1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KRISTEN GOHN, No. 2:25-cv-03430-JAM-DMC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING TRUMARK FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION’S MOTION TO DISMISS 14 TRUMARK FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION; TRIVERITY, INC.; 15 EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.; TRANS UNION 16 LLC; and EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, 17 Defendants. 18 19 Plaintiff Kristen Gohn, who became the victim of identity 20 theft in 2021, brings several causes of action against a credit 21 union, debt collector, and the credit reporting agencies, 22 alleging violations of state and federal fair credit reporting 23 and debt collection acts. The credit union in question, 24 Defendant TruMark Financial Credit Union (“TruMark”), which is 25 organized under the laws of and headquartered in Pennsylvania, 26 now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against it for lack of 27 personal jurisdiction, arguing it lacks sufficient minimum 28 contacts with California to satisfy due process requirements. 1 As discussed further below, the Court agrees and finds that 2 the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over TruMark. Accordingly, 3 the Court grants dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against TruMark 4 without leave to amend. 5 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 6 Plaintiff, a citizen of California, became aware she was the 7 victim of identity theft in November 2021 when she received a 8 call from Best Buy asking for an individual named “Kristen 9 Roberson,” a name Plaintiff has never used. First Am. Compl. 10 (“FAC”) ¶¶ 28–31, ECF No. 20. Plaintiff subsequently received 11 alerts that multiple hard inquiries had been made on her credit 12 file that she did not authorize. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff reviewed 13 her credit reports and discovered multiple accounts, inquiries, 14 addresses, phone numbers, and personal identifiers falsely 15 associated with her, including the name “Kristen Roberson,” a 16 fraudulent address at 4820 Westminster Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 17 19131, and a phone number 302-459-6008. Id. ¶ 33. 18 Of note here, the fraudster opened several accounts at 19 TruMark, a credit union organized under the laws of and 20 headquartered in Pennsylvania. Id. ¶¶ 16, 37; Monari Decl. ¶¶ 6– 21 9, ECF No. 27-1. The fraudster opened credit card account ending 22 4323 on September 22, 2021, which was charged off for more than 23 $15,000; credit account ending 0004 on September 15, 2021, which 24 was charged off for more than $5,800; and credit account ending 25 0001 on September 22, 2021, which was charged off for nearly 26 $15,000. FAC ¶ 37. Those accounts were opened using the false 27 name, false Pennsylvania address, and false phone number listed 28 above. Id. ¶ 42. 1 At the time the fraudulent TruMark accounts were opened, 2 TruMark had accessed and reviewed a consumer credit profile 3 associated with Plaintiff’s Social Security number. Id. ¶ 38. 4 That credit profile identified Plaintiff as a California 5 resident, reflecting longstanding California addresses, 6 California-based credit activity, and a credit history tied to 7 the State of California. Id. ¶ 39. The identity used to open 8 the TruMark accounts did not match Plaintiff’s true legal 9 identity, as Plaintiff’s correct surname is “Rogerson” (a name 10 she has not used since 2019), while the fraudulent applications 11 and accounts listed the surname “Roberson.” Id. ¶ 40. Based on 12 this, Plaintiff alleges that TruMark knew that the identity used 13 to open the accounts belonged to a California citizen, but still 14 permitted the fraudster to open several accounts with the 15 fraudster’s false name, false Pennsylvania address, and false 16 phone number. Id. ¶¶ 41–42. 17 On October 16, 2024, Plaintiff sent a comprehensive written 18 dispute package to Defendants Trans Union LLC, Experian 19 Information Solutions, Inc., and Equifax Information Services, 20 LLC (collectively, the Credit Reporting Agencies, or “CRAs”), 21 which included her identity-theft affidavit, police report, 22 annotated disclosures, identity documents, and proof of 23 residence. Id. ¶ 43. This dispute was transmitted to TruMark 24 through the CRAs. Id. ¶ 44. The CRAs reviewed Plaintiff’s 25 dispute package and verified the “fraudulent” TruMark accounts as 26 belonging to Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 45–47. Thus, the TruMark 27 accounts remained on Plaintiff’s credit reports. Id. ¶ 48. 28 Plaintiff alleges the CRAs and TruMark failed to conduct a 1 reasonable investigation into Plaintiff’s dispute, as they 2 ignored “clear” evidence provided by Plaintiff that the accounts 3 were fraudulent. Id. ¶¶ 49–87. 