La Grange v. Nueces County

989 S.W.2d 96, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 248, 1999 WL 152452
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 14, 1999
Docket13-97-215-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 989 S.W.2d 96 (La Grange v. Nueces County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
La Grange v. Nueces County, 989 S.W.2d 96, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 248, 1999 WL 152452 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

HINOJOSA, J.

We issued our original opinion in this case on August 31, 1998. Appellant, Gerard La Grange, subsequently filed a motion for rehearing. We deny appellant’s motion for rehearing, withdraw our opinion of August 31, 1998, and substitute the following as the opinion of the Court.

La Grange, sued appellee, Nueces County, for retaliatory discrimination in violation of the Whistleblower Act. A jury found that the Nueces County Sheriffs Department did not retaliate against La Grange when it demoted him for making a false report. La Grange complains the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding of no retaliation. La Grange contends the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite. We affirm.

In October 1992, La Grange was a sergeant with the Nueces County Sheriffs Department, serving in a supervisory position with the county’s jail operations. His immediate superior was Lt. Thomas Bailey, who in turn reported to Capt. Raymond Robinson.

On October 26, 1992, La Grange delivered a written report to Capt. Robinson claiming that on the previous day he had witnessed Lt. Bailey using excessive force while restraining an inmate. After receiving La Grange’s report, the internal affairs officer with the department’s Criminal Investigation Division conducted an investigation. The investigators determined the allegations were “not sustained.” Following a hearing on November 9, 1992, at which two of the three panelists determined the allegations were false and not the result of honest misperception, Nueces County Sheriff James Hickey ordered La Grange demoted to detention officer. La Grange filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission. On the advice of counsel, the Sheriffs Department objected that it was not subject to the Civil Service Commission’s jurisdiction and did not appear at the hearing. In the absence of opposition, the Civil Service Commission ordered La Grange’s reinstatement to his former rank.

La Grange sued Nueces County, asserting his demotion was unlawful retaliation for whistleblowing on the misconduct of a fellow law enforcement officer. A jury determined the demotion was not retaliation. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Nueces County.

By three points of error, La Grange contends (1) the evidence conclusively establishes his claim of retaliation for whistleblow-ing, (2) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding of no *99 retaliation, and (3) Nueces County failed to rebut the statutory presumption of unlawful retaliation. Because La Grange argues all of his points together, we will address them together.

A. Whistleblower Act

The Whistleblower Act provides for the recovery of damages and other relief when a governmental entity discriminates against a public employee who in good faith reports a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement agency. See Tex. Gov’t Code ANN. § 554.002 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1998). The Act provides for a rebuttable presumption of retaliation if adverse action is taken against the employee within ninety days of making the report. Id. § 554.004. Even if the employee reports a violation of law, the Whistleblower Act does not prohibit an employer from disciplining an employee who willfully makes false allegations. See Wichita County, Tex. v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex.1996).

The demotion occurred in 1992 when a former version of the Whistleblower Act applied. 1 Nevertheless, because the jury was instructed, without objection, under the current version, we will perform our analysis under the current version.

On appeal, La Grange argues that Nueces County conceded he was retaliated against, thus leaving the issue of good faith as the only fact in dispute. He contends the following language in the disciplinary memo amounts to an admission of retaliation:

The formal disciplinary action that will be taken against you is not in retaliation for making a legitimate complaint but merely progressive discipline being imposed on you for making false and frivolous allegations against Lt. Thomas Bailey.

We disagree with La Grange’s interpretation.

Preceding this sentence, the memo explains the investigators determined that only reasonable force was used to restrain the inmate and notes that neither the inmate nor the other officers present at the time of the alleged misconduct confirmed La Grange’s allegations of excessive force. Following the sentence, the memo cites six violated provisions of the Nueces County Sheriffs Department General Manual concerning truthfulness in making reports. The memo plainly sets out prima facie legitimate grounds for the disciplinary action, raising a fact question which the jury determined.

Furthermore, we find that good faith is not an issue in this appeal. The questions submitted to the jury were conditioned on affirmative answers to preceding questions. The first question asked the jury:

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Nueces County retaliated against the Plaintiff by demoting him for reporting a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority?

If the jury answered in the affirmative, it was instructed to answer the next question as well:

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such Plaintiffs report was made in “good faith?”

The jury answered the first question “No.” Thus, the jury found that La Grange’s demotion was not an act of retaliation for reporting a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement agency. Because the second question was conditioned on an affirmative finding of retaliation, the jury did not reach the issue of good faith.

By its finding in favor of Nueces County on question one, the jury must have found that the County successfully rebutted the presumption of retaliation by proving that the stated reason for its disciplinary action was justified. La Grange further contends the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of retaliation.

B. Standard of Review

When a party with the burden of proof complains on appeal from an adverse jury finding, the appropriate points of error are “that the matter was established as a matter of law” or “that the jury’s finding was against the great weight and preponderance *100 of the evidence.” Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex.1983). When we review a legal sufficiency or “that the matter was established as a matter of law” point, we examine the record for evidence supporting the finding of fact and ignore all evidence to the contrary. Sterner v. Marathon, 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989); Hickey v. Couchman, 797 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).

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989 S.W.2d 96, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 248, 1999 WL 152452, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/la-grange-v-nueces-county-texapp-1999.