Lajuan Scott Freeman v. State of Texas

Court of Appeals of Texas

Lajuan Scott Freeman v. State of Texas

DecidedNovember 30, 2001

Docket06-01-00004-CR

StatusPublished

This text of Lajuan Scott Freeman v. State of Texas (Lajuan Scott Freeman v. State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Lajuan Scott Freeman v. State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).

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Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-01-00004-CR ______________________________

LAJUAN SCOTT FREEMAN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 124th Judicial District Court Gregg County, Texas Trial Court No. 27693-B

Before Cornelius, C.J., Grant and Ross, JJ. Opinion by Chief Justice Cornelius

O P I N I O N

LaJuan Scott Freeman appeals his conviction for possession of more than five pounds but less than fifty pounds of marihuana. After the trial court denied Freeman's motion to suppress, Freeman waived a jury trial and pleaded guilty. The trial court rejected the State's recommendation of five years' confinement and sentenced Freeman to eight years' confinement.

Freeman contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress because the evidence found was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9 . We find that the seizure was constitutional and that Freeman lacks standing to contest the search. We therefore affirm the judgment.

We use an abuse of discretion standard to review the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress. Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimonies. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), and we afford almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts that the record supports, especially when the fact findings are based on an evaluation of the witnesses' credibility and demeanor. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We review de novo the court's application of the law of search and seizure to those facts. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 856. As no findings of fact or conclusions of law were filed, we will assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling as long as those findings are supported by the record. If the trial court's decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, we will affirm the decision. Id. at 855-56.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), provides the framework for our inquiry into this traffic stop.⁽¹⁾ The question in Terry was whether it was always unreasonable for a peace officer to seize a person and subject him to a limited search unless there was probable cause for an arrest. Id., 392 U.S. at 15. The Court held that even though a "stop" and "frisk" was a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, Id. at 16-17, such actions by peace officers could be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court adopted a two-part inquiry to determine the reasonableness of such an investigative detention: (1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception; and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the initial interference. Id. at 19-20.

Under the first part, "the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21. In assessing whether the intrusion was reasonable, an objective standard is used. The question is whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search would cause a man of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate. Id. at 21-22. An investigative detention not based on reasonable suspicion is unreasonable and therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The second part of the Terry inquiry deals with the scope of the detention. The Supreme Court noted that an investigative detention, "like any other search, must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation." Id. at 25-26. The scope of the search must be limited because a search reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment because of its excessive intensity and scope. Id. at 18. An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Lopez v. State, 663 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no pet.). A detention that is not temporary and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference is unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d at 243.

Freeman was traveling on the interstate highway in a rental vehicle when he was stopped by a police officer for following another vehicle too closely. On appeal Freeman does not contest the validity of the initial stop, but only the detention that followed. Essentially he argues that the officer's actions failed the second part of the Terry inquiry because the scope of the detention went beyond the purpose of the stop and was therefore unreasonable and unconstitutional. After being stopped, the officer approached the driver's-side window and asked to see Freeman's driver's license and the car rental agreement. After Freeman produced his Alabama driver's license and the rental agreement, he stepped out of the vehicle at the officer's request and went to the rear. There the officer questioned Freeman for a few minutes about his travel plans, who rented the vehicle, and the identity of the passenger in the car. With Freeman remaining at the rear of the vehicle, the officer then went to the passenger's-side window and questioned the female passenger. He asked her the same type of questions for two or three minutes. The officer said it was while questioning the passenger that he detected a smell emanating from the vehicle that indicated someone had been smoking marihuana.

The officer stopped Freeman for the purpose of investigating the traffic violation. Once the officer concluded the investigation of the traffic violation, he could no longer lawfully detain or question Freeman unless he had reasonable suspicion to believe another offense was being committed.

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