Opinion issued July 8, 2021
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-20-00303-CR ——————————— KRYSTLE CONCEPCION VILLANUEVA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 428th District Court Hays County, Texas1 Trial Court Case No. CR-17-0182-D
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Krystle Villanueva was convicted of capital murder in the death of her five-
year-old daughter. In the same trial, she was convicted of aggravated assault with a
1 The Texas Supreme Court transferred this appeal from the Austin District through a docket equalization order. deadly weapon for stabbing her boyfriend’s stepfather during the same episode. She
argued the affirmative defense of insanity. The jury rejected her defense and
convicted her of both offenses. Her two sentences were ordered to run concurrently,
with the capital murder conviction having the lengthier sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
In a single issue, she appeals the jury’s rejection of her affirmative defense of
insanity, arguing that the jury’s decision on that issue was against the great weight
and preponderance of the evidence so as to be manifestly unjust.
We affirm.
Background2
Krystle Villanueva and Refugio (Junior) Hernandez met as teenagers. Around
the age of 19, Krystle3 had a daughter, who they named Giovanna (Gio) Hernandez.
At times, the couple lived together with their child. At other times, Junior would live
with his mother and stepfather—Nancy and Eustorgio Arellano–in Kyle, and Krystle
and Gio would live with Krystle’s relatives. In late-December 2016, the couple
2 A note before we begin. The evidence in this case is graphic and gruesome. We will discuss the details of the child’s death and what happened to her body only to the extent necessary to resolve the issue raised on appeal. 3 We will refer to Villanueva and her family members by their given names for ease of reading and because various people share last names. 2 discussed Krystle and Gio moving back in with Junior, Nancy, and Eustorgio. At the
time, Krystle was 24 years old, and her daughter, Gio, was 5 years old.
Krystle and Gio moved into the home in Kyle on January 3, 2017. That night,
Junior took Krystle to the hospital because she had vomited. The witnesses dispute
the events surrounding her illness. At trial, Krystle presented evidence that she had
a delusional break from reality that evening, shaved off some body hair, and drank
bleach to rid herself of a “witch.” Neither Junior nor Eustorgio confirmed that
version of events. The attending physician who treated her that evening did not
either.
Two days later, on January 5, Junior and Nancy left for work early in the
morning. Eustorgio spent the morning in his bedroom watching TV. Krystle did
some laundry, bathed Gio, and sat outside looking at her computer. Around
lunchtime, Eustorgio was sitting at the kitchen table eating when he saw Krystle
retrieve a large knife from the kitchen and go into her bedroom. Neither spoke to the
other. Eustorgio testified that this was normal behavior for Krystle, who had a habit
of going into her bedroom with a knife to cut up and eat fruit.
Gio was in the bedroom when Krystle entered it with the knife. Eustorgio
recalled hearing Gio say, “No, Mommy. No, Mommy.” But, to Eustorgio, it sounded
like the child’s normal protestations when, for example, electronics were taken away
from her.
3 A short time later, Krystle returned to the kitchen and walked past Eustorgio.
After she passed him, she turned and plunged the knife into his back. She stabbed
him four times before he could turn to face her. Then she stabbed him twice more.
He bit her hand, which caused her to drop the knife. He picked up the knife and fled
to his neighbor’s house for help. His neighbor called 911 at 12:50 p.m.
While Eustorgio and the neighbor were on the phone with the 911 operator,
Krystle came outside with a BB gun. She said nothing. She just pointed the BB gun
at Eustorgio and the neighbor. The BB gun was not functional; it did not fire. Krystle
went back into the house.
While one 911 operator continued to talk to Eustorgio and the neighbor,
another 911 operator answered a call from Krystle. A recording of the 911 call was
played for the jury. Krystle told the operator, “These f— people are trying to kill
me,” and she gave her address. A couple minutes passed without her answering any
additional questions. Then she repeated that people were trying to kill her. The
operator asked who was trying to kill her, and she responded that it was her dad. The
operator asked her for her name. At first, she said “Krystle,” but then she said,
“Nathaniel Walker.”
The operator asked her if her dad had a weapon, and Krystle responded: “No.
No, he was just watching TV. My daughter wanted some cereal and I killed her.”
The operator sought to confirm her statement, and Krystle repeated: “Yeah, I killed
4 her and I stabbed my father-in-law.” Minutes passed, and the operator heard loud
banging and asked Krystle what she was banging on. Krystle responded: “Nothing.
I’m just trying – I cut my daughter’s head off.” The operator asked her why, and she
replied, “’Cuz she wanted cereal.” The operator continued to hear loud noises and
asked Krystle what was making those noises. For 10 minutes, Krystle did not
respond. Eventually, she replied, “Yes, I’m here,” but she did not answer any
questions or say anything else for the remainder of the 911 call.
Police officers began arriving about 10 or 15 minutes after the first 911 call.
They took the knife from Eustorgio and sent him to the hospital in an ambulance.
SWAT officers arrived next. A neighbor saw the SWAT officers arrive and called
Krystle’s mother in Austin. Krystle’s mother, younger sister, and nephew drove from
Austin to Kyle.
Over the next hour, the SWAT officers called for Krystle to come outside.
Krystle’s mother spoke to the officers and offered to go inside but was refused.
Eventually, there was a loud bang at one door, and the officers entered another door
to remove Krystle. She had just taken a shower. She was removed from the home in
handcuffs with a sheet around her nude body. She resisted the officers and had to be
carried to a police car. Once placed in the police car, she began banging her head
and feet on the windows, so she was removed and placed on the ground.
