BILLINGS, Judge.
Appeal from the decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission to uphold the Director of Revenue’s assessment of a use [625]*625tax upon egg processing equipment purchased by Petitioner-Appellant, L & R Egg Company (appellant).
The sole question before the Court is whether equipment used to clean, oil, inspect, weigh, grade, pack and mark chicken eggs is “manufacturing” equipment, within the meaning of § 144-030.2(5), RSMo 1986, so as to exempt Appellant from payment of use tax on that equipment. The Commission found that it is not manufacturing equipment. Affirmed.
The facts are not disputed. Appellant purchases eggs from farmers, then processes and sells the eggs to retailers. To expand and modernize operations, Appellant purchased and installed an air door and an egg processing system, but paid neither sales nor use tax on either. Following an audit, the Director of Revenue assessed a use tax on both.
When eggs are delivered to appellant’s plant, they are sent through the air door into a cooler for storage before processing. The air door blows a constant stream of air over the eggs as they enter, keeping the warm, outside air from entering the cooler, and permitting the cooler door to remain open for ready access.
The egg processing system handles several tasks. A conveyor transports stacked flats of eggs to the pre-loader, which sends flats to the loader individually. The loader consists of a series of suction cups, which pick up the eggs and place them on spool bars. The empty flats are then conveyed to washing and stacking areas.
Once on the spool bars, the eggs are conveyed through the washer to be sprayed and scrubbed. The temperature of the washing compound is 15 degrees warmer than the eggs’ interiors to prevent contaminants from entering through the porous egg shells. The eggs are then rinsed, air dried, and coated with mineral oil to replace the natural sealant lost during washing. The oil retards spoilage.
The eggs are next conveyed to the pre-candle area where a worker removes stained, dirty or leaking eggs. The remaining eggs are conveyed to the candle booth and pass over a 12,000 watt light source. A worker inspects the eggs and, using an electric wand, removes those with cracks or blood spots.
The remaining eggs are weighed individually by computer, and segregated by weight into classes. They are then conveyed to the packing area, packed, and the cartons stamped with the required dates and codes. The cartons are conveyed to a packaging station, where they are manually packed into cases, then conveyed to an automatic sealer for taping. Finally, each case is marked with the date, grade and size of the eggs, and packer identification number. The cases are stored in a cooler prior to shipping.
This processing does not affect the contents of the eggs. The equipment has, however, enabled appellant to double its annual output.
Construction of Missouri revenue law is a matter for the Court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Mo. Const, art. V, § 3. The Court reviews the Administrative Hearing Commission’s interpretation of revenue law de novo, Jackson Excavating Co. v. Administrative Hearing Commission, 646 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Mo.1983), and must affirm the decision of the Commission “if supported by the law and competent and substantial evidence on the whole record, and ... not clearly contrary to the reasonable expectations of the General Assembly.” GTE Automatic Electric v. Director of Revenue, 780 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Mo. banc 1989), and § 621.193, RSMo 1986.
While it is true that tax exemptions are generally construed against the party claiming the exemption, GTE, 780 S.W.2d at 50, the proper starting point for analysis is the plain language of the tax statute itself. See State ex rel. Union Electric Co. v. Goldberg, 578 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Mo. banc 1979). The Court will not construe a statute so as to wrench from it a result not intended by the legislature, and inconsistent with the import of the language of the statute. Union Electric, 578 S.W.2d at 923.
Section 144-030.2(5) provides an exemption from use tax for:
[626]*626Machinery and equipment, ... purchased and used ... to expand existing manufacturing ... plants in the State if such machinery and equipment is used directly in manufacturing ... a product which is intended to be sold ultimately for final use or consumption, (emphasis added)
The issue of definition of the term “manufacturing,” in the context of the above statute, has arisen before. This everyday term, however, has defied convenient interpretation, because its applications and meanings vary with the factual settings in which it is used. State ex rel. AMF, Inc. v. Spradling, 518 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Mo.1974).
“Manufacturing” has been defined as a process which changes and adapts something practically unsuitable for any common use into something suitable for common use. West Lake Quarry & Material Co. v. Schaffner, 451 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Mo.1970). It has been defined as the production of new and different articles, by the use of machinery, labor and skill, in forms suitable for new applications. Heidelberg Central, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 476 S.W.2d 502, 506 (Mo.1972). It is a process which “makes more than a superficial change in the original substance; it causes a substantial transformation in quality and adaptability and creates an end product quite different from the original.” Jackson Excavating Co. v. Administrative Hearing Commission, 646 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Mo.1983).
