Kristen Garcia v. Jonathan Rose

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: June 24, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-04666
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Kristen Garcia, No. CV-25-04666-PHX-SMB

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Jonathan Rose,

13 Defendants. 14 15 The Court now considers Defendant Jonathan Rose’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion 16 to Strike (Doc. 5) and Plaintiff Kristen Garcia’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13). The Court 17 denies Rose’s Motions and grants Kristen’s Motion. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Garcia was enrolled in a master’s program at Arizona State University (“ASU”). 20 (Doc. 1-1 at 5.) This case arises out of an alleged romantic relationship between Garcia 21 and her professor Erin Jordan. (Id. at 11.) Garcia originally sued: Jordan; other ASU 22 faculty; the Arizona Board of Regents (“ABOR”); and Jordan’s then-partner, Rose. 23 However, only Rose remains pursuant to a stipulated dismissal. (Doc. 19). 24 A complete recitation of the Complaint is unnecessary given that Rose is the only 25 remaining Defendant. In short, Garcia took a class taught by Jordan and the pair began to 26 flirt after the semester ended. (Doc. 1-1 at 7.) During this time Garcia bought Jordan 27 several lavish gifts. (Id.) However, Jordan’s behavior shifted and she texted Garcia “I’m 28 sorry, it’s not you,” and indicated that she would not accept any more gifts. (Id. at 8.) 1 Shortly thereafter, Garcia filed a Title IX complaint against Jordan for sexual harassment 2 and retaliation with ASU’s Title IX Coordinator. (Id. at 9.) 3 Thereafter, Jordan filed a complaint with ASU against Garcia. (Id. at 10.) ASU 4 informed Garcia “that she was potentially in violation of ABOR’s Student Code of Conduct 5 for ‘stalking’ and sending ‘unwanted gifts’ to Jordan.” (Id. at 10.) ASU also sent Garcia 6 a copy of its investigative report and summary of the evidence. (Id. at 11.) 7 As relevant here, the evidence included a letter from Rose that he wrote to Jordan. 8 (Id.) In that letter, Jordan: “call[ed] Garcia a ‘clearly infatuated and mentally disturbed 9 individual’”; “insinuate[ed] [that] Garcia was a ‘stalker’”; “call[ed] Garcia’s behavior 10 ‘grotesquely inappropriate’”; alleg[ed] [that] Garcia ‘threatened’ and ‘harassed’ Jordan”; ; 11 and “insinuate[ed] that when Garcia was in Arizona, she demanded and/or attempted to 12 spend time with Jordan against her will.” (Id. at 11–12.) Rose and Garcia never met. (Id. 13 at 12.) Plaintiff thereafter sued Rose for defamation and false light invasion of privacy. 14 (Id. at 17–19.) 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) motion for failure 17 to state a claim, a complaint must meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) 18 requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 19 relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 20 which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) 21 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). This notice exists if the pleader sets 22 forth “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 23 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 24 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 25 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 26 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory 27 or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. 28 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint that sets forth a 1 cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual 2 matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” 3 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equal 4 “probability,” but requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 5 unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 6 defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility . . . .’” 7 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 8 In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded factual allegations 9 are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins 10 v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). However, legal conclusions couched as 11 factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations 12 of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto 13 v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). A court ordinarily may not consider evidence 14 outside the pleadings when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See United States 15 v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may, however, consider 16 materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in 17 the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into 18 a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 908. 