5 One testifying officer, Detective K. Lysek, described her as “spitting at
everyone, and she was kind of smiling and laughing because it seemed to amuse her
that she was giving us such a struggle.” The officers placed a “spit sock,” padded
helmet, and “wrap” body restraint on her. The jury was shown video from Lysek’s
bodycam. Krystle is in the wrap, and the police are putting the spit sock and helmet
on her. After they place her in the car, she screams loudly.
Lysek drove Krystle to a hospital. The bodycam continued to record. Krystle
grunts and kicks a few times during the ride to the hospital. At one point, she says
her restraints are tight. Then she spontaneously asks, “Hey, do you have any weed
on you? I need to smoke a joint.”
When they arrive at the hospital, the officers are seen on the bodycam video
comforting each other. An officer is heard sniffling. Then the officers place Krystle
on a stretcher to wheel her into the hospital. One officer is seen pointing to Krystle
on the stretcher and noting, “And she is laughing.”
The bodycam then shows Krystle in an examination room. She screams
repeatedly. The medical personnel ask her what her name is, and she responds, “I
don’t have one.” They ask if she knows why she is there and she makes a hmmm-
hmmm sound that does not clearly indicate an affirmative or negative response. They
ask if she has any injuries, and she says she has a bite. She struggles against the
restraints and screams loudly again. Krystle’s tone abruptly changes and she asks,
6 “Do you have any weed?” Someone responds, “Shut up.” The video ends seconds
later.4
The jury was shown additional videos of the police moving Krystle to another
facility and preparing her for a police interview. In one video, two officers are seen
in the front seat of a police car as the audio picks up Krystle speaking from the back
seat. She is crying and says, “My baby [inaudible] I didn’t know it was her [inaudible
and crying] Just kill me. I didn’t know, I swear, I thought it was a doll. I thought it
was a f— clone. . . . I’m so sorry baby. I swear to God. Was it really? I thought it
was a [crying] no, no, no, no, no. Just kill me. I didn’t realize. I swear to God. I
swear I thought it was a doll. I thought it was a f— clone. [inaudible, crying] My
baby. Just kill me, please. [inaudible, crying] That was my baby. I don’t deserve to
live. [crying] I’m so sorry. That was my baby and [inaudible] a f— key. [inaudible]
I lost it. I’m so sorry. . . . I didn’t know it was real. I’m so sorry.” She repeated these
comments, crying, for several more minutes.
In the next videos, Krystle is being dressed into jail clothing and interviewed
by Sergeant Opiela. She is crying and says, “Oh my God. I f— up. I thought it was
a key. I really thought she was a f— clone. I really lost it. There are so many voices
in my f— head. I thought she was a clone.”
4 There is no indication in the record that a competency evaluation was requested or performed. 7 Sergeant Opiela reads Krystle the Miranda warnings and asks if she
understands them. She says, “I’m trying to focus. There are so many voices in my
head.” He attempts to begin a dialogue with her by asking what type of gaming
system she likes to play. Crying, she says, “Why does it matter? I just killed my
daughter.” Then she says, “I haven’t slept in days. There are so many voices in my
head.” He tells her, “Listen to my voice. This is the voice you are listening for.”
Then he asks her if she understands the Miranda warnings he read to her. She takes
the written copy, looks at it, and asks him to read it to her. He re-read it a third time
and asks her to sign it. She stares at the paper again for several minutes without
signing it.
Opiela offers to read the warnings again. Krystle hands the paper back to him,
and he reads the warnings a fourth time. He again asks her to sign the warnings,
pointing at the signature line. Krystle stares at the paper for several more minutes.
He reads it to her again while she stares down with a confused expression.
After 30 minutes of this, Krystle writes “no name” on the signature line.
Opiela tells her that is not her name. He spells her name to her as he asks her to sign
her name. She continues to stare at the page. He asks whether she is listening to him.
Krystle does not react, verbally or physically. After a few more minutes, she asks
him to read it again.
8 Krystle’s expert witness, Dr. West, testified that, based on information she
learned during her interview of Krystle that Krystle had thought the paper with the
written Miranda warnings was a contract to enter into prostitution, which is why
Krystle had hesitated to sign it.
As the video continues playing, Opiela asks Krystle again to sign the paper.
After 10 more minutes, Krystle signs the paper, and the two begin talking. Opiela
asks her a few questions that she does not directly respond to. Later, Opiela asks her
why she is there, and she says, “Because I killed my daughter.” He asks more
questions, but she does not answer. Then Krystle says, “I thought she was a doll. I
thought she was a doll, I swear.”
He asks her where Gio’s body parts are. Krystle asks him, “What body parts?”
He asks her where Gio’s head is. Krystle says, “It was there.” Eventually, Krystle
starts screaming “Gio” repeatedly, and then cries, “I need my baby, please.” Opiela
asks her to explain what happened in the house. Krystle appears to need to vomit.
Opiela gives her a trash can to vomit it; instead, Krystle begins digging through it.
He asks her again what happened in the bedroom. Krystle says, “I thought she was
a clone.”
Later, Krystle asks, “Where is my daughter?” Opiela asks again what
happened to Gio. Krystle replies, crying, “I f— killed her.” He asks her how. Krystle
paces and cries. Opiela repeatedly asks her to sit back down. She tries to pull her
9 pants down. He tells her not to and to sit down. She stands, hunched over. The other
officer in the room motions toward Krystle and leaves the room. More officers come
in, and they place Krystle on the floor. Opiela tells the officer helping him that
Krystle has feces in her hands.