Regardless of the definitional variation used, the processing through which appellant puts the eggs which it obtains from the farmers cannot be called “manufacturing” in any ordinary sense of the word. Neither city-dwellers nor country folks would consider an egg, just gathered from the hen’s nest, unsuitable for common use to begin with. It can be eaten, sold from the back of the farmer’s truck, or even incubated. Appellant thus fails the West Lake Quarry definition.
Nor are the Heidelberg and Jackson Excavating definitions met. Logic is strained to suggest that by appellant's use of the air door and processing system, the clean and neatly packaged eggs have taken on forms suitable for new applications, or are an end product quite different from the original.
Appellant argues, given the fungible nature of the product, that if the focus of inquiry is properly placed on the processed batches of eggs as a whole, rather than on the individual egg, then the egg processing must be “manufacturing” within the meaning of § 1^.030.2(5). Appellant also places great emphasis on the regulation of the egg industry.
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BILLINGS, Judge.
Appeal from the decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission to uphold the Director of Revenue’s assessment of a use [625]*625tax upon egg processing equipment purchased by Petitioner-Appellant, L & R Egg Company (appellant).
The sole question before the Court is whether equipment used to clean, oil, inspect, weigh, grade, pack and mark chicken eggs is “manufacturing” equipment, within the meaning of § 144-030.2(5), RSMo 1986, so as to exempt Appellant from payment of use tax on that equipment. The Commission found that it is not manufacturing equipment. Affirmed.
The facts are not disputed. Appellant purchases eggs from farmers, then processes and sells the eggs to retailers. To expand and modernize operations, Appellant purchased and installed an air door and an egg processing system, but paid neither sales nor use tax on either. Following an audit, the Director of Revenue assessed a use tax on both.
When eggs are delivered to appellant’s plant, they are sent through the air door into a cooler for storage before processing. The air door blows a constant stream of air over the eggs as they enter, keeping the warm, outside air from entering the cooler, and permitting the cooler door to remain open for ready access.
The egg processing system handles several tasks. A conveyor transports stacked flats of eggs to the pre-loader, which sends flats to the loader individually. The loader consists of a series of suction cups, which pick up the eggs and place them on spool bars. The empty flats are then conveyed to washing and stacking areas.
Once on the spool bars, the eggs are conveyed through the washer to be sprayed and scrubbed. The temperature of the washing compound is 15 degrees warmer than the eggs’ interiors to prevent contaminants from entering through the porous egg shells. The eggs are then rinsed, air dried, and coated with mineral oil to replace the natural sealant lost during washing. The oil retards spoilage.
The eggs are next conveyed to the pre-candle area where a worker removes stained, dirty or leaking eggs. The remaining eggs are conveyed to the candle booth and pass over a 12,000 watt light source. A worker inspects the eggs and, using an electric wand, removes those with cracks or blood spots.
The remaining eggs are weighed individually by computer, and segregated by weight into classes. They are then conveyed to the packing area, packed, and the cartons stamped with the required dates and codes. The cartons are conveyed to a packaging station, where they are manually packed into cases, then conveyed to an automatic sealer for taping. Finally, each case is marked with the date, grade and size of the eggs, and packer identification number. The cases are stored in a cooler prior to shipping.
This processing does not affect the contents of the eggs. The equipment has, however, enabled appellant to double its annual output.
Construction of Missouri revenue law is a matter for the Court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Mo. Const, art. V, § 3. The Court reviews the Administrative Hearing Commission’s interpretation of revenue law de novo, Jackson Excavating Co. v. Administrative Hearing Commission, 646 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Mo.1983), and must affirm the decision of the Commission “if supported by the law and competent and substantial evidence on the whole record, and ... not clearly contrary to the reasonable expectations of the General Assembly.” GTE Automatic Electric v. Director of Revenue, 780 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Mo. banc 1989), and § 621.193, RSMo 1986.
While it is true that tax exemptions are generally construed against the party claiming the exemption, GTE, 780 S.W.2d at 50, the proper starting point for analysis is the plain language of the tax statute itself. See State ex rel. Union Electric Co. v. Goldberg, 578 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Mo. banc 1979). The Court will not construe a statute so as to wrench from it a result not intended by the legislature, and inconsistent with the import of the language of the statute. Union Electric, 578 S.W.2d at 923.
Section 144-030.2(5) provides an exemption from use tax for:
[626]*626Machinery and equipment, ... purchased and used ... to expand existing manufacturing ... plants in the State if such machinery and equipment is used directly in manufacturing ... a product which is intended to be sold ultimately for final use or consumption, (emphasis added)
The issue of definition of the term “manufacturing,” in the context of the above statute, has arisen before. This everyday term, however, has defied convenient interpretation, because its applications and meanings vary with the factual settings in which it is used. State ex rel. AMF, Inc. v. Spradling, 518 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Mo.1974).