4 Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings two causes of 5 action against TruMark for (1) Violation of the Fair Credit 6 Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x; and (2) Violation of the 7 California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, Cal. Civ. Code 8 §§ 1785.1 et seq. Id. ¶¶ 122–31. TruMark moves to dismiss these 9 claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), 10 and 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1404(a) to a district court in Pennsylvania. See Mot. Dismiss 12 or Transfer (“Mot.”), ECF No. 27. This matter is fully briefed 13 and was submitted without oral argument under Local Rule 230(g). 14 See Pl.’s Opp’n (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 33; TruMark’s Reply (“Reply”), 15 ECF No. 36; ECF No. 42. 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) provides that a 18 defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal 19 jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). In opposing a motion to 20 dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears 21 the burden of establishing jurisdiction is proper. Picot v. 22 Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015). Where the 23 defendant’s motion is based on written materials rather than an 24 evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie 25 showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to 26 dismiss. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 27 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). 28 /// 1 The court may consider evidence presented in affidavits to 2 assist it in its determination. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 3 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Daimler 4 AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126 (2014). “Uncontroverted 5 allegations in the complaint are taken as true, but in the face 6 of a contradictory affidavit, the ‘plaintiff cannot simply rest 7 on the bare allegations of its complaint.’” Yamashita v. LG 8 Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th 496, 502 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Mavrix, 9 647 F.3d at 1223); see also Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. 10 Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1977) (a court “may 11 not assume the truth of allegations in a pleading which are 12 contradicted by affidavit”). Rather, the plaintiff must “come 13 forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting 14 personal jurisdiction.” Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 15 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KRISTEN GOHN, No. 2:25-cv-03430-JAM-DMC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING TRUMARK FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION’S MOTION TO DISMISS 14 TRUMARK FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION; TRIVERITY, INC.; 15 EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.; TRANS UNION 16 LLC; and EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, 17 Defendants. 18 19 Plaintiff Kristen Gohn, who became the victim of identity 20 theft in 2021, brings several causes of action against a credit 21 union, debt collector, and the credit reporting agencies, 22 alleging violations of state and federal fair credit reporting 23 and debt collection acts. The credit union in question, 24 Defendant TruMark Financial Credit Union (“TruMark”), which is 25 organized under the laws of and headquartered in Pennsylvania, 26 now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against it for lack of 27 personal jurisdiction, arguing it lacks sufficient minimum 28 contacts with California to satisfy due process requirements. 1 As discussed further below, the Court agrees and finds that 2 the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over TruMark. Accordingly, 3 the Court grants dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against TruMark 4 without leave to amend. 5 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 6 Plaintiff, a citizen of California, became aware she was the 7 victim of identity theft in November 2021 when she received a 8 call from Best Buy asking for an individual named “Kristen 9 Roberson,” a name Plaintiff has never used. First Am. Compl. 10 (“FAC”) ¶¶ 28–31, ECF No. 20. Plaintiff subsequently received 11 alerts that multiple hard inquiries had been made on her credit 12 file that she did not authorize. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff reviewed 13 her credit reports and discovered multiple accounts, inquiries, 14 addresses, phone numbers, and personal identifiers falsely 15 associated with her, including the name “Kristen Roberson,” a 16 fraudulent address at 4820 Westminster Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 17 19131, and a phone number 302-459-6008. Id. ¶ 33. 