In yet another video from the night of Gio’s death, Krystle says to the officers:
There’s so many voices in my head. I’m going crazy. I’m so sorry. I’m so sorry. What the f—? [inaudible] I didn’t know. I didn’t know. . . . I lost my mind. I lost my mind. [inaudible] Oh my God. I lost it. Oh, man. Oh, no. [inaudible] in my head. What the f— is – Oh man. I’m so sorry.” Then later, “I’m sorry. I’m sorry. I thought my daughter was a – I don’t know why I thought my daughter was a clone. Oh, no, no, no, no.” Still later, she said, “Where am I? [inaudible] I don’t know what the f— is going on. I thought my daughter was a clone. For some reason, I thought my daughter was a clone. [inaudible] telling me one thing, and I feel like my head is telling me something else. I don’t deserve to live. I killed my daughter. [inaudible] Why do I feel like – I felt like I was in a f— game. My mind was telling me I was in a game. What is going on? [inaudible] I’m sorry. I’m so sorry baby. Why do I – I’ve got so many f— voices in my head. I feel like my daughter’s talking to me right now. I’m sorry. I’m so sorry. What the f— is going on? . . . . My head. My daughter.
Jail records state that Krystle was diagnosed with psychosis five days later
and prescribed medications. There are multiple treatment records indicating that she
has refused medications while in jail.
Krystle did not testify. These videos were the only direct evidence the jury
received of Krystle discussing the events. Krystle’s insanity defense relied on her
statements in these videos, the testimony of her sister and mother about her history
10 of paranoia and delusions, and the expert testimony of a retained psychiatric expert,
Dr. S. West.
The State called 19 witnesses, including police officers, a doctor who treated
Krystle at the hospital on January 3, a medical examiner, a toxicologist, and then
Junior and Eustorgio. The State did not present a medical expert to opine on
Krystle’s mental state.
The officers described Krystle’s arrest, their investigation of the crime scene,
Krystle’s statements while being transported, and their recorded interviews of her.
The testimony of the medical examiner and other evidence revealed that Gio had
been stabbed and her body had been severely mutilated. Many of her injuries were
post-mortem. We will not detail them but will summarize as follows: various
appendages were cut off, her skin was sliced open from the top of her back down the
length of her back and continuing, her head was removed, and various internal
organs were removed and piled on her.
The toxicologist, S. Peyton, testified about alcohol and drug testing performed
a couple hours after Krystle’s arrest. Keeping in mind that .08 blood-alcohol content
is the level for intoxication in Texas, Peyton said that, comparatively, Krystle’s
blood-alcohol level was .035. She testified that the human body metabolizes, on
average, .02 grams of alcohol per hour. So, if the jury were to do the math, then, at
11 the time of Gio’s death, Krystle’s blood-alcohol level would have been somewhere
near .08.
The toxicologist also testified that Krystle’s blood was “presumptively
positive” for marijuana, which means that they did not confirm it was marijuana in
her system, but the test results were consistent with the presence of cannabinoids.
Junior testified. He agreed that he had taken Krystle to the hospital two days
before Gio’s death because she had thrown up. Junior agreed he had seen cleaning
supplies, like bleach, on the floor in the bathroom, but he denied thinking she had
swallowed bleach and denied ever telling anyone that she had. He also denied talking
to Krystle’s mom about the hospital visit or telling her that Krystle thought his
parents were trying to poison her. In response to the question about Krystle thinking
someone was trying to poison her, he testified, “Man, ain’t nobody try to poison her.
She didn’t tell me nothing like that.”
Junior testified about his interactions with Krystle the morning of Gio’s death.
His father, Eustorgio, also testified about his interactions with Krystle that morning
up to the point when she stabbed him. Junior said Krystle appeared normal to him.
Eustorgio testified that she behaved normally until she attacked him with the knife.
The defense witnesses were Krystle’s (1) sister, Samantha, (2) mother, Minia,
and (3) expert psychiatrist, Dr. West. Dr. West testified that she specialized in
filicide, which is the study of parents who kill their children. West explained to the
12 jury that there are certain driving forces that lead parents to kill their children. One
of those is psychosis that causes the parent to develop their own detached sense of
events that does not match reality. The parents can suffer from delusions that make
them think bizarre thoughts about their children and inaccurately evaluate the events
and associated risks.
One type of psychotic delusion is Capgras Syndrome. Dr. West testified that
Krystle has Capgras Syndrome, which she explained to the jury refers to the
delusional belief that loved ones have been replaced with impostors. According to
Dr. West, based in part on her interview of Krystle before trial, Krystle believed that
Gio had been replaced by a clone/impostor and that she had to return the clone to get
Gio back. Further, Krystle believed there was a key inside Gio’s body that she had
to find and return—again, to be able to get the real Gio back. In Dr. West’s expert
opinion, Krystle did not understand she was stabbing and cutting into Gio, a living
person. Rather, she thought she was doing that to an inanimate clone in search of a
key and that it was necessary to do so to “get her real daughter back.”
Dr. West testified that this was not an isolated incident of psychosis. After
reviewing Krystle’s medical file and speaking with Krystle’s mother and sister, Dr.
