Laboratory Charter School v. M. S.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: July 24, 2024
• Docket: 23-2473
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________

Nos. 23-2473, 23-2642 & 23-3199 _______________

LABORATORY CHARTER SCHOOL, Appellant in Nos. 23-2473 & 23-3199

v.

M.R.S., by and through her parent Sharona Smith, Sharona Smith individually, Appellants in No. 23-2642 _______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-21-cv-05538) District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sánchez _______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on June 25, 2024

Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and MATEY, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: July 24, 2024)

_______________

OPINION * _______________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

As a student with a disability, M.R.S. is entitled to a Free Appropriate Public

Education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). But

during her fifth-grade year, M.R.S.’s new school, Laboratory Charter (Lab Charter),

failed both to develop an appropriate Individualized Education Program (IEP) and to

reevaluate her abilities, as required by law. At the beginning of her seventh-grade year,

after M.R.S. struggled to adapt to virtual learning necessitated by the COVID pandemic

during sixth grade, Lab Charter excluded M.R.S. from school completely, claiming she

had withdrawn.

M.R.S.’s mother, S.S., filed two due process complaints against Lab Charter

alleging violations of the IDEA. A state hearing officer issued a “stay put” order placing

M.R.S. at Lab Charter and determined that Lab Charter had denied M.R.S. a FAPE

during fifth grade and a portion of seventh grade, but not during sixth grade, the year of

virtual schooling. The District Court affirmed the hearing officer in full and awarded

attorney’s fees and costs to M.R.S. While we agree that M.R.S. was denied a FAPE

during her fifth- and seventh-grade years, the District Court prematurely concluded that

equitable considerations bar recovery for her virtual sixth-grade year without assessing

whether M.R.S. was denied a FAPE in the first place. We will therefore affirm in part

and remand for further proceedings on that issue and the issue of fees and costs.

2 DISCUSSION 1

I. Denial of a FAPE

Under the IDEA, states that receive federal funding must provide a FAPE to every

child with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). The “primary mechanism” for

delivering a FAPE is the child’s IEP, Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 269 (3d

Cir. 2012) (citation omitted), which a local educational agency (LEA) is obliged to have

in place for every student with a disability at the beginning of each school year, 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(d)(2)(A). 2

If a student has been denied a FAPE, she may seek “compensatory education” in

the form of educational services within the district. C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist.,

606 F.3d 59, 66 (3d Cir. 2010). Although a procedural violation of the IDEA will not in

itself warrant compensatory education, a denial of a FAPE may occur when a procedural

violation “causes substantive harm to the child or [her] parents.” Id. (quoting Knable ex

rel. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 765 (6th Cir. 2001)).

The District Court had jurisdiction under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), (3)(A), and 1

we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. When reviewing a state administrative decision under the IDEA, a district court applies “a nontraditional standard of review, sometimes referred to as ‘modified de novo’ review.” Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2010)). A hearing officer’s factual findings “are to be considered prima facie correct,” and “[i]f a reviewing court fails to adhere to them, it is obliged to explain why.” Id. (quoting S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003)). We review the district court’s findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard, and we exercise plenary review over its conclusions of law. Id.

A charter school qualifies as an LEA. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.28(a); Hatikvah Int’l 2

Acad. Charter Sch. v. E. Brunswick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 10 F.4th 215, 217 (3d Cir. 2021). 3 A. FAPE During the 2019–2020 School Year

The hearing officer correctly determined that Lab Charter denied M.R.S. a FAPE

during her fifth-grade year. M.R.S.’s initial Lab Charter enrollment form indicated that

her previous school had developed an IEP to provide her extra academic support, and

S.S. discussed M.R.S.’s special needs with Lab Charter’s principal. But Lab Charter did

not obtain the existing IEP or develop a new IEP for M.R.S. until May 2020, after class

had ended for the year. An LEA that “knows or should know that a child has an

inappropriate IEP” and that fails to correct the situation is liable to provide compensatory

education for the period of deprivation, M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d

389, 397 (3d Cir. 1996), and here, Lab Charter failed to remedy a situation where a child

with a known disability had no IEP at all. We therefore agree with the hearing officer

that the school’s failure to develop and implement an IEP was a per se denial of a FAPE,

justifying an award of compensatory education.

B. FAPE During the 2020–2021 School Year

The hearing officer denied M.R.S. relief for her sixth-grade year, holding that

M.R.S. was not deprived of a FAPE during that period and that, even if she were, her

mother’s failure to cooperate in the IEP process precludes recovery on equitable grounds.

The District Court affirmed on the basis of S.S.’s alleged noncooperation and declined to

address the finding that M.R.S. was not denied a FAPE. We believe the District Court

too quickly denied relief on that ground alone, so we will remand for further proceedings.

