U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-2173
LABORATORY CHARTER SCHOOL, Appellant
v.
M.R.S., BY AND THROUGH HER PARENT SHARONA SMITH; SHARON SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY _____________________________ Appeal from the U.S. District Court, E.D. Pa. Judge Juan R. Sánchez, No. 2:21-cv-05538
Before: PORTER, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and BOVE, Circuit Judges Submitted Apr. 8, 2026; Decided Apr. 21, 2026 _____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION *
MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge. In this appeal under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), Laboratory Charter School (“Lab Charter”) seeks
reversal of a District Court’s order holding that Lab Charter denied M.R.S., a disabled
minor, a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) for her sixth-grade year, and award-
ing M.R.S. partial compensatory education. We agree with the District Court’s conclu-
sions, so we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 1
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. First, the District Court did not commit reversible error in finding that Lab Charter
denied a FAPE to M.R.S. in her sixth-grade year. 2 The District Court found that Lab Char-
ter failed to reevaluate M.R.S. for a new Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) by
April 4, 2020—even though the IDEA mandated this reevaluation. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(a)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring, at minimum, triennial reevaluations); Ridley Sch. Dist. v.
M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The IEP is . . . the primary mechanism for deliv-
ering a FAPE.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). What is more, the District Court
noted that an independent evaluation of M.R.S. revealed that the IEP Lab Charter eventu-
ally put in place was insufficient. 3 Our own review of that evaluation reveals that M.R.S.
suffered from several mental-health issues, including “[s]ignificant symptoms of depres-
sion,” “[s]ignificant variability on cognitive ability testing,” “[s]ignificant problems on
tasks of executive functioning,” and “[s]ignificant academic weaknesses across reading,
writing and math.” Joint Appendix (hereinafter “App. __”) 710. And if those difficulties
2 Whether Lab Charter fulfilled its FAPE obligations is a question “subject to clear error review as [a] question[] of fact.” P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 735 (3d Cir. 2009). That highly deferential standard demands our adherence to the District Court’s factual findings unless those findings are not “plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985). 3 Lab Charter assails the District Court for failing to accept the state administrative officer’s credibility determinations as to this independent evaluation. But our law does not require unbridled deference to state agencies. See S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Factual findings from the administrative proceedings are to be considered prima facie correct. If a reviewing court fails to adhere to them, it is obliged to explain why.” (citation modified)). Here, the District Court explained why it departed from the officer’s determinations. And the officer did not make credibility find- ings because, as M.R.S. points out, the author of the evaluation did not testify.
2 did not put Lab Charter on notice of the need for a new IEP, M.R.S.’s “lack of progress in
school” should have. Lab’y Charter Sch. v. M.R.S. ex rel. S.S., No. 21-cv-5538, 2025 WL
1508020, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2025) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A)(i)). Still, Lab
Charter did not reevaluate M.R.S.’s IEP. See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty.
Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 399 (2017) (“To meet its substantive obligation under the
IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress
appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”).
Lab Charter counters that the District Court overlooked the school’s “reasonable
efforts to educate M.R.S.” and “develop a new IEP.” Opening Br. 20. Even accepting Lab
Charter’s view of the record, we cannot reverse just because we “would have weighed the
evidence differently.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574; see also Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v.
DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 277 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that challengers must “provide[]
evidence that overcomes the deference that we must give to . . . factual findings”). But
also, the District Court did not overlook Lab Charter’s efforts to educate M.R.S. To the
contrary, the District Court considered that Lab Charter made “significant efforts to ad-
dress” M.R.S.’s sixth-grade academic challenges. Lab’y Charter Sch., 2025 WL 1508020,
at *3. It found those efforts insufficient for the reasons discussed above. And we see no
reversible error in those findings.
Second, we also see no reversible error in the District Court’s award of partial com-
pensatory education to M.R.S. 4 The District Court awarded compensatory education for
4 We review that award for abuse of discretion. Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 716 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872 (3d Cir. 1990)).
3 M.R.S.’s sixth-grade year, less two months for “the time reasonably required for the school
district to rectify the problem.” Lab’y Charter Sch., 2025 WL 1508020, at *5 (quoting D.F
v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ., 694 F.3d 488, 499 (3d Cir. 2012)).
Lab Charter argues that the District Court abused its discretion because it awarded
M.R.S. compensatory education for 81.5 days that she was absent. The school attributes
those absences to M.R.S.’s struggles with remote education during the COVID-19 pan-
demic, not its denial of a FAPE. We disagree. Lab Charter is correct that the IDEA gen-
erally does not contemplate compensatory education for factors beyond the school’s con-
trol. See Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 575 F.3d 235, 251 (3d Cir. 2009) (refusing to
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U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-2173
LABORATORY CHARTER SCHOOL, Appellant
v.