West opined that Krystle had a history of untreated mental illness. She testified about
a time in June 2015 when the police encountered Krystle walking along the side of
a highway, supposedly fleeing from a man named “Santana.” Dr. West reviewed the
13 medical records from that ER visit and determined that Krystle was diagnosed with
a psychotic disorder with paranoia and delusional beliefs.
Krystle’s mother, Minia, testified that Krystle talked to her about Santana in
2016 and told her that he was capable of turning into a bird, flying to find her, and
hurting Gio or Junior. Minia recounted the story to Dr. West in their interview.
Dr. West also discussed a drug rehabilitation stint in 2016. Krystle told the
staff she had bipolar disorder, and they prescribed her medications. In Dr. West’s
expert opinion, the proper diagnosis for Krystle was not bipolar disorder, but,
instead, psychosis.
According to Dr. West, Krystle’s sister, Samantha, shared stories of Krystle’s
past delusions. For example, Krystle would sometimes hide in closets or disappear
for days. Krystle would tell family members that the devil was searching for her,
that a picture was being used to hex or curse her, and that, at various times, there
were snipers in the trees outside their home. Once, Krystle screamed at family
members to get down and claimed to have seen a “red dot” on one person’s forehead
from a sniper’s gun. Another time, Krystle disappeared while inside a store, and
Samantha found her hiding in the bathroom. Krystle was scared. Samantha told Dr.
West that Krystle had thought that CIA agents were after her. Samantha confirmed
these events when she testified.
14 During her own interview with Dr. West, Krystle discussed an event in late
2016 when she was shopping with Gio and Junior. Krystle reported that she had
come to believe that Gio was a witch. She looked at Gio that day and said, “You’re
not my daughter.” Gio cried. Junior asked what she meant, and she did not respond.
Krystle also told Dr. West that she once stood over Junior with a knife,
thinking that she needed to kill him because he was an impostor. Gio stirred, and her
activity brought Krystle back to reality. Based on Krystle’s description, this event
occurred the evening before Gio’s death—about 12 hours before she stabbed
Eustorgio and killed Gio.
Krystle told Dr. West that she never fully shared these past thoughts with
medical personnel before Gio’s death because she was afraid of being sent to a
psychiatric hospital. That was the reason, according to Krystle, that she did not tell
the ER doctor on January 3 that she had swallowed bleach and shaven herself to get
a “witch” out of her. Instead, she only discussed the possibility of additional drug
rehabilitation with the doctor that night.
Dr. West recounted Krystle’s version of events on January 5. Krystle woke up
agitated. She went outside to watch videos on her computer to calm down, but it did
not help because it appeared that the videos were reacting to her eye movements.
She smoked a cigarette, but then the cigarette looked like it changed from tobacco
to tea leaves. Gio woke up and asked for cereal. Krystle had her take a shower. The
15 “next thing she remembers is that she’s strangling her, and she has a knife and she’s
stabbing her, and she is looking for a ring.”
According to Dr. West, Krystle did these things to Gio and her dead body
because Krystle “was very ill, psychotic, delusional at this time, she did not, in [Dr.
West’s] opinion, know the wrongfulness of what she was doing. She interpreted this
as simply cutting up something that wasn’t in existence. It was a doll. It was a clone.
It was not her daughter. It wasn’t human; therefore, it’s not a crime.”
Dr. West testified that Krystle also thought that Eustorgio was a clone who
had to be returned to get Gio back and that Krystle had called 911 because her
attempts to get Gio back were not working—Eustorgio had escaped, and Krystle
could not find the key inside the clone-Gio. Krystle was calling 911 to help her, in
Dr. West’s view.
Dr. West testified that the police bodycam videos were capturing the moments
when Krystle was coming out of her delusional state and beginning to realize that
what she had thought was real actually was not. Dr. West noted that in one video
clip Krystle is heard saying, “They tricked me.” She explained to the jury that this
demonstrates Krystle’s dawning understanding that what she had thought she needed
to do to get Gio back was not reality.
16 Dr. West also noted the pace and content of Krystle’s interactions on the
videos. She opined that they were evidence of disorganized behavior and being
inundated with voices inside her head, which are signs of psychosis.
Dr. West testified that Krystle was severely delusional on the day of Gio’s
death—she was suffering from psychosis that prevented her from knowing the
difference between right and wrong, meaning that she met the definition of legal
insanity. Dr. West’s diagnostic impression, tied to the time of the offense, was
“unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder” with paranoia
and disorganized thoughts and behaviors. The schizophrenia is labeled
“unspecified,” according to Dr. West, in recognition of evidence that Krystle had
used marijuana days before Gio’s death. Dr. West testified that she could not
definitely rule out substance abuse as a causal factor precipitating Krystle’s
symptoms; yet she could opine that the “severity and longevity of her psychosis
suggests otherwise,” meaning that marijuana use would not have been the cause of
Krystle’s behavior.
Dr. West’s report was included as a trial exhibit. It lists “unspecified
schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder” as the diagnostic impressions
at the time of the offense. It notes Krystle’s history of drug use and a low IQ of 77.
It concludes that Krystle was experiencing symptoms of psychosis when she
attacked Gio and Eustorgio; that she did not know her actions were wrong at the time
17 because she believed her family had been replaced by clones; that, although she has
a history of substance use, “the events of January 5, 2017 are unlikely to flow from
drugs or alcohol; and that Krystle “was suffering from a severe mental disease,
namely unspecified Psychosis. Because of this [she] did not know what she was
doing was wrong.”
