Lafonzo R. Turner v. V. Singh, et al.

District Court, E.D. California·Decided February 13, 2026·No. 2:23-cv-00954·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LAFONZO R. TURNER, No. 2:23-cv-0954 DC SCR P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 14 V. SINGH, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is incarcerated in state prison and proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with 18 this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has filed two motions that are pending 19 before the undersigned: (1) a motion to compel and request for an extension of time to conduct 20 discovery, ECF No. 62; and (2) motion for access to legal property and to stay the proceedings, 21 ECF No. 63, which the undersigned construes as a motion for a temporary restraining order 22 (“TRO”). 23 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL 24 I. The Parties’ Arguments 25 Plaintiff filed the motion to compel to discovery on December 22, 2025. ECF No. 62. In 26 the one-page filing, plaintiff alleges that defendants have not responded to discovery. Plaintiff 27 additionally requests a 30-day extension of time to conduct discovery and cites defendants’ delays 28 and the prison’s “administrative program shutdowns” as good cause. Id. 1 Defendants timely opposed the motion and argue that they cannot provide a substantive 2 response because plaintiff did not identify the deficient discovery, raise any legal arguments 3 regarding the alleged deficiencies, and did not attach the subject responses or responses. ECF 4 No. 64 at 1-2. Defendants also oppose an extension of time to conduct discovery because he has 5 not provided good cause and previously received an extension time to complete discovery. Id. at 6 2 (citing ECF No. 61). 7 II. Legal Standard 8 Under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a party seeking discovery may 9 move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 37(a)(3)(B). Such motion may be made if “a party fails to produce documents or fails to respond 11 that inspection will be permitted – or fails to permit inspection – as required under Rule 34.” Fed. 12 R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iv). “District courts have ‘broad discretion to manage discovery and to 13 control the course of litigation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.’” Hunt v. County of 14 Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Avila v. Willits Envtl. Remediation Trust, 15 633 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2011)). 16 The party moving to compel bears the burden of informing the court (1) which discovery 17 requests are the subject of the motion to compel, (2) which of the responses are disputed, (3) why 18 the party believes the response is deficient, (4) why any objections are not justified, and (5) why 19 the information sought through discovery is relevant to the prosecution of this action. McCoy v. 20 Ramirez, No. 1:13-cv-1808 MJS PC, 2016 WL 3196738, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2016); Ellis v. 21 Cambra, No. 1:02-cv-5646 AWI SMS PC, 2008 WL 860523, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2008). 22 Thereafter, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that the discovery should be 23 prohibited, and the burden of clarifying, explaining or supporting its objections.” Bryant v. 24 Ochoa, No. 07-cv-200 JM (PCL), 2009 WL 1390794, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2009) (citations 25 omitted). 26 III. Discussion 27 The undersigned will begin with plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to conduct 28 discovery. Plaintiff does not explain how defendants’ alleged delays or the prison’s 1 “administrative program shutdowns” prevented him from conducting discovery. Moreover, on 2 December 5, 2025, the undersigned granted plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to conduct 3 discovery and extended the discovery cut-off date to February 9, 2026. ECF No. 61. Based on 4 the close timing between that order and plaintiff’s request for an extension of time at issue here 5 (which is signed and dated December 15, 2025, see ECF No. 62 at 1), the undersigned suspects 6 the two documents passed each other in the mail. Therefore, as plaintiff has not shown good 7 cause to extend discovery and in fact received a lengthy extension right before filing this motion, 8 his request for an extension of time is denied. 9 Turning to the motion to compel, courts are required to liberally construe the discovery 10 motions of incarcerated litigants. See United States v. Seesing, 234 F.3d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 11 2000). But even under a liberal construction, plaintiff’s motion fails to provide any of the 12 information necessary for the undersigned to resolve his motion. For instance, plaintiff does not 13 identify any of the discovery requests subject to the motion or which responses are disputed. For 14 this reason, plaintiff’s motion is denied without prejudice to its renewal. 15 Given the discovery motion cut-off of February 9, 2026 has just passed, the undersigned 16 will grant plaintiff an additional thirty (30) days from the date of this order to file a motion to 17 compel that complies with the legal requirements above. The discovery deadline will be extended 18 solely for the purpose of allowing plaintiff to file a renewed motion to compel. On its own 19 motion, the court hereby vacates the dispositive motion deadline. Plaintiff is advised that a 20 failure to file a renewed motion to compel within the next 30 days will result in an order closing 21 discovery and setting a dispositive motion deadline. 22 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ACCESS TO LEGAL PROPERTY 23 I. Plaintiff’s Argument 24 On January 12, 2026, plaintiff filed a motion that seeks an order directing the Kern Valley 25 State Prison and defendants to return his unspecified legal property. ECF No. 63. Plaintiff states 26 that on December 23, 2025, he was assaulted and knocked unconsciousness and is now in 27 administrative segregation. Id. at 1. If the court does not order access to his property, he requests 28 a stay of the action due to his injuries from the attack, which include a traumatic brain injury and 1 possible broken jaw and arm. Id. at 2. Plaintiff further alleges that he has not seen a doctor since 2 December 23, 2025. Id. Defendants did not respond to plaintiff’s motion. 3 II. Legal Standard 4 The undersigned construes plaintiff’s motion as seeking a TRO. A TRO is an 5 extraordinary remedy that may only be granted if the moving party satisfies one of two legal 6 standards. A plaintiff seeking a TRO must generally establish all four of the following elements: 7 (1) likely success on the merits of his underlying case; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm 8 in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an 9 injunction is in the public interest. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). A 10 plaintiff may also be entitled to a temporary restraining order by showing serious questions going 11 to the merits, irreparable harm, and a balance of equities that tips strongly in the plaintiff’s favor. 12 All. For the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011).

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Lafonzo R. Turner v. V. Singh, et al., (E.D. Cal. 2026).

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