Kyle v. Kyle

263 So. 2d 142, 48 Ala. App. 163, 1972 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 376
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Alabama
DecidedMay 31, 1972
Docket6 Div. 131
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 263 So. 2d 142 (Kyle v. Kyle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kyle v. Kyle, 263 So. 2d 142, 48 Ala. App. 163, 1972 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 376 (Ala. Ct. App. 1972).

Opinion

BRADLEY, Judge.

The appeal is from a decree of the Circuit Court on Jefferson County, In Equity, rendered on September 9, 1971, granting appellee’s request for an award of $16,548.-96 previously ordered paid to her by said court, or in lieu thereof be in contempt of court, awarding counsel fees for appellee of $500.00, overruling appellant’s motion to strike respondent’s answer and petition to modify and denying appellant’s petition to modify.

The parties to this proceeding were divorced from the bonds of matrimony by decree of said court entered on August 12, 1969. The decree also ratified and made a part thereof two agreements previously entered into by the parties on August 4, 1969 and August 21, 1968.

The agreement of August 4, 1969 contained the following pertinent provisions:

“1. The Husband agrees to pay to the Wife, for the maintenance and support of herself, exclusive of housing, the sum of Four Hundred Twenty-Five Dollars ($425.00) per month in two installments of Two Hundred Twelve and 50/100 ($212.50) each, said installments being due and payable on the 5th and 20th of each month. . . . It is understood
and agreed that the sum of money hereinabove mentioned does not include an allowance for housing in that the Husband has heretofore paid to the Wife the sum of Fourteen Thousand Six Hundred Sixty-Two and 67/100 ($14,662.67) under an Agreement dated August 21, 1968, said sum being the net proceeds which the Husband received from the sale of his undivided one-half interest in the home located at 3301 Hermitage Road, Mountain Brook, Alabama. Said Agreement dated August 21, 1968 between the parties hereto is incorporated hereby by, reference and adopted as a part of this Agreement.”

The agreement of August 21, 1968 also contained the following pertinent language :

“1. Nan will receive the entire net proceeds from the sale of said home free from any claim by Walter ....
“2. That upon a final resolve of the marital problems now existing between Walter and Nan and in the final property settlement made between Walter and Nan, Walter will receive credit in the manner hereinafter mentioned for the money so received by Nan from the sale of said home.
“3. This agreement shall in no way effect the legal obligations of Walter to Nan and the two children except that Walter shall no longer be obligated to furnish a home or a place to live as it is contemplated that the money received by Nan from the sale of the above property shall be used to supply housing for herself and the two children who live with her.
”4. That the net proceeds from the above-mentioned sale shall be made directly to Nan and she will receive the [166]*166proceeds free and clear from any claim against the proceeds'on Walter’s behalf.
ifc if.
“2. Receipt by Nan of the full net proceeds from said sale will extinguish the obligation of Walter to provide housing for herself and the children.”

The house in question was sold and the proceeds of the sale (about $29,000) after deducting expenses thereof were paid to appellee who deposited the money to her account in two savings and loan associations.

In late 1969 or early 1970 the U. S. Internal Revenue Service informed the appellant that he owed additional taxes and penalties for the years 1966, 1967 and 1968 in the amount of $30,000. This amount was reduced by the IRS, after an amended return was filed, to $16,548.96 for taxes and one-half that amount for penalties. The appellant paid the penalties, but did not pay anything on the taxes.

Inasmuch as the parties to this suit had filed joint tax returns for the years in question, the IRS attached appellee’s accounts at both savings and loan associations for the amount of the tax due plus interest. An amount of $16,622.39 was taken from her to satisfy the tax claims for the years in question.

Appellant was requested to reimburse appellee for this sum of money taken by the U. S. Government to satisfy the tax claims resulting from jointly filed income tax returns. No response was made to sttch request.

In her petition for the rule nisi, appellee states that the $16,622.39 taken by the government for taxes jointly owed came from the proceeds of the sale of the house pursuant to the agreement of August 21, 1968. The money received from said sale according to the terms of the agreement heretofore mentioned was to be in lieu of a housing allowance for appellee and the children. She further states in said petition that because of the government levy on her savings accounts, she has not received the proceeds free and clear of any claim on said proceeds, and as a result of appellant’s tax fraud has been deprived of the proceeds of the house sale which constitutes a breach of the decree incorporating said agreements.

Appellant did not demur to said petition but did file an answer thereto in which he said:

“ . . . respondent is financially unable to reimburse petitioner-complainant for the total assessment outstanding in one sum. Respondent denies that he has refused to reimburse petitioner-complainant but in the alternative has not been able to do so.”

Nowhere in said answer did appellant deny or disclaim any liability to reimburse appellee for the money taken from her by the government to satisfy their joint tax obligations. He simply stated that he had not refused to reimburse appellee for the sum of money in question, but that he was unable to do so at that time.

After the trial, the court entered a decree finding appellant indebted to appellee for $16,548.96; one-half of this amount to be paid on or before December 31, 1971 and the balance by March 31, 1972. Failure to make the payments as directed would result in appellant being in contempt of court. Appellee was also awarded $500 as attorney fees for her counsel.

From said decree an appeal was perfected to this court.

Appellant assigns eight grounds of error, all directed in some fashion to the final decree.

In brief, assignments of error one, two and six are argued together; assignments three and four are argued together; and assignments seven and eight are argued together. Assignment of error five, not having been argued, is considered waived. Rule 9, Supreme Court Rules.

[167]*167Nowhere in the argument section of the brief is there a single citation of authority to support the argument made by appellant. It has been said by our Supreme Court that the failure to discuss or mention authorities in support of an assignment of error does not amount to an argument. Alabama Electric Co-op., Inc. v. Partridge, 284 Ala. 442, 225 So.2d 848; Cairnes v. Hillman Drug Co., 214 Ala. 545, 108 So. 362.

In considering the assignments of error in the first argument of appellant, we find that assignment one says that the trial court erred in finding that appellant was indebted to appellee for the amount in question and ordering appellant to pay appellee or otherwise be in contempt. There is a transcript page number listed wherein the error occurred, in accordance with Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
263 So. 2d 142, 48 Ala. App. 163, 1972 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 376, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kyle-v-kyle-alacivapp-1972.