Krystle’s younger sister, Samantha, testified. She told the jury that she and
her mother received a call from a relative who saw the police at the Kyle home. They
immediately drove to Kyle. She saw the police remove her sister from the home. She
spoke to police at the scene, and she participated in a police interview two days later.
Samantha thought that drugs might have been involved because Krystle had a history
of drug use.
Samantha was asked about events in the days before Gio’s death. She said
that, just a couple days earlier, she and her son and Krystle and Gio were all living
with a relative. Krystle was in a back bedroom alone, sitting cross-legged on the bed,
and laughing loudly. Samantha went back to the bedroom to check what was going
on. Krystle was sitting there alone, just laughing. Later that day, Samantha went
back to check on her again. Krystle was taking her cellular phone apart. She had the
battery in one hand and the rest of the phone in the other. Krystle commented that
the phone was still beeping and asked Samantha if she could hear it. Samantha told
18 her that she could not hear it. Krystle continued to take the phone apart with a pair
of tweezers until it was in pieces.
Samantha was asked how she reacted to Krystle’s behavior. Samantha
testified that Krystle had a history of being paranoid, thinking that people were
watching her and other conspiratorial thoughts. Samantha thought the paranoia was
odd, but she recalled Krystle displaying paranoid behavior since Samantha was a
young child, so, to Samantha, it seemed like normal behavior—normal for Krystle.
For example, Samantha remembered that Krystle would always cover the
camera of her phone with duct tape to prevent people from watching her. She
remembered that, in 2013, Krystle became paranoid that the devil was coming after
Gio because Gio had a “pure” soul. Another time, Krystle saw a drawing and
panicked, believing that it was an indication she was cursed. That same year, Krystle
disappeared for three days. When she returned, she ran into the house and said God
had touched her and shown her everything and now the devil was after her. Krystle
went to the shower and sobbed. By the time she got out of the shower, she appeared
fine again.
Yet another time, in 2015, Samantha and Krystle and their kids were in a store
when Krystle ran off. Samantha found her hiding in the store restroom. Krystle said
that the CIA was in the store and had found her. Krystle appeared frightened and
would not leave the restroom. Samantha had to tell her that the CIA left before
19 Krystle would leave the restroom. Many times, Samantha found Krystle hiding in
the closet of their home, and Krystle would explain that she was hiding from either
the CIA or the devil.
Samantha testified that these paranoid episodes would occur at random, “one
minute she’s fine, the next she’s not. There was really no pattern to it.” Samantha
agreed that Krystle had a history of drug use, but she also testified that, at least with
regard to the store-restroom incident and hiding from the CIA, Samantha knew that
Krystle had not been on drugs those days.
On cross-examination, Samantha agreed that, on the day of Gio’s death, she
had told the police that there actually was a pattern to Krystle’s behavior—that
Krystle acted odd when she was on drugs. Specifically, she told the police that
Krystle used marijuana and Xanax along with other drugs and that Krystle would
behave weirdly and think the CIA was listening to her when she was using meth.
Samantha also agreed that she had not shared any of these specific stories of
delusions and paranoia with the police when they interviewed her for 30 minutes
immediately after Gio’s death. But, later in her testimony, Samantha said that she
had mentioned to the police that Krystle had a history of being paranoid and thinking
the CIA was watching her. She testified that she also told the police that Krystle had
a history of thinking she saw ghosts and that there had been times when Krystle
20 would speak, Samantha would ask her what she had said, and Krystle would tell her
that she was talking to someone else, even though no one else was in the room.
Samantha testified that Krystle would not take drugs around Gio, but she
would be under the influence of drugs in Gio’s presence. Samantha also testified that
Krystle was never violent with Gio, even when Krystle used drugs.
Samantha and Krystle’s mother, Minia, also testified. She said that she,
Krystle, Samantha, and their children were all living together with another relative
days before Gio’s death. Minia had planned to leave for Nicaragua on January 7. In
advance of that, Krystle and Gio were moving in with Junior and Junior’s parents.
On January 5, she received a call from another relative who lived near Junior’s
parents, saying she needed to come there. She saw the police removing Krystle from
the house.
Minia testified about Krystle’s behavior in the months before Gio’s death.
About two months before, Krystle became much quieter and stayed in her room a
great deal of the time, staring at the ceiling.
Minia also testified that, when Krystle was around the age of four or five, a
male cousin had been “doing stuff to her,” which caused a strain in family
relationships. Minia testified that, beginning around the age of nine, Krystle would
report seeing a “shadow” boy in their home. After they moved, she reported seeing
him in the new house too. The boy was referred to as a “shadow” or “ghost.” Later,
21 around age 21, Krystle would talk about people watching her through the air vents.
Shortly after, there was an incident when Minia came home to find the police
assisting Krystle. Krystle had called them to report that there were people with guns
in the trees. No one was there. Minia took her daughter back into the house. That
evening, Minia saw Krystle lying on the floor. Krystle told Minia to get down
because people with guns were in the trees. Then, Krystle told Minia that Minia had
a red dot on her forehead. Minia described this as paranoid behavior. Still later,
Krystle tried to convince her family members to get rid of their phones because she
believed the government was tracking them. Yet another time, Minia was in the
home when Krystle looked outside and began screaming. Minia asked what
happened, and Krystle said there was a man outside holding a gun. No one was out
there, but Krystle thought it was real.
A year or two later, Krystle went to the hospital after being found walking
along the highway. She reported that a man had attacked her. She referred to him as
“Santana.” Months later, Krystle told Minia that Santana could become a bird and
follow her around, which made Krystle fearful for her own safety, as well as Gio’s
and Junior’s.
