Laffon Glymph v. Extended Stay America Management, LLC (ESA)

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: June 26, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01699
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 LAFFON GLYMPH, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01699-JNW 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 9 MOTION TO DISMISS v. 10 EXTENDED STAY AMERICA 11 MANAGEMENT, LLC (ESA),

12 Defendants. 13 1. INTRODUCTION 14 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Extended Stay America 15 Management, LLC and Jacquelline Cockrell’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 15, pro se 16 Plaintiff Laffon Glymph’s first amended complaint, Dkt. No. 12. 17 The FAC alleges that Glymph was a “paying hotel guest” at Extended Stay 18 America, who intended to stay at the hotel for 60 days. Dkt. No. 12 at 3. Glymph 19 alleges that General Manager Jacquelline Cockrell accused Glymph of damaging 20 hotel property, entered Glymph’s hotel room without authorization, monitored and 21 surveilled Glymph, and shared Glymph’s personal information with staff and law 22 enforcement. Id. at 3–4. Glymph alleges that Cockrell’s treatment ultimately 23 1 resulted in Glymph’s removal from the hotel. Id. at 4. Glymph brings seven claims, 2 which the FAC labels Counts I through V, VII, and VIII (the FAC contains no Count

3 VI): Count I, public accommodations discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a; Count 4 II, denial of the equal right to make and enforce contracts under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 5 Count III, violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count IV, 6 unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment; Count V, denial of 7 equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; Count VII, 8 intentional infliction of emotional distress; and Count VIII, breach of contract. Dkt.

9 No. 12 at 5–18. 10 The FAC does not allege sufficient facts to support Glymph’s claims.1 Her 11 breach of contract claim independently fails because she identifies no breached 12 contract term, and it is alternatively barred by claim preclusion in light of her prior 13 King County District Court action arising from the same hotel stay. 14 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion for the reasons stated below. 15 2. LEGAL STANDARD 16 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain “enough facts to 17 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 18 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 19 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 20 21 1 The FAC also references trespass, invasion of privacy, and defamation, but the 22 FAC pleads no separate count for those theories, and the Court does not treat them as freestanding claims. Even construed liberally as separate claims, they would fail 23 for the same absence of well-pleaded factual allegations discussed below. 1 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 2 (2009) (citations omitted). The plausibility standard is less than probability, “but it

3 asks for more than a sheer possibility” that a defendant did something wrong. Iqbal, 4 556 U.S. at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 5 defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 6 ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). In other words, a 7 plaintiff must plead “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed- 8 me accusation.” Id.

9 When considering a motion to dismiss, courts must accept the complaint’s 10 factual allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the 11 plaintiff. Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2021). But courts “do not 12 assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of 13 factual allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, 14 “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat 15 a motion to dismiss.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

16 A pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 17 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985). But liberal construction does not require the Court to 18 supply essential elements of a claim that are not pled. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 19 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). 20 21

22 23 1 3. DISCUSSION 2 3.1 Glymph’s motion to strike is denied, and her surreply does not change the result. 3 The Court first addresses two procedural requests. Glymph moves under 4 Rule 12(f) to strike Exhibit B1 to Defendants’ request for judicial notice. Dkt. No. 17 5 at 2–4. The request is moot, because Defendants withdrew Exhibit B1 by errata, 6 Dkt. Nos. 19, 20, and meritless regardless, because Rule 12(f) reaches only 7 pleadings, not exhibits to a request for judicial notice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a), 12(f); 8 LCR 7(g)(5). The motion is DENIED. Glymph’s surreply, Dkt. No. 21, reargues 9 claim preclusion and judicial notice rather than addressing material in a reply brief, 10 as LCR 7(g) requires. The Court has reviewed it given Glymph’s pro se status but 11 finds that it does not change the analysis below. 12 3.2 Glymph’s breach of contract claim. 13 The Court begins with the breach of contract claim, which fails to state a 14 claim and, in the alternative, is barred by claim preclusion. 15 The claim fails on the pleadings because Glymph does not identify any 16 contract term that Defendants breached. A breach claim requires “(1) a contract 17 imposing a duty, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) damages proximately caused by 18 breach.” Seattle Pac. Indus., Inc. v. S3 Holding LLC, 831 F. App’x 814, 817 (9th Cir. 19 2020) (citing C 1031 Prop., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 301 P.3d 500, 503 (2013)). 20 The FAC—though it alleges that Glymph prepaid for lodging and intended to stay 21 sixty days—identifies no term guaranteeing an unconditional right to remain or 22 barring the hotel from ending her stay. The claim is dismissed on this ground. 23 1 It is also independently barred by claim preclusion. Claim preclusion “bars 2 litigation in a subsequent action of any claims that were raised or could have been