18 Of note here, the fraudster opened several accounts at 19 TruMark, a credit union organized under the laws of and 20 headquartered in Pennsylvania. Id. ¶¶ 16, 37; Monari Decl. ¶¶ 6– 21 9, ECF No. 27-1. The fraudster opened credit card account ending 22 4323 on September 22, 2021, which was charged off for more than 23 $15,000; credit account ending 0004 on September 15, 2021, which 24 was charged off for more than $5,800; and credit account ending 25 0001 on September 22, 2021, which was charged off for nearly 26 $15,000. FAC ¶ 37. Those accounts were opened using the false 27 name, false Pennsylvania address, and false phone number listed 28 above. Id. ¶ 42. 1 At the time the fraudulent TruMark accounts were opened, 2 TruMark had accessed and reviewed a consumer credit profile 3 associated with Plaintiff’s Social Security number. Id. ¶ 38. 4 That credit profile identified Plaintiff as a California 5 resident, reflecting longstanding California addresses, 6 California-based credit activity, and a credit history tied to 7 the State of California. Id. ¶ 39. The identity used to open 8 the TruMark accounts did not match Plaintiff’s true legal 9 identity, as Plaintiff’s correct surname is “Rogerson” (a name 10 she has not used since 2019), while the fraudulent applications 11 and accounts listed the surname “Roberson.” Id. ¶ 40. Based on 12 this, Plaintiff alleges that TruMark knew that the identity used 13 to open the accounts belonged to a California citizen, but still 14 permitted the fraudster to open several accounts with the 15 fraudster’s false name, false Pennsylvania address, and false 16 phone number. Id. ¶¶ 41–42. 17 On October 16, 2024, Plaintiff sent a comprehensive written 18 dispute package to Defendants Trans Union LLC, Experian 19 Information Solutions, Inc., and Equifax Information Services, 20 LLC (collectively, the Credit Reporting Agencies, or “CRAs”), 21 which included her identity-theft affidavit, police report, 22 annotated disclosures, identity documents, and proof of 23 residence. Id. ¶ 43. This dispute was transmitted to TruMark 24 through the CRAs. Id. ¶ 44. The CRAs reviewed Plaintiff’s 25 dispute package and verified the “fraudulent” TruMark accounts as 26 belonging to Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 45–47. Thus, the TruMark 27 accounts remained on Plaintiff’s credit reports. Id. ¶ 48. 28 Plaintiff alleges the CRAs and TruMark failed to conduct a 1 reasonable investigation into Plaintiff’s dispute, as they 2 ignored “clear” evidence provided by Plaintiff that the accounts 3 were fraudulent. Id. ¶¶ 49–87. 4 Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings two causes of 5 action against TruMark for (1) Violation of the Fair Credit 6 Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x; and (2) Violation of the 7 California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, Cal. Civ. Code 8 §§ 1785.1 et seq. Id. ¶¶ 122–31. TruMark moves to dismiss these 9 claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), 10 and 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1404(a) to a district court in Pennsylvania. See Mot. Dismiss 12 or Transfer (“Mot.”), ECF No. 27. This matter is fully briefed 13 and was submitted without oral argument under Local Rule 230(g). 14 See Pl.’s Opp’n (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 33; TruMark’s Reply (“Reply”), 15 ECF No. 36; ECF No. 42. 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) provides that a 18 defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal 19 jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). In opposing a motion to 20 dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears 21 the burden of establishing jurisdiction is proper. Picot v. 22 Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015). Where the 23 defendant’s motion is based on written materials rather than an 24 evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie 25 showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to 26 dismiss. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 27 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). 28 /// 1 The court may consider evidence presented in affidavits to 2 assist it in its determination. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 3 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Daimler 4 AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126 (2014). “Uncontroverted 5 allegations in the complaint are taken as true, but in the face 6 of a contradictory affidavit, the ‘plaintiff cannot simply rest 7 on the bare allegations of its complaint.’” Yamashita v. LG 8 Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th 496, 502 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Mavrix, 9 647 F.3d at 1223); see also Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. 10 Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1977) (a court “may 11 not assume the truth of allegations in a pleading which are 12 contradicted by affidavit”). Rather, the plaintiff must “come 13 forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting 14 personal jurisdiction.” Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 15 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 16 Where, as here, no federal statute authorizes personal 17 jurisdiction, the law of the state in which the district court 18 sits applies. Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 19 1484 (9th Cir. 1993). California’s long-arm jurisdictional 20 statute is coextensive with federal due process requirements. 21 Id. Due process requires that the defendant “have certain 22 minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance 23 of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and 24 substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 25 310, 316 (1945) (citation omitted). “Depending on the strength 26 of those contacts, there are two forms that personal jurisdiction 27 may take: general and specific.” Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211. 28 /// 1 General jurisdiction exists when the defendant is domiciled 2 in the forum state or has contacts with the forum state that are 3 so “continuous and systematic” as to render the defendant “at 4 home” in that forum. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 5 Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). Specific jurisdiction exists 6 when a suit arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts 7 with the forum. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014). In 8 the Ninth Circuit, specific jurisdiction is determined by a 9 three-prong test: “(1) the defendant must either ‘purposefully 10 direct his activities’ toward the forum or ‘purposefully avail[ ] 11 himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum’; 12 (2) ‘the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the 13 defendant’s forum-related activities’; and (3) ‘the exercise of 14 jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, 15 i.e. it must be reasonable.’” Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem 16 Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Dole 17 Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002)). 18 “The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two 19 prongs of the test[,]” while the burden of the third prong shifts 20 to the defendant. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 21 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). “If any of the three requirements 22 is not satisfied, jurisdiction in the forum would deprive the 23 defendant of due process of law.” Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & 24 Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1995). 25 III. OPINION 26 A. Sanctions 27 As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s 28 Opposition is 21 pages in violation of this Court’s Order re 1 Filing Requirements that such filings are limited to 15 pages. 2 See ECF No. 4-2. Thus, the Court will impose monetary sanctions 3 of $50.00 per page, or $300.00, against Plaintiff. 4 B. Personal Jurisdiction 5 TruMark argues that the Court lacks both general and 6 specific personal jurisdiction over TruMark. Mot. at 7–11. 7 TruMark argues that the Court lacks general jurisdiction because 8 TruMark is domiciled in Pennsylvania, not California. Id. at 7– 9 8; see also Monari Decl. ¶¶ 6–9 (attesting that TruMark is 10 organized under the laws of and headquartered in Pennsylvania). 11 TruMark also argues that the Court lacks specific jurisdiction 12 because TruMark operates solely within Pennsylvania and has never 13 purposefully directed any activities towards California; 14 Plaintiff’s claims arise solely out of contact with TruMark in 15 Pennsylvania, not California; and exercising jurisdiction would 16 pose an unreasonable burden “on TruMark—a regionally based not- 17 for-profit that does not offer nationwide credit services—by 18 having to defend an action in a jurisdiction where it has never 19 before filed or defended a lawsuit, thousands of miles away from 20 its home . . . .” Mot. at 8–11. Thus, TruMark contends 21 Plaintiff’s claims against it should be dismissed. Id. at 11. 22 In opposition, Plaintiff concedes that the Court may not 23 assert general jurisdiction over TruMark. See generally Opp’n. 24 However, Plaintiff argues that the Court may assert specific 25 jurisdiction over TruMark because TruMark purposefully directed 26 tortious conduct at Plaintiff in California by opening credit 27 accounts with her personal information despite knowing of the 28 “glaring mismatch between the identity in the credit profile and 1 the identity on the applications”; Plaintiff’s claims arise out 2 of TruMark’s contacts with California as TruMark “knowingly 3 extended credit using a consumer credit profile tied to a 4 California resident while ignoring clear indicators of fraud”; 5 and, given that Plaintiff is the victim of fraud and California 6 has an interest in protecting its citizens, it would be fair and 7 reasonable to subject TruMark to personal jurisdiction in 8 California. Id. at 6–15. 