Minia testified that, as each of these incidents occurred, she thought it was
because Krystle “smoked weed.” Krystle spent some time in a rehabilitation facility.
Minia thought it was for drug use, but she was not sure.
22 The State’s closing argument emphasized their theory of the case, which was
that Krystle’s past episodes, as described by Samantha and Minia, were drug-related.
She had a documented history of drug abuse. The State suggests that Krystle could
have been ingesting intoxicating substances during the morning of January 5, when
Eustorgio was in his own bedroom. The State emphasized that Krystle never spoke
of clones or people being dolls on the 911 call or at the hospital. It was only after
her blood was drawn and she was tested for marijuana, that Krystle started talking
about clones and dolls.
The State further emphasized that Samantha and Minia always thought
Krystle’s behavior was drug-related; that they had a chance to tell the police
immediately after Gio’s death about delusions, paranoia, snipers in trees, and so on;
and they did not mention it. The State reminded the jury that it was not until later
that Minia and Samantha took the position that “suddenly she’s crazy.” The State
argued these were not credible witnesses—they were there only to help Krystle.
The State further emphasized that there were trash bags around Gio’s body at
the crime scene, which the State argued was evidence of Krystle trying to dispose of
evidence of her crime. The State posed the question for the jury: “And if you know
enough to know that you need to dispose of evidence, you certainly know enough to
know you’ve done something illegal.”
23 Finally, the State argued that Dr. West was a “hired gun” who came into court
with a goal of helping Krystle establish insanity and, in doing so, ignored any
evidence that indicated guilt.
Krystle’s closing argument emphasized that filicide—the killing of children—
is a recognized area of psychology and that psychosis is one of the documented
reasons parents kill their children. Krystle’s medical records and family testimony
were summarized, highlighting references to delusions and hallucinations. The jury
was told that no motive had been uncovered for killing Gio—that the only
explanation was the psychosis Krystle was experienced at the time.
The jury was reminded that the medical personnel who saw Krystle after her
arrest had diagnosed her with psychosis, just as Dr. West had. They were reminded
of Krystle’s confused state in the bodycam videos, particularly during her police
interview.
In conclusion, the jury was told that “mental illness is real” and that “mental
illness caused that mother to kill that daughter . . . And it’s hard for people to
understand this . . . But she didn’t choose it . . . If she was in her right mind, she
never would have done this, but she was not.”
In its rebuttal, the State argued that Krystle might not have been “in her right
mind,” and she may not have asked for that to be the case, “but she did bring it on
herself.” The State argues that voluntary intoxication negates the defense of insanity
24 and, because Krystle had alcohol and marijuana in her system, she chose to be
intoxicated, which means she does not meet the criteria for an insanity defense. At
the conclusion of its closing, the State argued that it would not be just or right to sit
in judgment of a person with a history of drug-induced episodes of losing touch with
reality, know that she was on drugs when she killed her daughter and mutilated her
body, and then tell her it was not her fault because she is “insane.” “She did
something crazy that day . . . but she was not insane,” under the legal definition, the
State argued.
The court’s charge gave the jury three options regarding guilty and innocence
on the two offenses of capital murder and aggravated assault. They could find her
guilty, innocent, or innocent by reason of insanity. The charge instructed the jury
that a person’s conduct that would otherwise be a crime is not a criminal act if, “at
the time of that conduct, the person, as a result of severe mental disease or defect,
did not know that the conduct was wrong,” and thus was insane. They were further
instructed that temporary insanity caused by voluntary intoxication “does not
constitute a defense to the commission of crime” and that the term “intoxication”
means “disturbance of mental and physical capacity resulting from the introduction
of any substances into the body.”
25 The jury found Krystle guilty of both offenses, and the trial court sentenced
her to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the capital murder offense
and 20 years’ confinement for the aggravated assault offense.
Krystle appealed the jury’s rejection of her insanity affirmative defense,
arguing that their verdict was against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence to be manifestly unjust, i.e., factually insufficient.
Insanity Affirmative Defense
Krystle challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s
rejection of her insanity defense. She does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the jury’s finding of the essential elements of capital murder.
A. Applicable law
Texas presumes that a defendant is sane and that she intends the natural
consequences of her actions. Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 591 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008). Insanity is an affirmative defense that the defendant has the burden to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence. TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 2.04(d), 8.01(a); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46C.153(a)(2). Insanity excuses a person from criminal
responsibility even though the State proves all elements of the offense, including
mens rea, beyond a reasonable doubt. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46C.153(a).
Insanity under the law is defined as (1) “a severe mental disease or defect”
that (2) resulted in the actor not knowing that his conduct was wrong at the time of
26 the offense. TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.01(a); Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 878 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1994). “Under Texas law, ‘wrong,’ in this context, means ‘illegal.’”
Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 592. Even if a defendant believes his actions were morally
justified, so long as the defendant knows the actions were illegal, the affirmative
defense of insanity is not available. See id.
There are two additional limitations on the insanity defense. First, voluntary
intoxication and temporary insanity caused by intoxication do not allow for the
insanity defense. TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.04; Afzal v. State, 559 S.W.3d 204, 208 n.4
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet. ref’d). Temporary insanity caused by intoxication
may be used as mitigation evidence during the penalty phase of a criminal trial, but
it cannot be relied on to obtain a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. See TEX.