“Manufacturing” has been defined as a process which changes and adapts something practically unsuitable for any common use into something suitable for common use. West Lake Quarry & Material Co. v. Schaffner, 451 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Mo.1970). It has been defined as the production of new and different articles, by the use of machinery, labor and skill, in forms suitable for new applications. Heidelberg Central, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 476 S.W.2d 502, 506 (Mo.1972). It is a process which “makes more than a superficial change in the original substance; it causes a substantial transformation in quality and adaptability and creates an end product quite different from the original.” Jackson Excavating Co. v. Administrative Hearing Commission, 646 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Mo.1983).
Regardless of the definitional variation used, the processing through which appellant puts the eggs which it obtains from the farmers cannot be called “manufacturing” in any ordinary sense of the word. Neither city-dwellers nor country folks would consider an egg, just gathered from the hen’s nest, unsuitable for common use to begin with. It can be eaten, sold from the back of the farmer’s truck, or even incubated. Appellant thus fails the West Lake Quarry definition.
Nor are the Heidelberg and Jackson Excavating definitions met. Logic is strained to suggest that by appellant's use of the air door and processing system, the clean and neatly packaged eggs have taken on forms suitable for new applications, or are an end product quite different from the original.
Appellant argues, given the fungible nature of the product, that if the focus of inquiry is properly placed on the processed batches of eggs as a whole, rather than on the individual egg, then the egg processing must be “manufacturing” within the meaning of § 1^.030.2(5). Appellant also places great emphasis on the regulation of the egg industry. The original product is a batch of dirty, unpackaged and partly inedible eggs, while the end product is a batch of clean, properly packaged and entirely edible eggs. Therefore, appellant argues, the end product is both quite different from the original, and suitable for new application, that is, it can be legally sold by appellant.1
The logic is tempting, but unravels with a few tugs. First, the Court held in Unitog Rental Services, Inc., v. Director of Revenue, 779 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Mo. banc 1989), that the common thread in the definition cases is that manufacturing involves the “production of an article with a new use different from its original use.” The fundamental “use” for a batch of eggs when it arrives at appellant’s plant and when it leaves is the same — consumption. Appellant’s efforts make little difference in the way in which consumers use the eggs. Compare Jackson Excavating Co. v. Administrative Hearing Commission, 646 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Mo.1983) (water purification process “creates” water fit for human consumption; process is manufacturing). The same is true if the focus is on the individual egg.
Second, whether edible or inedible, an egg which goes through appellant’s processing is not itself changed; it is simply washed and the natural sealant which is lost during washing is replaced with miner[627]*627al oil. Washing is not manufacturing. See Unitog, 779 S.W.2d 568.
Third, an inedible egg is not made edible by appellant’s efforts; it is simply culled. Discarding such an egg is not manufacturing. Similarly, although it is true that the quality of the batch of eggs as a whole is improved when appellant culls the inedible eggs, this ‘.‘change” does not constitute manufacturing in the ordinary sense of the word. While manufacturing implies a change, not every change is manufacturing. State ex rel. AMF, Inc. v. Spradling, 518 S.W.2d 58, 62 (Mo.1974), and Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assoc. v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562, 28 S.Ct. 204, 206, 52 L.Ed. 336, 338 (1908) (to examine, sort, wash, steam, worm, brand, treat and dry imported corks changes them, but is not the “manufacturing” of corks).
Fourth, regulation of the egg industry does not convert steps taken to comply with those regulations into manufacturing processes. In Jackson Excavating Co. v. Administrative Hearing Commission, 646 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Mo.1983), the Court noted the state’s heavy regulation of drinking water in order to reject the Commission’s overly simple argument that “water is [just] water,” and therefore the purification of impotable water could not be “manufacturing” in the context of the tax exemption statute. In holding that the water purification process was manufacturing, however, the Court examined and relied on the process itself, not the regulation of the process.
The crux of the determination of whether appellant’s processing is manufacturing must be the nature of the enterprise itself, not the attendant regulations. See Bain v. Department of Revenue, 293 Or. 163, 646 P.2d 12, 20 (1982) (Tanzer, J., dissenting). That the egg industry regulations are in place, in large part, for the protection of public health and safety, Mueller v. Burchfield, 218 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Mo.App.1949), aff'd. 359 Mo. 876, 224 S.W.2d 87 (1949), does not change the result.
Decision affirmed.
BLACKMAR, C.J., and ROBERTSON, HIGGINS and COVINGTON, JJ., concur.
HOLSTEIN, J., dissents in separate opinion filed.
RENDLEN, J., dissents and concurs in dissenting opinion of HOLSTEIN, J.