9 The Court disagrees with Plaintiff and finds that it lacks 10 personal jurisdiction over TruMark. As stated above, courts in 11 this circuit apply a three-part test to determine whether they 12 can exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant: 13 “(1) the defendant must either ‘purposefully direct his 14 activities’ toward the forum or ‘purposefully avail[ ] himself of 15 the privileges of conducting activities in the forum’; (2) ‘the 16 claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the 17 defendant’s forum-related activities’; and (3) ‘the exercise of 18 jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, 19 i.e. it must be reasonable.’” Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1068. 20 The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs 21 of the test. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. “If the plaintiff 22 fails to satisfy either of these prongs, personal jurisdiction is 23 not established in the forum state.” Id. 24 Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden here. With respect 25 to the first prong, the purposeful availment analysis is most 26 often used in suits sounding in contract, while the purposeful 27 direction analysis is most often used in suits sounding in tort. 28 Id. As Plaintiff’s claims sound in tort, the Parties agree that 1 the purposeful direction test is appropriate here. See Mot. at 2 9-10; Opp’n at 10–11. “[T]he purposeful direction test requires 3 that the defendant (1) commit an intentional act, that is 4 (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) which causes harm 5 that the defendant knows will be suffered in the forum state.” 6 Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 F.4th 739, 751 (9th Cir. 2025) (en 7 banc). 8 Here, Plaintiff argues that “there is no question that 9 Trumark’s conduct satisfies the purposeful direction test.” 10 Opp’n at 10. Plaintiff contends that, before approving the 11 accounts at issue, Trumark intentionally accessed and reviewed a 12 consumer credit profile associated with Plaintiff’s Social 13 Security number which unmistakably identified Plaintiff as a 14 California resident and reflected a longstanding California 15 credit history, which contradicted the name, Pennsylvania 16 address, and phone number used to apply for the Trumark accounts. 17 Id. These allegations “demonstrate that Trumark knowingly 18 directed its conduct at a California consumer by accessing and 19 relying on Plaintiff’s California credit profile while extending 20 credit to a plainly inconsistent identity,” thereby intentionally 21 harming a California resident. Id. at 11. 22 The Court disagrees that such conduct satisfies the 23 purposeful direction test. Within the purposeful direction test, 24 the “expressly aimed” analysis “looks to the defendant’s contacts 25 with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with 26 persons who reside there.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. Simply put, 27 “the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and 28 the forum. Rather, it is the defendant’s conduct that must form 1 the necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis 2 for its jurisdiction over him.” Id. “The proper question is not 3 where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but 4 whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a 5 meaningful way.” Janus v. Freeman, 840 F. App’x 928, 930 (9th 6 Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Thus, to satisfy the purposeful 7 direction test, Plaintiff must show that TruMark expressly aimed 8 its conduct at California. Plaintiff fails to do so. 9 In support of its Motion to Dismiss, TruMark provides a 10 declaration from TruMark representative John Monari, who attests 11 that TruMark is organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, is 12 headquartered in Pennsylvania, and has never maintained a 13 presence in, or conducted any business in, California. Monari 14 Decl. ¶¶ 1–36. Monari further attests that TruMark limits its 15 membership to “anyone who lives, works, worships, volunteers, 16 attends school, or is a family member of a credit union member in 17 the Southeastern Pennsylvania Counties of Bucks, Chester, 18 Delaware, Montgomery, and Philadelphia.” Id. ¶ 37. 