3 raised in the prior action.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 4 713 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Defendants assert that a judgment entered in 5 King County District Court has preclusive effect on Glymph’s claims, especially for 6 her breach of contract claim. See Glymph v. Extended Stay of Am., 7 22CIV18362KCX, King County District Court (Dec. 8, 2023).2 In that case, the 8 Court entered judgment for Glymph finding that the hotel manager violated

9 Glymph’s right of quiet enjoyment as a hotel guest, requiring reimbursement of the 10 amount Glymph paid for rent, tax, and fees and for lost food costs. Dkt. No. 15-2 at 11 34. Claim preclusion applies when there is (1) an identity of claims; (2) a final 12 judgment on the merits; and (3) identity or privity between the parties. Hilliard v. 13 Murphy Land Co., LLC, No. 22-35129, 2023 WL 2235653, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 14 2023) (citation omitted). 15 First, Glymph’s breach of contract claim is identical to the relief she sought in

16 her King County case. The King County Judgment adjudicated the contractual loss 17 that Glymph suffered from her hotel stay, by awarding her rent, taxes, and fees, 18 and lost food costs. Second, the King County judgment is a final judgment on the 19 merits. Chao v. A-One Medical Services, Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 921 (9th Cir. 2003) 20 (small claims judgments in Washington courts that exceed the $250 monetary 21 2 The Court takes judicial notice of the court filings in the underlying King County 22 District Court action. Fed. R. Evid. 201. Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (courts may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public 23 record, including state court filings). 1 threshold to permit appeals have claim preclusion effect). Here, there was a final 2 judgment amount of $1,150.34 and Glymph had the right to seek appellate review.

3 As for the third element, Plaintiff is the same in both matters, and Defendants here 4 are in privity with the defendant in the King County matter. There, the defendant 5 was Extended Stay America, ESA P Portfolio Operating Lessee LLC, a related 6 entity to Extended Stay America LLC, the defendant in this matter. Furthermore, 7 although Defendant Cockrell was not named in the small claims matter, there is no 8 dispute that she was an employee at the time of the events underlying the

9 complaint. The employer and employee relationship suffices to establish privity for 10 claim preclusion purposes. Eugster v. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, 397 P.3d 131, 146 11 (2017). 12 Thus, Glymph’s breach of contract claim is also barred by claim preclusion. 13 Although Defendants contend that the King County judgment precludes Glymph’s 14 remaining claims as well, the Court need not reach that argument because, as 15 explained below, each of those claims independently fails to state a claim.

16 3.3 Glymph’s Title II and Section 1981 claims fail because she pleads no facts of racial discrimination. 17 Glymph’s Title II public accommodations discrimination claim fails because 18 she does not allege facts showing that other similarly situated persons who were not 19 members of the protected class received the full benefits of the services or were 20 treated better. Opara v. Yellen, 57 F.4th 709, 722–23 (9th Cir. 2023). Nor does she 21 allege facts otherwise giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination. Id. 22 Alleging that such persons exist “[u]pon information and belief” is not enough. Dkt. 23 1 No. 12 at 6. Separately, Title II authorizes only injunctive relief, not damages, and 2 Glymph—who has been removed from the hotel and alleges only a past incident—

3 identifies no basis for prospective relief. Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 4 1120 n.6 (9th Cir. 2000). 5 Glymph’s Section 1981 claim fails for the same reason. Section 1981 prohibits 6 racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts. See 42 7 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Only purposeful discrimination violates Section 1981. Gen. Bldg. 8 Contractor's Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982). Glymph’s