M.R.S., BY AND THROUGH HER PARENT SHARONA SMITH; SHARON SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY _____________________________ Appeal from the U.S. District Court, E.D. Pa. Judge Juan R. Sánchez, No. 2:21-cv-05538
Before: PORTER, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and BOVE, Circuit Judges Submitted Apr. 8, 2026; Decided Apr. 21, 2026 _____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION *
MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge. In this appeal under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), Laboratory Charter School (“Lab Charter”) seeks
reversal of a District Court’s order holding that Lab Charter denied M.R.S., a disabled
minor, a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) for her sixth-grade year, and award-
ing M.R.S. partial compensatory education. We agree with the District Court’s conclu-
sions, so we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 1
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. First, the District Court did not commit reversible error in finding that Lab Charter
denied a FAPE to M.R.S. in her sixth-grade year. 2 The District Court found that Lab Char-
ter failed to reevaluate M.R.S. for a new Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) by
April 4, 2020—even though the IDEA mandated this reevaluation. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(a)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring, at minimum, triennial reevaluations); Ridley Sch. Dist. v.
M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The IEP is . . . the primary mechanism for deliv-
ering a FAPE.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). What is more, the District Court
noted that an independent evaluation of M.R.S. revealed that the IEP Lab Charter eventu-
ally put in place was insufficient. 3 Our own review of that evaluation reveals that M.R.S.
suffered from several mental-health issues, including “[s]ignificant symptoms of depres-
sion,” “[s]ignificant variability on cognitive ability testing,” “[s]ignificant problems on
tasks of executive functioning,” and “[s]ignificant academic weaknesses across reading,
writing and math.” Joint Appendix (hereinafter “App. __”) 710. And if those difficulties
2 Whether Lab Charter fulfilled its FAPE obligations is a question “subject to clear error review as [a] question[] of fact.” P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 735 (3d Cir. 2009). That highly deferential standard demands our adherence to the District Court’s factual findings unless those findings are not “plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985). 3 Lab Charter assails the District Court for failing to accept the state administrative officer’s credibility determinations as to this independent evaluation. But our law does not require unbridled deference to state agencies. See S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Factual findings from the administrative proceedings are to be considered prima facie correct. If a reviewing court fails to adhere to them, it is obliged to explain why.” (citation modified)). Here, the District Court explained why it departed from the officer’s determinations. And the officer did not make credibility find- ings because, as M.R.S. points out, the author of the evaluation did not testify.
2 did not put Lab Charter on notice of the need for a new IEP, M.R.S.’s “lack of progress in
school” should have. Lab’y Charter Sch. v. M.R.S. ex rel. S.S., No. 21-cv-5538, 2025 WL
1508020, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2025) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A)(i)). Still, Lab
Charter did not reevaluate M.R.S.’s IEP. See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty.
Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 399 (2017) (“To meet its substantive obligation under the
IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress
appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”).
Lab Charter counters that the District Court overlooked the school’s “reasonable
efforts to educate M.R.S.” and “develop a new IEP.” Opening Br. 20. Even accepting Lab
Charter’s view of the record, we cannot reverse just because we “would have weighed the
evidence differently.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574; see also Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v.
DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 277 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that challengers must “provide[]
evidence that overcomes the deference that we must give to . . . factual findings”). But
also, the District Court did not overlook Lab Charter’s efforts to educate M.R.S. To the
contrary, the District Court considered that Lab Charter made “significant efforts to ad-
dress” M.R.S.’s sixth-grade academic challenges. Lab’y Charter Sch., 2025 WL 1508020,
at *3. It found those efforts insufficient for the reasons discussed above. And we see no
reversible error in those findings.
Second, we also see no reversible error in the District Court’s award of partial com-
pensatory education to M.R.S. 4 The District Court awarded compensatory education for
4 We review that award for abuse of discretion. Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 716 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872 (3d Cir. 1990)).
3 M.R.S.’s sixth-grade year, less two months for “the time reasonably required for the school
district to rectify the problem.” Lab’y Charter Sch., 2025 WL 1508020, at *5 (quoting D.F
v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ., 694 F.3d 488, 499 (3d Cir. 2012)).
Lab Charter argues that the District Court abused its discretion because it awarded
M.R.S. compensatory education for 81.5 days that she was absent. The school attributes
those absences to M.R.S.’s struggles with remote education during the COVID-19 pan-
demic, not its denial of a FAPE. We disagree. Lab Charter is correct that the IDEA gen-
erally does not contemplate compensatory education for factors beyond the school’s con-
trol. See Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 575 F.3d 235, 251 (3d Cir. 2009) (refusing to
award compensatory education for a period in which a student suffered an acute medical
condition). But we also hold schools liable for periods “accru[ing] from the point that the
school district knows or should know of the IEP’s failure.” M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l
Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 396 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Ferren C., 612 F.3d at 717 (reasoning
that compensatory education is “a remedy to compensate the student for rights the district
already denied because the School District violated the statutory rights while the student
was still entitled to them” (citation modified)). As the District Court found, Lab Charter
was on notice that its IEP failed M.R.S. at least as early as the beginning of her sixth-grade
year—thus at least partially explaining M.R.S.’s absenteeism. Because the District Court
“An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court’s decision rests upon a clearly errone- ous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Id. (citing P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006)).
4 plausibly found that fact, we discern no abuse of discretion in its award of compensatory
education.
For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.