Ladwig v. United States
This text of 600 F.2d 803 (Ladwig v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This is an appeal from.-the judgment of the U.S. Customs Court, 81 Cust. Ct. 71, C.D. 4768, 460 F. Supp. 683 (1978), holding foreign market value defined in section 205 of the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 164 (1970),1 and not constructed value prescribed in section 206 of the act, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 165 (1970),2 to be the proper value for computing dumping duties on certain importations of pig iron from Canada. We affirm.
Background
The pig iron was subject to a special dumping duty under section 202 of the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 161 (1970).3 Customs assessed dumping duties equal to the differences between the foreign market value and the purchase prices.4 Appellant challenged these assessments in the Customs Court, arguing that no foreign market value was determinable at the time of the importa[105]*105tions and, therefore, the dumping duties should have been computed as the differences between constructed value and purchase prices.
To support its argument, appellant presented to the court seven exhibits which included a list of prices at which the producer of the pig iron in question had sold its production of pig iron in Canada and a letter written by Mr. Hobbs, president of Western Canada Steel, .the exporter of the subject pigiron.5 The letter contained the following statement concerning a Canadian market value:
Our prices in the Canadian market have varied based upon a number of factors which we take into account, but there is no regular price structure in terms of class of customer, quantity or other factors which are specifically definable.
All our sales are made on a delivered price basis, per long ton, and all money amounts are given in Canadian currency. No discounts are allowed. As shown in the tabulation, these prices include freight, and a standard $1 allowance per long ton for sales commission. The quality of the merchandise sold in the home market is the same as that sold for export to the United States. There is no financial relationship, directly or indirectly, between this company and any purchaser in Canada.
No witnesses were called before the Customs Court and appellant offered no further evidence with regard to the pricing policy of any of the other Canadian producers of pig iron.6
Customs Court
The Customs Court noted that foreign market value can be determined from the value at which “such or similar” merchandise was sold or offered for sale. According to the Customs Court, the definition of “such or similar merchandise”7 required appellant to offer evidence [106]*106to negate the existence of a determinable market value for each type of merchandise set forth in the subparagraphs of the definition. The court concluded appellant's price list at best showed sales at varying prices but, stated that without further explanation, such a list was insufficient to establish that no one price existed at which the pig iron could be purchased. The court noted that the record was silent with regard to the sales oí offers of the other pig iron producers and that, although the record reflected sales to Japan by Western Canada Steel, no information was submitted concerning the prices and quantities involved. The court held that the value as found by Customs had not been rebutted because of appellant’s failure to introduce evidence to meet every material issue.8
Opinion
Despite appellant’s arguments to the contrary, the Customs Court correctly concluded that in order to prove that no foreign market value existed for the pig iron in question, it was necessary for appellant to negate the existence of a determinable value for each of the types of merchandise described in the six subparagraphs of the definition of “such or similar merchandise.”
In Nichols v. United States, 59 CCPA 67, C.A.D. 1041, 454 F. 2d 1183 (1972), this court held that an importer wishing to disprove the existence of foreign value for particular merchandise on the basis of lack of a free market in the country of origin must establish that “similar” as well as “such” merchandise was not freely offered for sale in the relevant country during the relevant period.9 In essence, the court took cognizance of the conjunctive construction of the provision.
Section 205 of the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 164, also requires examination of the price of “such or similar” merchandise. In this instance, this phrase is defined in the statute 10 and the legislative history of the definition makes clear its meaning.
The definition first appeared in Public Law No. 85-630, 72 Stat. 583, which amended the Antidumping Act of 1921. The amendment was accompanied by the following statement in the Senate report:
Section 5 of the bill, as reported, inserts a new section 212 in the law, entitled “Definitions.” Section 212(3) defines “such or similar merchandise.” Subparagraphs (A) and (B) describe merchandise which is identical — i.e., “such” merchandise. Subparagraphs (C), (D), (E), and (F) describe merchandise [107]*107which can be considered “similar.” Section 202 (b)(3) and (c)(3) of the Antidumping Act, as added by section 2 of the bill, as reported, provide that where “similar” merchandise (i.e., merchandise described in sec. 212(3) (C), (D), (E), or (F)) rather than “such” merchandise (i.e., merchandise described in sec. 212(3) (A) or (B)) is being compared, allowance may be made for differences between the articles under consideration.11
No significant amendments were made to the definition of “such or similar merchandise” between the time of its enactment and the date of the subject importations.
With the definition of “such or similar merchandise” and its legislative history in mind, it is apparent that it was incumbent upon appellant to negate the existence of a determinable value under each of the subparagraphs of the definition. Since the only evidence introduced by appellant consisted of the unexplained price lists and the conclusory statement of Mr. Hobbs, and since no evidence was presented concerning the sales of the other Canadian producers of pig iron, we hold that appellant was fallen far short of fulfilling its burden. Further, appellant failed to establish why any offers for sale of pig iron within Canada or sales of pig iron for export to Japan contemporaneously with the subject importations should not have been considered as provided in section 205 of the Antidumping Act, supra.
Conclusion
Appellant has failed to rebut the existence of a foreign market value for pig iron under section 205 of the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 164 (1970).
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
600 F.2d 803, 66 C.C.P.A. 103, 1979 CCPA LEXIS 228, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ladwig-v-united-states-ccpa-1979.