PENAL CODE § 8.04; Ex parte Martinez, 195 S.W.3d 713, 722 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006). This means that, if a person experiences temporary visual and auditory
hallucinations, paranoia, and other psychotic symptoms because they are under the
influence of drugs and commits a crime in that delusional state, the affirmative
defense of insanity is not available to obtain a not-guilty verdict—it is only relevant
to punishment for the crime. See Afzal, 559 S.W.3d at 209–10.
Second, the affirmative defense of insanity is a legal issue, not a medical one.
Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); see Plough v. State,
725 S.W.2d 494, 500 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.). A person may meet
27 the medical definition of insanity but be legally denied access to an insanity defense
because, even though she suffers from delusions, she still understands that her
actions are illegal. Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 949.
The determination of whether a person understands that her actions are illegal
is reserved to the factfinder. Id.; Dashield v. State, 110 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). An expert’s opinion may aid the
factfinder in resolving the issue, but the expert may not dictate the result. Graham,
566 S.W.2d at 948–49; McAfee v. State, 467 S.W.3d 622, 636–37 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d); Dashield, 110 S.W.3d at 115. As we have
stated, “The ultimate issue of criminal responsibility is beyond the province of an
expert witness; otherwise, the issue ‘would be tried in hospitals rather than in
courts.’” Dashield, 110 S.W.3d at 115 (quoting Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 949).
The factfinder’s determination is based, at least in part, on its credibility
determination of various witnesses’ testimony. Id. The circumstances of the crime
itself are also important in determining the mental state of the accused at the time of
the commission of the offense. McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at 637. The jury may consider
evidence indicating knowledge of wrongful conduct, such as an attempt to conceal
incriminating evidence or elude law enforcement. Id.; see Torres v. State, 976
S.W.2d 345, 347–48 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
28 The Graham case provides an illustration. There, a man (Graham) stopped by
the house of an acquaintance and invited her out for drinks. 566 S.W.2d at 943. He
began making sexual advances to her, which she declined. Id. at 944. He became
aggressive, eventually hitting her. Id. Then he “came back to his senses,” apologized,
and bought first-aid supplies to care for her wounds. Id. He almost took her home
but hesitated, fearing she would tell her parents. He drove her to a secluded area,
threatened her with a knife, tied her up, and sexually assaulted her. Id. He left for a
while, returned, and then beat her. Id. After “he got his senses back,” he untied her
and asked her whether he had done that to her. Id. When she said he had, Graham
apologized, saying “Well, I’m sorry. I guess I have been drinking too much.” Id.
They went to his car, but he feared taking her home. Id. She promised not to go to
the police. He dropped her off at her house five and one-half hours after picking her
up. Id. She testified that she thought he knew what he was doing and that his
statements of apology were just “to make me feel better toward him or something.”
Id. at 945.
Two psychiatrists testified that Graham had schizophrenia with paranoid
delusions. Id. at 946. They explained that schizophrenic persons often have difficulty
distinguishing fantasy and dreams from reality and that remissions can occur
dramatically, with changes from hour to hour “or maybe even quicker.” Id. Further,
one can be in a delusional state where he does not know right from wrong, quickly
29 enter into a period of remission where he knows what he is doing, knows that it is
wrong, and is capable of conforming to the law, and then return to a delusional state.
See id. at 946. According to the psychiatrists, Graham first showed signs of
schizophrenia a year before the offense. Id. at 947. Graham later told his doctor that
he thought the rape happened as a nightmare while he slept. Id.
The jury rejected Graham’s insanity defense. Id. at 943. The Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the conviction. Id. at 954. First, the Court noted that the burden is
on the criminal defendant to establish the defense of insanity by a preponderance of
the evidence and that the State is under no burden to establish sanity or supply expert
testimony on the topic. Id. at 950. Second, the Court emphasized that a jury may
accept or reject in whole or in part lay testimony and expert testimony. Id. at 950–
51. Third, the Court noted that the two psychiatrists allowed for periods of remission
“at irregular and unpredictable intervals.” Id. And finally, the Court focused on the
woman’s testimony that Graham apologized after beating her and displayed fear of
taking her home because she might go to the police or tell her parents. Id. at 952.
According to the Court, Graham’s apologies and fear of detection could be viewed
as evidence he was aware of his actions and of the wrongfulness of them. Id.
The Court concluded that the jury had weighed the evidence, made credibility
determinations, and performed its role in deciding the insanity defense beyond the
medical definition of insanity, taking into account the “inarticulable ethical
30 component, which includes imperatives of free will, self-control, and responsibility
for one’s acts that are fundamental to our notions of man, and that are the foundation
of social relationships and criminal responsibility built on such a concept of man.”
Id. at 953. The Court then affirmed the conviction, declaring, “Rarely will this Court
overturn a jury’s findings on this issue.” Id.
In sum, when presented with an insanity defense, the factfinder’s ultimate
question is whether “the defendant factually know[s] that society considers [his]
conduct against the law, even though [he], due to his mental disease or defect, may
think that the conduct is morally justified.” Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 592. If the
defendant understands his conduct is illegal, the defense is not available. See id.
B. Standard of review
Krystle challenges only the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the
jury’s rejection of her affirmative defense. By challenging the factual sufficiency of
the evidence to support the adverse finding, she is asserting that the adverse finding
was so against the great weight and preponderance of the entire body of admitted
evidence as to be manifestly unjust. See Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 670 n.29,
671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). In review of the factual sufficiency to support the jury’s
rejection of an affirmative defense, we consider all the evidence in a neutral light
while preserving the factfinder’s weight and credibility determinations. Id. at 671.