In concluding that relief was inappropriate, the District Court relied primarily on

evidence concerning S.S.’s failure to attend a meeting to discuss her daughter’s IEP. Lab

4 Charter had scheduled the meeting after S.S. raised concerns about M.R.S.’s

accommodations, but S.S. apparently did not respond to the school’s invitation. The

District Court treated S.S.’s lack of response alone as sufficient to bar relief. But there

are any number of reasons a parent might miss an IEP meeting, and we are aware of no

authority holding that a parent’s failure to attend a single IEP meeting per se precludes all

recovery for the denial of a FAPE. Rather, a number of factors, including S.S.’s

participation at other points in the IEP process and her efforts to organize the meeting in

the first place, must be considered together to determine whether the “equities” warrant a

reduction of a student’s recovery for IDEA violations. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A.,

557 U.S. 230, 247 (2009); see also Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 718

(3d Cir. 2010) (“In fashioning discretionary equitable relief under the IDEA, a court must

‘consider all relevant factors.’” (quoting Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7,

16 (1993))). On remand, if the District Court determines that M.R.S. was denied a FAPE

during her sixth-grade year, it should more thoroughly weigh the evidence concerning

S.S.’s actions as they relate to Lab Charter’s ability to provide M.R.S. with a FAPE

before denying recovery on equitable grounds.

In the first instance, though, the District Court should review the hearing officer’s

determination that M.R.S. was not denied a FAPE during sixth grade. The IDEA requires

LEAs to reevaluate each student with a disability at least once every three years. 20

U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2). Though a failure to conduct this triennial reevaluation is itself only

a procedural violation of the IDEA, it may result in a substantive denial of a FAPE if it

(1) “[i]mpeded the child’s right to a FAPE;” (2) “[s]ignificantly impeded the parent’s

5 opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a

FAPE to the parent’s child; or” (3) “[c]aused a deprivation of educational benefit.” 34

C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2).

Here, the hearing officer explained that M.R.S.’s frequent absences from virtual

class made it difficult for Lab Charter to implement her IEP, despite its “appropriate and

significant efforts” to support her. App. 846. But it also found that Lab Charter prepared

M.R.S.’s May 2020 IEP without first conducting a reevaluation, even though she was due

for one in April 2020. Had Lab Charter reevaluated M.R.S. before she began sixth grade,

as required by law, the school may have used different strategies to engage with her

during the pandemic. It is therefore plausible that Lab Charter’s procedural violation

caused substantive harm to M.R.S., depriving her of educational benefit. See Ridley Sch.

Dist., 680 F.3d at 269. The District Court did not discuss this possibility, so we will

remand to give it that opportunity.

II. Stay Put Order

We now turn to the hearing officer’s stay put order, his determination that Lab

Charter unlawfully excluded M.R.S. at the start of her seventh-grade year, and the

resulting award of compensatory education confirmed by the District Court. We agree

with the District Court and will affirm.

The IDEA’s “stay put” provision prescribes that “[a] child shall remain in [her]

then-current educational placement” during the pendency of any due process

proceedings. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). This rule “reflects Congress’s policy choice that all

children with disabilities remain in their current educational placement until the dispute

6 about their placement is resolved.” Hatikvah Int’l Acad. Charter Sch. v. E. Brunswick

Twp. Bd. of Educ., 10 F.4th 215, 218 (3d Cir. 2021). The “dispositive factor in deciding

a child’s ‘current educational placement’ should be the [IEP] . . . functioning when the

‘stay put’ is invoked.” Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1996)

(quoting Drinker ex rel. Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 867 (3d Cir. 1996)).

At the start of the 2021–2022 school year, M.R.S.’s IEP placed her at Lab Charter.

Lab Charter argues that M.R.S. had withdrawn from the school by the time she

filed her due process complaint. But the record reflects that S.S. never withdrew her

daughter from Lab Charter and made her intentions to keep M.R.S. at the school

abundantly clear. The hearing officer found M.R.S.’s witnesses more credible than Lab

Charter’s witnesses on this point, and we afford that determination “special weight.” D.S.

v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2010). The documentary evidence,

including a series of emails among S.S., the school, and their respective attorneys, also

supports this conclusion. Any possible miscommunications between the parties—a

single email stating “No problem!” and a middle schooler’s alleged confusion about her

future educational plans, App. 1040—hardly suggest otherwise.

By wrongfully excluding M.R.S. at the beginning of the 2021–2022 school year,

Lab Charter abdicated its duty to provide her with a FAPE, so we agree with the District

Court that compensatory education is an appropriate remedy.

III. Attorney’s Fees and Costs

In a separate appeal, Lab Charter challenges the District Court’s award of

attorney’s fees and costs to M.R.S., the “prevailing party” under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C.

7 § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). Given that we are remanding a portion of this case to the District

Court, we will not presently rule on the issue. 3

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in

part, vacate in part, and remand for the Court to determine whether M.R.S. was denied a

FAPE during the 2020–2021 school year in the first instance.

3 Lab Charter also argues for an award of attorney’s fees in its favor under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)–(III). That provision, however, is only applicable when a parent’s complaint was either “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” or “presented for any improper purpose.” Here, that characterization is foreclosed by the rulings of each tribunal that considered this matter. 8