9 complaint does not infer any purposeful racial discrimination. Snoqualmie Indian 10 Tribe v. City of Snoqualmie, 186 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1163 (W.D. Wash. 2016) (alleging 11 “[o]n information and belief” is not enough to allow the court to reasonably infer 12 that purposeful racial discrimination accounts for the alleged differential 13 treatment). 14 3.4 Glymph’s Section 1983, Fourth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims fail because Defendants are not state actors. 15 Glymph cannot meet the requirements of a Section 1983 claim against 16 Defendants. Section 1983 claims require that the Defendant acted “under color of 17 state law.” San Pedro Hotel Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 479 (9th 18 Cir. 1998). Defendants are a private hotel operator and its manager, not state 19 actors. Glymph’s allegation that Cockrell summoned police based on false 20 accusations does not change this, because “merely complaining to the police does not 21 convert a private party into a state actor.” Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 22 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008). 23 1 Similarly, Glymph’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims fail because 2 Defendants are not government actors. Dkt. No. 12 at 10. She alleges that

3 Defendants unauthorized entry into her room precipitated the arrival of law 4 enforcement’s arrival and her eventual removal from the hotel. Id. But Defendants 5 are private individuals, and Glymph does not allege that they were acting as agents 6 of law enforcement. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (the Fourth 7 Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches does not apply to a search 8 “by a private individual not acting as an agent of the government or with the

9 participation or knowledge of any government official.”). Glymph’s Fourteenth 10 Amendment claim fails because she has not sufficiently alleged that Defendants’ 11 actions are attributable to the State of Washington. Only when the government is 12 responsible for a plaintiff's complaints are individual constitutional rights 13 implicated. Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n., 531 U.S. 14 288, 295 (2001). 15 3.5 Glymph fails to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 16 Finally, Glymph fails to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 17 distress. This requires proof of the following elements: (1) extreme and outrageous 18 conduct, (2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3) actual 19 result to plaintiff of severe emotional distress. Trujillo v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc., 355 20 P.3d 1100, 1110 (2015) (citations omitted). The conduct must be “so outrageous in 21 character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, 22 and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” 23 1 Grimsby v. Samson, 530 P.2d 291, 295 (1975). Whether certain conduct is 2 sufficiently outrageous is ordinarily for the jury, but it is initially for the court to

3 determine whether reasonable minds could differ on whether the conduct was 4 sufficiently extreme to result in liability. Phillips v. Hardwick, 628 P.2d 506, 510 5 (1981). Even when construing the complaint in the light most favorable to Glymph, 6 Defendants’ conduct was not outrageous. This is largely because Glymph’s 7 description of Defendants’ conduct lacks sufficient detail. False accusations and 8 conclusory statements that Defendants subjected Glymph to “harassment,

9 unwarranted monitoring, and intimidation” are not enough to meet the first 10 element. Glymph also does not sufficiently plead the third element as she simply 11 states in a conclusory fashion that she suffered “severe emotional distress, including 12 humiliation, anxiety, embarrassment, and disruption to her personal and 13 professional life.” Dkt. No. 12 at 14. 14 3.6 Leave to amend. 15 The Court finds that further leave to amend is not warranted here. Glymph 16 has already had the opportunity to state a viable claim and has not done so. But 17 more importantly, the defects in Glymph’s amended complaint are not the result of 18 inartful pleading, they represent substantive defects that cannot be cured by 19 further amendment. This is especially clear for the constitutional claims, which fail 20 because Defendants are private parties, and no amendment can supply the state 21 action those claims require. See, e.g., Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int'l, 300 F.3d 1083, 22 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding “there is no need to prolong the litigation by 23 1 permitting further amendment” where the “basic flaw” in the pleading cannot be 2 cured); Fid. Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., 792 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th

3 Cir. 1986) (“The district court's discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly 4 broad where the court has already given the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his 5 complaint.”). 6 4. CONCLUSION 7 Accordingly, the Court orders as follows: 8 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 15 is GRANTED.

9 2. Plaintiff’s motion to strike, Dkt. No. 17, is DENIED. 10 3. This case is dismissed, with prejudice. 11 4. The Clerk is directed to close this case. 12 13 Dated this 26th day of June, 2026. 14 a Jamal N. Whitehead 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23