We may find the evidence factually insufficient only “if, after setting out the relevant
31 evidence and explaining precisely how the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the
evidence supporting the verdict, [we] clearly state[ ] why the verdict is so much
against the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, conscience-
shocking, or clearly biased.” Id. If we so conclude, the remedy is a new trial, not
acquittal. See id. at 672.
C. Analysis
Viewing the evidence in a neutral light while preserving the jury’s credibility
determinations, we hold that the jury’s rejection of the insanity defense was not so
against the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. See Matlock, 392
S.W.3d at 671.
The evidence presented to the jury regarding whether Krystle knew her
behavior was legally wrong came from Dr. West. She testified that Krystle did not
know her behavior was wrong because she thought she was attacking clones, not
real people. The jury reasonably could have rejected Dr. West’s opinions and, based
on Krystle’s own recorded statements after Gio’s death, determined that she knew
she was killing her daughter and stabbing Junior’s stepfather. See Lancon v. State,
253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding that witness credibility issues
are reserved to the jury, which may choose to believe some testimony and disbelieve
other testimony); Davis v. State, 177 S.W.3d 355, 358 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
32 Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (stating that jury may choose to believe all or any part of any
witness’s testimony).
Krystle told the 911 operator that she killed her “daughter” and stabbed her
“father-in-law.” And she provided a reason: Gio wanted cereal. After loud banging
noises, she told the 911 operator, less than an hour after the killing: “Nothing. I’m
just trying – I cut my daughter’s head off.” Krystle’s reference to those she harmed
as her “daughter” and “father-in-law” on the 911 tape is some evidence that she
understood they were her family members, which the jury reasonably could have
concluded was inconsistent with Dr. West’s opinion that Krystle did not think these
were real people and therefore did not understand that her attacks were illegal.
On the police bodycam videos, Krystle repeatedly stated that she had killed
her “daughter.” She told the police officers to kill her for it, and she repeatedly
apologized for her actions. But she also said that she thought Gio was a doll and that
the two were clones. The role of resolving these inconsistent statements is left
exclusively to the jury, which reasonably could have determined that Krystle’s
references to those she injured as her “daughter” and “stepfather” indicated an
awareness that they were people, thus negating the factual basis of Dr. West’s
opinion that Krystle did not understand her attacks to be illegal. See Graham, 566
S.W.2d at 952 (affirming conviction where some evidence supported view that
33 criminal defendant was unaware of his attacks and other evidence supported view
that he took action to avoid detection of his crime).
We emphasize that the jury did not have to reject Dr. West’s expert opinion
that Krystle has psychosis and periods of paranoid delusions for it to have rejected
the affirmative defense of insanity. Under Texas law, medical insanity does not, by
itself, meet the standard for legal insanity under the Penal Code to remove legal
responsibility for one’s actions. Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 953 (“The ‘mental disease
or defect’ component is one that limits the availability of the defense, not one that
automatically invokes its protective shield.”). The criminal defendant’s burden
includes establishing that “as a result of severe mental disease or defect,” she did not
know that her conduct was illegal. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.01(a); Ruffin, 270
S.W.3d at 592.
Here, even if the jury accepted that Krystle was medically insane when she
attacked Gio and Eustorgio, there still was sufficient evidence from which the jury
could have determined that Krystle understood her actions were illegal. The only
basis the jury had been given to conclude otherwise was Dr. West’s testimony that
Krystle thought Gio and Eustorgio were clones, not real people and, based on that
belief, could not have believed it was illegal to cut into them. Yet, Krystle repeatedly
referred to Gio as her “daughter” on the 911 call, police bodycam recordings, and
during the police interview. She also referred to Eustorgio as her “father-in-law” on
34 the 911 recording. The jury could have concluded, based on these references, that
Krystle understood these two people were her family members, as she described
them. See Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 952. If the jury did so, the sole defensive theory
for why she did not know her actions were illegal was negated.
Nor did the jury necessarily have to determine that Krystle was voluntarily
intoxicated to have rejected the insanity defense. The jury reasonably could have
determined that Krystle’s actions were unrelated to the trace amounts of marijuana
or the consumption of alcohol that would have elevated her blood-alcohol content to
near .08—the minimum threshold for intoxication. In other words, the jury was not
limited to two choices: (A) finding that Krystle’s insanity was a medical condition
or (B) finding that voluntary intoxication caused her insanity. It had other options,
including (C) finding that, regardless of whether she was medically insane, she was
aware that her actions in killing Gio and stabbing Eustorgio were illegal. And, based
on that reason alone, the jury could have rejected Krystle’s insanity defense without
ever reaching the issue of voluntary intoxication. We conclude that there is sufficient
evidence in the record to affirm the conviction without resolving the parties’ dispute
over whether Krystle’s intoxication was layered on top of her mental illness or the
cause of it.
In conclusion, after hearing all the evidence, the jury could have determined
that Krystle’s actions indicated that she knew her conduct was wrong at the time of
35 Gio’s murder and Eustorgio’s stabbing, even if she otherwise met the medical
criteria of insanity. Whether we would have reached the same conclusion is not the
test: the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s rejection of her affirmative
defense, and the jury’s decision was not so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d
at 671; Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (noting that
an appellate court may not act as a “thirteenth juror”). We overrule Krystle’s sole
issue.
Conclusion
Sarah Beth Landau Justice
Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Landau, and Hightower.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).