Kue v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services

18 Cl. Ct. 777, 1989 U.S. Claims LEXIS 249, 1989 WL 140694
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedNovember 2, 1989
DocketNo. 88-5-V
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 18 Cl. Ct. 777 (Kue v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kue v. Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services, 18 Cl. Ct. 777, 1989 U.S. Claims LEXIS 249, 1989 WL 140694 (cc 1989).

Opinion

OPINION1

REGINALD W. GIBSON, Judge:

This vaccine injury case has been filed under the authority of the National Child[778]*778hood Vaccine Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10, etseq. (West Supp.1989) (the Act). The matter is presently before the court pursuant to the Report of Special Master Bryan J. Bernstein, filed on June 20, 1989, by authority of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c)(2).

Said Report was filed following a hearing on the merits held on May 3, 1989. At that hearing the petitioner called three witnesses—Yang and Zer Kue, the parents of Khoua Kue, the deceased infant; and a medical expert, Dr. Louis I. Hochheiser. The petitioner also introduced documentary evidence to support his claim. The respondent, on the other hand, introduced no testimonial witness, offering instead some documentary evidence.2

In his Report, the Special Master concluded that:

“1. The petitioner properly filed a petition under 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-ll.
2. The petitioner’s son, Khoua Kue died as a result of a hypotonic-hyporesponsive collapse characterized under 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-14(b)(l).
3. The death of the petitioner’s son, occurring one day after administration of the DPT vaccine, fits within the covered injuries set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table at 42 U.S.C.A. [§] 300aa-14(a).
4. The petitioner demonstrated his case by a preponderance of the evidence required by 42 U.S.C.A. [§] 300aa-13(a)(l)(A).
5. The respondent did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the death was due to factors other than the vaccine as required under 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-13(a)(l).
6. The petitioner should be awarded compensation for a vaccine-related death under 42 U.S.C.A. [§] 300aa-15(a)(2), (b), and (e).”

The respondent objected to these conclusions on July 10, 1989, after which the petitioner filed his Memorandum In Opposition to Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 25, 1989. On the basis of the Report of the Special Master, and after a thorough review of the evidence and the total record, we find that the matters required to be shown under the Act by the petitioner have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence and support the recommendations of the Special Master. Moreover, creditable proof is wanting that death was due to factors unrelated to the administration of the vaccine described in the petition. [779]*779Therefore, we adopt, and incorporate herein by reference, the attached Report of the Special Master regarding the factual findings and conclusions of law on the merits. Additionally, and consistent with the foregoing, we find that the petitioner is entitled to an award of $250,000 in statutory compensation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(2) (West Supp.1989).

Attorney’s Fees and Other Costs

On May 15, 1989, petitioner filed his claim for attorney’s fees in the amount of $14,135.00. Attached to said claim was an affidavit of an attorney practicing in the same locale as petitioner’s attorney who averred his knowledge of the latter’s record and that “an hourly rate of $100 is a fair and reasonable attorney’s fee for an attorney with the experience and expertise of Mr. Isserlis.” Also, there was attached a Time Sheet, consisting of seven (7) pages, detailing, by date, the time applied to subject case, and the precise activity. The petitioner claimed 141.35 hours at $100.00 per hour for a total of $14,135.00 in attorney’s fees.

Petitioner, by three (3) separate submissions, asserted the following claims for costs:

Date Costs
(i) June 2, 1989 $6,702.60
(ii) June 7, 1989 $ 151.51
(iii) October 26, 1989 $1,020.00.

The detailed cost schedule identifying expenditures by date, consisting of three (3) pages, was attached in support of the $6,702.60 claim. The $151.51 claim was identified as “expense made for a transcript,” and the $1,020.00 claim was for additional attorney’s fees of 10.2 hours at $100.00 per hour.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(l) (West Supp.1989) provides only that the “judgment of the ... Court on a petition filed under section 300aa-ll of this title awarding compensation shall include an amount to cover—(A) reasonable attorneys’ fees, and (B) other costs____” Thus, it is incumbent on petitioner’s counsel to establish that said fees claimed, i.e., the $100.00 hourly rate, is reasonable within the contemplation of the statute.

In support of this burden, all that was proffered was an affidavit by a fellow attorney of petitioner’s counsel to the effect that—(i) he has practiced law in the State of Rhode Island for 25 years; (ii) he has experience and knowledge and is familiar with fees usually charged by attorneys therein; (iii) he has known petitioner’s counsel, Mr. Milton I. Isserlis, for a period of 20 years; (iv) he is familiar with Mr. Isserlis’s experience as a trial lawyer; and (v) in his opinion, in an action such as the one at bar “an attorney’s fee based on an hourly rate of $100 is a fair and reasonable attorney’s fee for an attorney with the experience and expertise of Mr. Isserlis.”

The court does not view the bland conclu-sory assertions in said affidavit of Mr. Irving J. Waldman to constitute prima facie evidence of reasonableness. Said affidavit is totally void of any demonstrative showing insofar as how and why $100.00 per hour is a reasonable fee for an attorney of Mr. Isserlis’s experience and competence to charge in such a case as exists at bar. In the absence of such proof, and specific guidance in the statute, we embrace the pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court as persuasive in Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2553-54, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988), where it held in an Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) case that “Congress thought that $75 an hour was generally quite enough public reimbursement for lawyers’ fees, whatever the local or national market might be.” Consequently, because of the failure of definitive proof of reasonableness, attorney’s fees shall be limited to $75.00 per hour. Thus, the total attorney’s fees and other costs allowed shall be as follows:

(i) Attorney’s fees (141.35
hours at $75.00) $10,601.25
(10.2 hours at $75.00) 765.00
(ii) Other costs ($6,702.60 +
$151.51) 6,854.11
Total $18,220.36.

Given the foregoing, we also award to petitioner $18,220.36 in attorney’s fees and [780]*780other costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

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18 Cl. Ct. 777, 1989 U.S. Claims LEXIS 249, 1989 WL 140694, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kue-v-secretary-of-the-department-of-health-human-services-cc-1989.