . . the [c]ourt is . . . playing with the words [of] paragraph [twenty-five of] the lease[, which] says rent will not abate in whole or in part due to air conditioning problems. . . . So[,] whether [']rent abatement['] and [']set off['] [are] the . . . same thing or . . . different thing[s], [the court] do[es]n't know, but . . . even with that language in there, and even . . . if you want to call a set off an abatement, the argument raised by . . . defendant is a good argument because[] . . . if that happens once or twice, there won't be a rent abatement.
But really[,] . . . it happened throughout the summer months for four years . . . . So[,] that sort of . . . makes paragraph [twenty-five] with regard to no rent abatement somewhat unconscionable, . . . in practice. In other words, especially when you have this [HVAC invoice] . . . saying that it's a[n] ongoing[,] common problem and it essentially can't be remedied, . . . [the court] do[es]n't know whe[ther] that clause would be . . . equitable, fair[,] or enforceable.
Although the court found defendant's argument he should receive a "set
off of the entire rent for the three months . . . [of] each summer for four years"
unpersuasive, it determined a set off was "appropriate." It reasoned while the
A-0802-25 8 apartment "was livable" and defendant had remained in the property, the rising
heat made it "uncomfortable," causing defendant to sleep on the sofa downstairs.
Accordingly, the court determined defendant was entitled to a $1,325.28
"set off" for plaintiff's failure to remedy the issue over four years, representing
two percent of the total rent due under the parties' lease from January 2021 to
December 2024, pursuant to the billing statements, which totaled $66,264.2
After subtracting the $1,325.28 "set off" from the $4,258.06 damages
calculation, it found plaintiff, as the prevailing party, was entitled to the filing
fee and entered judgment in favor of plaintiff for $3,032.26. The court did not
specifically address the late fees or utility charges plaintiff had requested.
II.
A trial court's factual findings made following a bench trial are accorded
deference and will be left undisturbed so long as they are supported by
substantial credible evidence. See Reilly v. Weiss, 406 N.J. Super. 71, 77 (App.
Div. 2009) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-
84 (1974)). On the other hand, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the
legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any
2 The court stated $66,264 "was the total price . . . [defendant] . . . paid for the four years" from January 2021 to December 2024, however, defendant had vacated the premises in September 2024 following the warrant of removal. A-0802-25 9 special deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019)
(alteration in original) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of
Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
New Jersey courts "have shown an increasing tendency to analogize
landlord-tenant law to conventional doctrines of contract law." McGuire v. City
of Jersey City, 125 N.J. 310, 321 (1991). "The polestar of contract construction
is to discover the intention of the parties as revealed by the language used by
them." Karl's Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Gimbel Bros., 249 N.J. Super. 487, 492
(App. Div. 1991).
"Generally, the terms of an agreement are to be given their plain and
ordinary meaning." M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Transp., 171 N.J. 378, 396
(2002). "[W]here the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous[,] there is
no room for interpretation or construction[,] and the courts must enforce those
terms as written." Karl's Sales, 249 N.J. Super. at 493. "The court has no right
'to rewrite the contract . . . .'" Ibid. (quoting Levison v. Weintraub, 215 N.J.
Super. 273, 276 (App. Div. 1987)).
A.
Plaintiff argues the court failed to enforce the lease as written and
disregarded its plain terms regarding late fees, sewer charges, and property
A-0802-25 10 damage. It emphasizes the lease expressly provided for $153.30 per month in
late charges and $28 per month in sewer charges, and defendant made no
payments after July 2024. Thus, plaintiff contends the court erred in not
including an additional $362.60 in the judgment, representing the late fees and
sewer fees defendant owed for August and September 2024. Additionally, the
judgment should have included an additional $870 worth of property damage
and cleaning charges listed in the move-out report submitted to the court, which
were expressly provided for in the lease. Plaintiff further claims defendant
presented no evidence warranting the exclusion of such charges.
Although the court noted plaintiff sought damages related to late fees and
utility charges at the outset of its ruling, it did not make any findings as to
plaintiff's entitlement to those damages. Given the lease clearly provides for the
recovery of late fees and utility charges, which the court recognized, we remand
the matter for the court to add those fees to the judgment.
However, we affirm the trial court's determination plaintiff was not
entitled to an award for the alleged property damage. The record supports the
finding plaintiff failed to present sufficient proof the damage was "something
above and beyond normal wear and tear" or evidence showing it had to clean the
apartment "over and above what [it would] have [had] to do anyhow" to prepare
A-0802-25 11 the premises for the next tenant. See Reilly, 406 N.J. Super. at 77. Plaintiff
presented no pictures of the alleged damage and instead only presented its own
report of the property's alleged condition and its assessed value of the
corresponding charges to repair and clean the unit. It asserts defendant "did not
provide any evidence that such cleaning and repairs were not required to be
performed." However, defendant did not have the burden of proof. Given the
deference accorded to the trial court's factual and credibility findings, we discern
no basis to disturb its ruling on the alleged damage to the property.
B.
Plaintiff argues the court erred in awarding defendant a rent abatement
based on the alleged air conditioning issue, emphasizing the lease expressly
stated rent would not abate for such an issue. It asserts defendant provided no
evidence he requested his unit be repaired, highlighting the lease's requirement
he provide notice if his air conditioner was malfunctioning. It also contends
there was insufficient evidence to find the apartment was uninhabitable, as
defendant could not identify a single day on which the apartment was too hot.
