KYLE v. INDIANA I.D.O.C.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedFebruary 19, 2025
Docket2:23-cv-00251
StatusUnknown

This text of KYLE v. INDIANA I.D.O.C. (KYLE v. INDIANA I.D.O.C.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
KYLE v. INDIANA I.D.O.C., (S.D. Ind. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

ERIC CHARLES KYLE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 2:23-cv-00251-JMS-MG ) CHAD PLATT I.D.O.C. Recreation Director, et ) al., ) KEITH HARTZEL Deputy Warden, ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONFOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff, Eric Charles Kyle, an inmate at Plainfield Correctional Facility ("PCF" or "Plainfield"), brought this action alleging constitutional violations related to asbestos exposure at the PCF gymnasium. Dkt. 2. Defendants, Recreation Director David "Chad" Platt, and Deputy Warden Keith Hartzell, have moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 41. Both Defendants argue that summary judgment is proper because Mr. Kyle has not alleged that he suffered any injury, he was not subjected to an objectively serious condition, the defendants were not deliberately indifferent to the risk of asbestos exposure, and the defendants are entitledt to qualified immunity. Dkt 43. For the reasons explained in this Order, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all of Mr. Kyle's claims and the motion, dkt. [41] is GRANTED. I. Standard of Review A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A court only has to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need not

"scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the basis for its motion and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

II. Factual Background Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a), the Court views and recites the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Kyle and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Khungar, 985 F.3d at 572–73. A. The Parties During the time period at issue, Mr. Eric Kyle was an inmate incarcerated at Plainfield. Dkt. 42-1 at 9 (Kyle's Deposition). Starting in November of 2020, he was hired at the prison as a rec worker for the sanitation department. Id. at 12, 16. As part of his job duties, Mr. Kyle would wipe down equipment, sweep, mop and buffer the gym floor. Id. at 14. He also would also perform gym maintenance such as removing the floor tiles as they became loose. Id. Defendant David "Chad" Platt was an employee at PCF and formally held the title of Recreation Coordinator. Dkt. 42-3 at 1. Mr. Platt served as Mr. Kyle's direct supervisor. Dkt. 42-1

at 14. Defendant Keith Hartzell was an employee at PCF and served as the Deputy Warden of Reentry. Dk 42-2 at 1. In his role, he addressed general sanitation issues that were reported throughout PCF and would submit work orders or contact the maintenance supervisor directly depending on the issue. Id. On rare occasions, he would come to the gymnasium and talk with the rec workers. Id. at 36. B. Mr. Kyle's Exposure to Asbestos and PCF Testing In or about early 2022, the heating system in the PCF gym was not operational, and the cold temperatures within the building caused the tiles in the gym to slowly loosen, tile-by-tile. Dkt. 42-3 at 1. When tiles became loose, Defendant Platt or other recreational workers would remove

them from the gym and place the discarded tiles in a closed room. Id. As part of his job, Mr. Kyle spent about nine to ten hours daily in the gymnasium. Dkt. 42-1 at 15. When he noticed tiles becoming loose, Mr. Kyle was given a long metal bar with a flat blade at the end of it to wedge underneath the individual tiles and pop them loose from the adhesive adhering them to the floor. Id. at 15. They were then placed on a pushcart located in a closed room. Dkt. 42-3 at 1. Mr. Kyle testified that that early on in the tile removal process, he notified Mr. Hartzell that more and more tiles were becoming loose, and Mr. Hartzell told him, "just hang on…we'll see what should be the proper circumstances to take care of the situation." Dkt 42-1 at 34. In November of 2021, Mr. Kyle asked Mr. Platt if they should simply remove all the tiles rather than waiting for them to deteriorate individually. Id. at 16- 17. Mr. Platt responded that they would need Mr. Hartzell's approval before they could fully remove all tiles, and he instructed Mr. Kyle to just continue to remove the tiles as they became damaged. Id. Mr. Hartzell eventually came down to the gym and told the rec workers "it's all right to go ahead and start popping up the tiles." Id. at 35.

In his affidavit, Mr. Hartzell alleges he was not involved in any of the decisions surrounding removing the tiles within the gymnasium, closing the gym, or implementation of tile removal and asbestos remediation. Dkt. 42-2 at 1-2. By May of 2022, Mr. Platt attested that he was instructed by PCF's physical plant director to remove the remaining tiles from the gym floor that had not already become loose from temperature fluctuations. Dkt. 42-3 at 1-2. Recreation workers then began removing all the tiles, whether they were loose or not, from the gym floor. Dkt. 42-1 at 21. When Mr. Kyle would pop the tiles loose with the metal bar, the dust and debris from the tiles would become airborne. Dkt. 42-1 at 25. At times, the ventilation system in the PCF gym did not work, and the gym used large propane heat blowers to warm the space which stirred up more

dust. Id. After the rec workers discussed their concerns about asbestos and airborne debris, Mr. Hartzell simply stated that during the removal, the workers should spray water on the floor to help with dust and debris. Id. at 35-36. Although Mr. Kyle discussed his concerns related to potential asbestos and tile contamination many times with Mr. Platt, Mr. Platt continued to direct the removal of the floor tiles. Id. at 20. Early on in the removal process, Mr. Kyle asked Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
KYLE v. INDIANA I.D.O.C., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kyle-v-indiana-idoc-insd-2025.