Krystal Alvarez v. Galpin Motors, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedMay 10, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-01598
StatusUnknown

This text of Krystal Alvarez v. Galpin Motors, Inc. (Krystal Alvarez v. Galpin Motors, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Krystal Alvarez v. Galpin Motors, Inc., (C.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

Case 2:22-cv-01598-ODW-MRW Document 44 Filed 05/10/22 Page 1 of 7 Page ID #:342

O 1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California 10 11 KRISTAL ALVAREZ, Case № 2:22-cv-01598-ODW (MRWx)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING TRANS 13 UNION’S MOTION TO v. DISMISS [22]; GRANTING 14 AMERICAN HONDA FINANCE 15 GALPIN MOTORS, INC., et al., CORPORATION’S MOTION TO 16 DISMISS [23]; and DENYING Defendants. EQUIFAX’S JOINDER [37] 17 18 19 Defendant Trans Union LLC and Defendant American Honda Finance 20 Corporation (“Honda Finance” or “AHFC”) each move to dismiss the claims Plaintiff 21 Kristal Alvarez asserts against them in her operative Amended Complaint. (Trans 22 Union Mot., ECF No. 22; AHFC Mot., ECF No. 23; see Notice of Removal Ex. A 23 (“Am. Compl.”), ECF No. 1-1.) Defendant Equifax Information Services LLC seeks 24 to join in Trans Union’s Motion to Dismiss. (Joinder, ECF No. 37.) After carefully 25 considering the papers filed in connection with the Motions and Joinder, the Court 26 deemed the matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. 27 P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Trans 28 Union’s and Honda Finance’s Motions and DENIES Equifax’s Joinder. Case 2:22-cv-01598-ODW-MRW Document 44 Filed 05/10/22 Page 2 of 7 Page ID #:343

1 A. Trans Union Motion to Dismiss 2 Alvarez brings a single claim against Trans Union, for violation of the Fair 3 Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 111–24.) 4 Trans Union moves to dismiss this claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) and noticed the motion hearing on April 18, 2022. (See Notice of 6 Mot. 1, ECF No. 22.) Alvarez was thus required to file any opposition no later than 7 March 28, 2022. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-9 (requiring a party opposing a noticed motion 8 to file an opposition no later than twenty-one days before the designated hearing date). 9 On April 11, 2022, two weeks after the deadline to oppose, the Court received 10 Alvarez’s Opposition to Trans Union’s Motion. (Opp’n TU Mot., ECF No. 40.) 11 Central District Civil Local Rule (“Local Rule”) 7-12 provides that a failure to 12 timely file a required responsive document such as an opposition may be deemed as 13 consent to the granting of the motion. See also Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 14 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint based on 15 plaintiff’s failure to oppose motion as required by local rules). Prior to dismissing an 16 action, or a defendant, pursuant to a local rule, courts must weigh: (1) the public 17 interest in expeditious resolution of cases, (2) the court’s need to manage its docket, 18 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants, (4) public policy favoring disposition of 19 cases on the merits, and (5) the availability of less drastic measures. See Ghazali, 20 46 F.3d at 53 (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). 21 “Explicit findings with respect to these factors are not required.” Ismail v. County of 22 Orange, No. SACV 10-00901 VBF (AJW), 2012 WL 12964893, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 23 Nov. 7, 2012) (first citing Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424; and then citing Malone v. 24 U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 129 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 819 25 (1988)). In Ghazali, the Ninth Circuit found these factors satisfied where the plaintiff 26 received notice of the motion and had ample opportunity to respond yet failed to do 27 so. See 46 F.3d at 54. 28

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1 The Court has considered the Ghazali factors and finds they support granting 2 Trans Union’s Motion. Although Alvarez is proceeding pro se, she was properly 3 served with Trans Union’s Motion, and Trans Union’s attorney attempted several 4 times to confer with Alvarez prior to filing the Motion. (See Certificate of Service, 5 ECF No. 23-3; Decl. Kristin L. Marker ¶¶ 5–7, ECF No. 22-1.) Therefore, Alvarez 6 received notice of the Motion and had sufficient opportunity to timely respond but 7 failed to do so. Alvarez signed her Opposition on April 9, 2022, nearly two weeks 8 after her deadline, and offers no explanation for her delay in opposing Trans Union’s 9 Motion. (See generally Opp’n TU Mot.) As such, the Court finds granting Trans 10 Union’s Motion as unopposed is appropriate. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-12; Ghazali, 11 46 F.3d at 54. 12 The Court also considers Trans Union’s Motion on its merits and finds that 13 Alvarez fails to state a claim against Trans Union in her Amended Complaint. To 14 state a claim under § 1681e(b) of the FCRA, a plaintiff must establish that the credit 15 reporting agency prepared a report containing inaccurate information; however, an 16 agency will not be liable if it establishes that it followed reasonable procedures. 17 Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, 18 “[l]iability under § 1681e(b) is predicated on the reasonableness of the credit reporting 19 agency’s procedures in obtaining credit information.” Id. 20 Here, Alvarez’s sole allegation against Trans Union is that it “failed to follow 21 any reasonable procedures to maximum [sic] possible accuracy of the information in 22 reports that it prepared.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 124.) Alvarez does not allege that Trans 23 Union prepared any credit report in her name or that such a report contained 24 inaccurate information. (See id. ¶¶ 111–24.) Moreover, Alvarez does not allege any 25 facts related to procedures or policies that were purportedly unreasonable, nor how 26 Trans Union’s purported failure to follow reasonable procedures caused Alvarez any 27 damages. (See id.) Thus, Alvarez fails to state a claim against Trans Union for 28 violation of the FCRA. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive

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1 a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 2 true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” (internal quotation marks 3 omitted)). 4 Even were the Court to consider Alvarez’s untimely opposition, the same result 5 obtains. In her Opposition, Alvarez fails to coherently address the above deficiencies. 6 (See Opp’n TU Mot.) Although a pro se complaint must be construed liberally, a 7 “liberal interpretation . . . may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not 8 initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 9 (9th Cir. 1982). 10 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Trans Union’s Motion to Dismiss Alvarez’s 11 claim against it, as unopposed and for failure to state a claim. As the Court cannot 12 find that any amendment would be futile, dismissal is with leave to amend to address 13 the above-noted deficiencies. Carrico v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 14 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). Amendment beyond the permitted scope will be 15 dismissed or stricken. 16 B.

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Related

Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
673 F.2d 266 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Donald v. Spencer
656 F.3d 14 (First Circuit, 2011)
Henderson v. Duncan
779 F.2d 1421 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)

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Bluebook (online)
Krystal Alvarez v. Galpin Motors, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/krystal-alvarez-v-galpin-motors-inc-cacd-2022.