Moreover, plaintiff argues the court arbitrarily set the rent abatement award at
two percent of the total rent from January 2021 to December 2024, even though
A-0802-25 12 defendant only claimed to have experienced issues with the air conditioning
during the summer months and did not pay rent after July 2024.
A trial court's determination regarding rent abatement "is a factual finding
and will be affirmed if supported by credible evidence in th[e] record." C. F.
Seabrook Co. v. Beck, 174 N.J. Super. 577, 596 (App. Div. 1980). In Marini v.
Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144 (1970), our Supreme Court held all residential leases
contain an implied covenant or warranty of habitability. A landlord's covenant
of habitability and a tenant's covenant to pay rent are mutually dependent on one
another. Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 469 (1973). "Accordingly[,] in an
action by a landlord for unpaid rent[,] a tenant may plead, by way of defense
and set off, a breach by the landlord of his continuing obligation to maintain an
adequate standard of habitability." Ibid. The tenant must show "[t]he condition
complained of must be such as truly to render the premises uninhabitable in the
eyes of a reasonable person." Ibid. "At a minimum, the necessities of a
habitable residence include sufficient heat and ventilation, adequate light,
plumbing and sanitation[,] and proper security and maintenance." Trentacost v.
Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 225 (1980). However, a tenant must also provide their
landlord with notice and reasonable time to effectuate repairs. Berzito, 63 N.J.
at 469.
A-0802-25 13 Contrary to plaintiff's argument defendant provided no notice of the
alleged problems with the air conditioning, the record supports the court's
finding defendant made "numerous complaints" to plaintiff about the property
being too hot during the summer. Defendant testified he placed service requests
for his air conditioning unit, and plaintiff repeatedly told him it would "look into
it." Plaintiff's property manager also testified there were "several work orders"
related to defendant's air conditioner. Additionally, the HVAC invoice
corroborated defendant's complaints, as it noted defendant complained of "a lack
of airflow going to the loft." Thus, the record shows defendant put plaintiff on
notice of the issue.
Additionally, there was sufficient evidence for the court to find the
property's "ongoing" airflow issue made defendant's bedroom "uncomfortable
to the point of being impossible to sleep up there because of the heat ," even in
the absence of testimony as to specific days on which the property was too hot.
Defendant testified the heat was "unbearable" during the summer, causing him
to "have to sleep downstairs" often where "the temperature was [eighty-five]
degrees with the air conditioning running all day and . . . night."
Moreover, as to plaintiff's argument regarding the lease's non-abatement
language, the court acknowledged the clause but found it "somewhat
A-0802-25 14 unconscionable . . . in practice," as the airflow issue was an ongoing problem
that could not be remedied. Plaintiff does not challenge the court's
unconscionability finding or point to any case law concerning the enforceability
of such a provision. We also note the lease's non-abatement language, taken in
the context of the entire clause, not only applies to a malfunctioning air
conditioning unit but also applies to other issues, such as water leaks and
electrical problems. The clause also notes plaintiff will "act with customary
diligence to make repairs and reconnections" prior to stating "[r]ent will not
abate." We discern no error in the court's ruling, as the rent abatement provision
runs counter to the remedies afforded to tenants in New Jersey for habitability
breaches and improperly stripped defendant of a core remedy while preserving
plaintiff's right to collect rent.
We conclude the court reasonably exercised its discretion to award
defendant a modest offset of the rent owed. It recognized the problems with the
air conditioner occurred during the summer months but appears to have utilized
a formula spread across the entire lease to help calculate the abatement. While
the methodology may have been somewhat unorthodox, we discern no error in
the court's calculation of the final abatement figure, except as noted below.
A-0802-25 15 The court calculated the abatement based on "the total price . . .
[defendant] . . . paid for the four years" from January 2021 to December 2024.
However, defendant vacated the premises in September 2024, following the
warrant of removal. We are therefore constrained to remand the matter to the
trial court to calculate damages consistent with the time period during which
defendant lived in the unit.
C.
Plaintiff further argues the court erred in finding the lease did not provide
for attorney's fees in connection with a civil action for damages. It contends
that finding is contrary to the lease's unambiguous terms, which it claims
expressly provided for fee-shifting in "any court proceeding." (Emphasis and
boldface omitted). Plaintiff further asserts the court's dissuasion from awarding
attorney's fees because they totaled approximately thirty percent of the amounts
claimed is not a basis to deny recovery, because "there need not be
proportionality between the damages recovered and the attorney['s ]fee[s]
award[ed]." Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 23 (2004). Given the
court awarded plaintiff $100 in filing fees, plaintiff argues it should have
similarly found it had the same authority to award it attorney's fees as the
prevailing party.
A-0802-25 16 We conclude the court erred in finding the lease required the parties to be
responsible for their own attorney's fees for the civil matter. Although the court
found paragraph thirty-one of the lease only allowed an award of attorney's fees
related to an eviction matter and not a civil matter, another provision of the lease
specifically stated defendant "is responsible for any and all legal fees and court
costs for any court proceeding which shall be due as additional rent." For these
reasons, we remand the matter to the trial court for a calculation of attorney's
fees and costs consistent with the plain language of the lease.
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
A-0802-25 17