19 “[M]embership is not available to persons who are residents of 20 the State of California at the time a membership application is 21 submitted.” Id. ¶ 40. Monari explains that “[o]n or about 22 August 30, 2021, an individual by the name of Kristen Roberson 23 applied for membership at TruMark.” Id. ¶ 42. As part of her 24 application, Roberson reported having a permanent present address 25 at 4820 Westminster Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19131, with a 26 telephone number of 302-459-6008, and an email address of 27 k8roberson8@gmail.com. Id. ¶ 43. Monari provides copies of a 28 Pennsylvania driver’s license and utility bill Roberson submitted 1 along with the application to confirm her Westminster Avenue 2 address. Id. ¶ 44. Monari attests that “[m]embership at TruMark 3 was offered to Roberson exclusively based on the zip code of her 4 Pennsylvania Address, which confirmed Roberson’s residence in 5 Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, making her an eligible 6 applicant.” Id. ¶ 45. 7 This evidence persuasively demonstrates that TruMark did not 8 expressly aim any conduct at California, as TruMark neither 9 conducted any business in California, nor intentionally directed 10 any business activities (including offers of membership to its 11 credit union) towards California citizens. Plaintiff does not 12 contest this evidence. Rather, Plaintiff argues that TruMark 13 “knew or reasonably should have known” it was offering membership 14 to a California citizen based on the differences between 15 Plaintiff’s credit profile and the false name, Pennsylvania 16 address, and phone number used for the credit applications. 17 Opp’n at 10–11. Even if this were true, it is insufficient to 18 satisfy the purposeful direction test. A theory of 19 individualized targeting, which Plaintiff appears to utilize 20 here, “alleges that a defendant ‘engaged in wrongful conduct 21 targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident 22 of the forum state.’” Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1069. In Walden, 23 571 U.S. 277, however, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s 24 “actions in Georgia did not create sufficient contacts with 25 Nevada simply because he allegedly directed his conduct at 26 plaintiffs whom he knew had Nevada connections.” Id. at 289. 27 Following Walden, district courts in this Circuit have recognized 28 that a “theory of individualized targeting, which relies on a 1 plaintiff’s strong connection to a forum and the defendant’s 2 knowledge that the plaintiff is a resident of that forum and will 3 experience foreseeable harm in that forum, on its own will no 4 longer support a finding of express aiming.” Liggett v. Utah 5 Higher Ed. Assistance Auth., No. 8:19-cv-01589-JLS-ADS, 2020 WL 6 1972286, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2020) (quoting Deveroux v. TT 7 Mktg. Inc., No. 1:18-CV-487 AWI SAB, 2018 WL 3968249, at *2 (E.D. 8 Cal. Aug. 16, 2018) (internal quotation marks and alterations 9 omitted)). Rather, the “personal jurisdiction analysis must 10 focus on the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, not the 11 defendant’s contacts with a resident of the forum.” Picot, 780 12 F.3d at 1214. 13 The Court finds that TruMark did not expressly aim its 14 conduct at California by, for example, sending correspondence to 15 Plaintiff at a California address. Plaintiff’s argument is that 16 TruMark should have known of Plaintiff’s California connections 17 when it authorized the accounts at issue. Opp’n at 8. This 18 falls short of meeting the purposeful direction standard. See, 19 e.g., id. at 1214–15 (affirming dismissal for lack of personal 20 jurisdiction when plaintiff alleged defendant’s tortious conduct 21 targeted him, a California resident, because defendant engaged in 22 his allegedly tortious conduct “without entering California, 23 contacting any person in California, or otherwise reaching out to 24 California”); Deveroux, 2018 WL 3968249, at *5 (concluding that 25 “direct targeting alone is not sufficient” when the plaintiff 26 alleged that the defendant misreported plaintiff’s debt while 27 knowing that the plaintiff was a resident of the forum state, as 28 “[t]here must be contacts by the defendant with the forum, not ~——e REIN IIR IEE IE IRI EINE IIE IORI EIEIO IIE OSE ED eNO □□□□
1] merely with a forum resident”). 2 Given that Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden of 3 showing TruMark purposefully directed any conduct towards 4 California and is therefore unable to meet the first prong of the 5 | personal jurisdiction test, the Court need not analyze the 6 | remaining two requirements. TruMark’s Motion to Dismiss is 7 granted. 8 Iv. ORDER 9 For the reasons above, TruMark Financial Credit Union’s 10 Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 27) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s First and 11 Second Causes of Action are DISMISSED against TruMark without 12 leave to amend since further amendment would be futile. 13 In addition, Counsel for Plaintiff is ordered to pay $300 14 to the Clerk of Court no later than June 8, 2026. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 Dated: June 2, 2026 17 HN A. MENDEZ. 1s Fee UNITED pe acl JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13