Kwesi Muhammad v. Marisol Hernandez, et al.
Opinion
1 2 3 6 7 KWESI MUHAMMAD, Case No. 22-cv-01604-AMO (PR)
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR COSTS AND DENYING 9 v. REMAINING PENDING MOTIONS AS MOOT 10 MARISOL HERNANDEZ, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 43, 46 Defendants. 11
12 This is a closed federal civil rights action filed by Plaintiff Kwesi Muhammad, who 13 represented himself. On August 19, 2025, the Court granted Defendants’ summary judgment 14 motion and entered judgment in favor of Defendants. Dkts. 41, 42. Now pending before the 15 Court is Defendants’ motion for costs, seeking $1,512.00 for Defendants’ cost of litigation, 16 including costs to depose Muhammad and various filing fees.1 Dkt. 43-1 at 7-8. Muhammad has 17 filed an objection to the motion for costs, arguing that this action was neither frivolous nor brought 18 in bad faith, and imposing such costs would “chill future civil rights litigation.” Dkt. 44 at 1-2. 19 Muhammad also states that he is unable to pay the costs. Id. at 2. 20 Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part that 21 “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs — other than 22 attorney’s fees — should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). While the 23 rule creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to a prevailing party, it also vests district 24 courts with the discretion to refuse to award costs. Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. State of 25 Cal., 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000). A district court “must state reasons for the denial of costs 26 1 Defendants have also filed a motion for extension of time to file a reply to Muhammad’s 27 opposition to their motion for costs. Dkt. 43. Muhammad subsequently filed a motion for leave to 1 so that the appellate court will be able to determine whether or not the trial court abused its 2 discretion.” Subscription Television, Inc. v. S. Cal. Theatre Owners Ass’n, 576 F.2d 230, 234 (9th 3 Cir. 1978). 4 A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs even in the case of indigent prisoner litigants. 5 Monroe v. U.S. Marshals, 101 F.3d 706, 1996 WL 665147, at *2 (9th Cir. 1996). However, in a 6 civil rights action, consideration of a plaintiff’s limited resources is an appropriate reason for 7 denial of costs. Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators, 231 F.3d at 593. The court should also consider 8 the financial resources of the plaintiff and the chilling effect on future similar actions. Stanley v. 9 Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Nat’l Org. for Women v. Bank of 10 Cal., 680 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982). 11 In Draper v. Rosario, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion 12 when it awarded $3,018.35 against the plaintiff alleging Eighth Amendment violations in a state 13 prison. See 836 F.3d 1072, 1089 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit found that individual Eighth 14 Amendment cases are important for safeguarding the rights and safety of prisoners, indicating that 15 it is a case of substantial public importance. Id. at 1088. The Ninth Circuit also found that the 16 case was close because the plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to survive summary judgment, 17 leaving it to the jury to assess competing accounts of the alleged events. Id. The Ninth Circuit 18 further reasoned that such a large cost award could chill similar lawsuits challenging Eighth 19 Amendment violations in jails and prisons. Id. “Many would-be litigants in Eighth Amendment 20 excessive force cases . . . have virtually no resources. Even those with meritorious cases may 21 choose not to risk an unsuccessful lawsuit that could add to the fees and costs associated with 22 conviction and imprisonment.” Id. Finally, the Ninth Circuit noted that district courts have 23 routinely declined to award costs against prisoners representing themselves proceeding under 24 similar circumstances, citing potential chilling effects. Id. at 1088-89 (citing Baltimore v. 25 Haggins, No. 1:10-CV-00931-LJO, 2014 WL 804463, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2014) (denying 26 $1,462.61 in costs and noting that potential chilling effect of being taxed with costs upon defeat 27 cannot be ignored in indigent inmates’ section 1983 cases)). ] concludes that Muhammad’s limited resources, combined with the possibility that the imposition 2 || of the award would have a chilling effect on civil rights litigants, render an award of costs against 3 Muhammad inequitable. The Court therefore declines to award costs to Defendants and against 4 || Muhammad. 5 Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for costs is DENIED. Dkt. 43. Defendants’ motion for 6 || an extension of time to file a reply and Muhammad’s motion for leave to file a surreply to 7 || Defendants’ reply are DENIED as moot because the Court did not consider the reply and surreply 8 || when deciding the motion for costs. Dkts. 43, 46. 10 || Dated: February 20, 2026 □
ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN 12 United States District Judge
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