Kyles v. Mary Jo Trunnell

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJanuary 29, 2020
Docket2:18-cv-02003
StatusUnknown

This text of Kyles v. Mary Jo Trunnell (Kyles v. Mary Jo Trunnell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kyles v. Mary Jo Trunnell, (E.D. Wis. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

RONAN J. KYLES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 18-CV-2003

MARY JO TRUNNELL, et al.,

Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Ronan J. Kyles, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court screened the amended complaint and allowed Kyles to proceed on a claim that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 12 at 5.) The defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Kyles did not exhaust his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 38.) On November 7, 2019, the court ordered that Kyles could file a supplemental response to the defendants’ motion because the defendants did not attach copies of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, Civil Local Rule 7, or Civil Local Rule 56 to their summary judgment motion and instead included the rules along with their summary judgment reply brief. (ECF No. 48.) Kyles filed his supplemental response on December 3, 2019. (ECF No. 52.) The court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the matter arises under federal statutes. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. The parties have consented to United States magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and General Local Rule 73 (E.D. Wis.). FACTUAL BACKGROUND Kyles did not submit a response to the defendants’ proposed findings of fact. Therefore, the facts in this section are taken from the defendants’ proposed findings of fact and their declaration in support (ECF Nos. 40-41). Kyles alleges that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs when they refused to provide him with a lower bunk restriction as well as a pillow or blanket for elevation of his leg, causing him pain. (ECF No. 40, ¶1.) Kyles was housed at Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility (MSDF) from May 7, 2018, until April 12, 2019. (Id., ¶2.) He filed one inmate complaint regarding the allegations of this case. (Id., ¶3.) Kyles first attempted to file inmate complaint MSDF-2019-308 on November 28, 2018. (ECF No. 40, ¶4.) In the inmate complaint Kyles alleged that he had metal

fragments in his leg which caused swelling from being on the top bunk and that he had been requesting a low bunk restriction since May 2018. (Id.) The complaint was not accepted because Kyles failed to follow the filing requirements of the complaint system. (Id.) Specifically, Kyles failed to follow the proper chain of command before filing his inmate complaint. (Id., ¶5) He did not contact the MSDF health services manager to resolve the issue. (Id.) 2 A copy of the complaint was returned to Kyles on December 10, 2018, with instructions on how to properly meet the filing requirements. (ECF No. 40, ¶5.) Kyles was instructed that he could resubmit his returned complaint after following the

chain of command. (Id., ¶6.) On December 21, 2018, Kyles resubmitted the inmate complaint, stating that he had written the health services manager with no results. (ECF No. 40, ¶7.) The institution complaint examiner, Kesha Packer, accepted the complaint and investigated the allegations. (Id.) Packer contacted the MSDF health services manager regarding Kyles’s allegations. (Id., ¶8.) The health services manager

reviewed Kyles’s medical records and found that, after evaluation, health services staff determined that Kyles did not meet the criteria for a low bunk. (Id.) On February 1, 2019, Packer recommended that Kyles’s inmate complaint be dismissed because he simply disagreed with the decision of the health care providers. (ECF No. 40, ¶9.) On February 15, 2019, the reviewing authority, regional nursing coordinator Lon Becher, agreed with Packer’s recommendation to dismiss the complaint. (Id.) That day, a copy of the decision was provided to Kyles. (Id., ¶10.)

Kyles did not appeal the decision on inmate complaint MSDF-2019-308 to the corrections complaint examiner or the office of the secretary. (Id.) SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment is required where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Celotex 3 Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986); Ames v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 629 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2011). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court takes evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must

grant the motion if no reasonable juror could find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 255 (1986). “Material facts” are those under the applicable substantive law that “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute over a “material fact” is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. A party asserting that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed must

support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). “An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).

4 ANALYSIS A. The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Requirement The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that an inmate cannot

assert a cause of action under federal law “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006) (holding that the PLRA requires proper exhaustion of administrative remedies). Exhaustion requires that an inmate comply with the rules applicable to the grievance process at the inmate’s institution. Pozo v.

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
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Ames v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.
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