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 The Court begins with Rose’s Motion. The Court notes that Rose’s Motion rests 21 within a single filing that includes Rose’s: Answer; a Motion to Dismiss; a Motion to 22 Strike; and Counterclaims. (See generally Doc. 5.) The Court begins with the Motion to 23 Dismiss. 24 A. Rose’s Motion to Dismiss 25 Rose seeks to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Arizona’s Anti-SLAPP statute, 26 A.R.S. § 12-751. (Doc. 5 at 13.) Rose’s Motion is scant and suffers from multiple defects. 27 “The Ninth Circuit employs a two-step process to evaluate anti-SLAPP motions.” 28 Avid Telecom LLC v. Frankel, No. CV-22-00558-TUC-JCH, 2023 WL 5056949, at *2 (D. 1 Ariz. May 26, 2023). “First, the court determines whether the actions at issue involve an 2 exercise of protected rights.” Id. “Second, the court analyzes whether the anti-SLAPP 3 motion raises a legal or a factual challenge.” Id. Defendant Jones’ Motion raises a legal 4 challenge. (Doc. 22 at 9.) “When the anti-SLAPP motion challenges the legal sufficiency 5 of a claim, a district court should apply the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 6 standard and consider whether a claim is properly stated.” Frankel, 2023 WL 5056949, 7 at *2 (citation modified). 8 “To establish defamation under Arizona common law, a publication must be false 9 and must bring the defamed person into disrepute, contempt, or ridicule, or must impeach 10 plaintiff's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation.” Rogers v. Mroz, 502 P.3d 986, 988 11 (Ariz. 2022) (citation modified). “To establish a claim for false light invasion of privacy, 12 a plaintiff must show (1) the defendant, with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for 13 the truth, gave publicity to information placing the plaintiff in a false light, and (2) the false 14 light in which the plaintiff was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person in 15 the plaintiff’s position.” Desert Palm Surgical Grp., P.L.C. v. Petta, 343 P.3d 438, 450 16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015). 17 The Court now turns to Rose’s Motion; the Motion is two pages. The Court need 18 not reach the substance of Garcia’s defamation claim. To start, Rose has not demonstrated 19 that his letter is “an exercise of protected rights.” Frankel, 2023 WL 5056949, at *2. 20 Arizona’s Anti-SLAPP statute protects the “lawful exercise of [rights] . . . pursuant to the 21 United States Constitution or Arizona Constitution.” § 12-751(A). Rose contends that he 22 “exercised his First Amendment right to free speech and his right to petition by submitting 23 testimony to ASU’s Title IX/OURR proceeding.” (Doc. 5 at 13.) According to Rose: 24 “This constitutes speech in connection with an official proceeding and on a matter of public 25 concern.” (Id.) Rose does not cite any authority establishing that his letter filed in an ASU 26 Title X proceeding constitutes an official proceeding on a matter of public concern. 27 Even assuming Rose’s speech was protected, he still “has the burden of establishing 28 prima facie proof that the legal action was substantially motivated by a desire to deter, 1 retaliate against or prevent the lawful exercise of a constitutional right.” § 12-751(B). 2 “The moving person may submit evidence based on the record, a sworn affidavit or other 3 evidence that is submitted with the motion to dismiss or quash.” Id. Plaintiff does not 4 point to any such evidence. Instead, Rose only contends that “Plaintiff’s lawsuit is 5 transparently motivated by a desire to punish Mr. Rose for participating in the Title 6 IX/OURR proceeding and to chill similar protected speech. This is precisely the type of 7 retaliatory lawsuit the Anti-SLAPP statute was designed to prevent.” (Doc. 5 at 13–14.) 8 Rose does not point to any evidence corroborating this assertion. Accordingly, Rose’s 9 Motion fails to sufficiently implicate Arizona’s Anti-SLAPP statute. 10 Rose also contends that Garcia’s claim is time barred because his “letter was 11 published November 1, 2024. Plaintiff filed suit November 11, 2025—ten days after the 12 one-year limitations period expired under A.R.S. § 12-541(1).” (Doc. 5 at 14.) Rose’s 13 argument fails for multiple reasons. First, the Court is not required to accept as true Rose’s 14 claim that his letter was published on November 1; indeed, Rose does not direct this court 15 to any evidence corroborating this assertion. Even if Rose did, it is not clear that Garcia’s 16 cause of action necessarily began to accrue on that date. “The discovery rule holds that 17 when defamatory statements are published in a manner in which they were peculiarly likely 18 to be concealed from the plaintiff, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers 19 the statements or reasonably should have discovered them.” Breeser v. Menta Grp., Inc., 20 NFP, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1161 (D. Ariz. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Breeser v. Menta Grp., 21 Inc., 622 F. App’x 649 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). Here, the Complaint alleges 22 that Rose’s letter was submitted as part of an ostensibly private proceeding initiated by 23 Jordan. Garcia was only made aware of the letter on November 14. (Doc. 1-1 at 11.) It 24 appears that Garcia would not have had any way to learn of the letter or its contents before 25 that point. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are not time-barred. 26 Rose also argues that his statements “are absolutely privileged as communications 27 in a quasi-judicial proceeding.” (Doc. 5 at 14.) Rose does not cite any authority 28 corroborating this assertion. As a practical matter, the Court is not convinced that his 1 statements—which were not made under oath—are shielded from a defamation challenge 2 merely because they were entered into evidence during an ASU internal proceeding. 3 Again, Rose cites no authority to the contrary. 4 Rose also argues that Garcia’s claims must be dismissed because his statements “are 5 substantially true and supported by extensive documentary evidence” or are otherwise 6 “protected opinions.” (Doc. 5 at 14.) Rose does not materially expound upon these 7 assertions. Nonetheless, the Court is unable to reach these conclusions as a matter of law. 8 Rose is alleged to have accused Garcia of criminal conduct such as harassment and 9 stalking. (Doc. 1-1 at 11–12.) At this juncture, construed in Garcia’s favor, these 10 statements “may be reasonably interpreted as factual assertions, not simply statements of 11 opinion.” See Breeser, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 1162. The Court is also poorly situated to 12 evaluate the truth of Rose’s statements at this stage of the proceedings 13 The Court thus denies Jordan’s Motion to Dismiss. The Court notes that the Motion 14 does not mention Garcia’s false light claim. The Court acknowledges that Rose made 15 certain conclusory assertions challenging this claim in his Answer, but such arguments did 16 not appear in the Motion to Dismiss portion of Garcia’s filing. 17 B. Rose’s Motion to Strike 18 The Court next considers Rose’s Motion to Strike. Rose moves for the Court to 19 strike paragraph 82 of the Complaint. (Doc. 5 at 15.) Paragraph 82 references Rose’s 20 letter, stating: “Upon information and belief [Rose] repeated such statements and/or 21 innuendos to multiple third parties throughout 2024 and 2025.” (Doc. 1-1 at 12.) Rose 22 contends that such statement should be stricken pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil 23 Procedure 12(f) because the “allegation is impermissibly vague and conclusory” as it “fails 24 to identify: (1) any specific third party to whom statements were allegedly made; (2) any 25 specific date on which such statements were allegedly made; (3) any specific statement 26 that was allegedly repeated; or (4) any factual basis for the ‘information and belief’ upon 27 which this allegation rests.” (Doc. 5 at 15.) 28 Although Rose originally filed this Motion in state court, the Court analyzes his 1 Motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 2 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Under Rule 12(f), “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an 3 insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” The 4 Court may do so on its own, or “on motion made by a party either before responding to the 5 pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the 6 pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)(2). Rose’s Motion is thus untimely because he filed it 7 with his Answer. 8 Nonetheless, the Motion lacks merit. At a general level, motions to strike “are 9 disfavored and infrequently granted.” Complete Distribution Servs., Inc. v. All States 10 Transp., LLC, No. 3:13-CV-00800-SI, 2015 WL 1393281, at *3 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2015) 11 (citation modified). The Court recognizes that the statement is relatively conclusory, 12 however, the Court finds that this not a sufficient basis upon which to strike it. 13 The Court thus denies Rose’s Motion to Strike. 14 C. Garcia’s Motion to Dismiss 15 Finally, the Court considers Garcia’s uncontested Motion to Dismiss. Garcia seeks 16 to dismiss Rose’s abuse of process counter claim. “The two essential elements of the abuse 17 of process tort include (1) a willful act in the use of judicial process (2) for an ulterior 18 purpose not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.” Houston v. Ariz. State Bd. 19 of Educ., No. CV-10-8160-PHX-GMS, 2012 WL 466474, at *7 (D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 2012), 20 aff’d, 579 F. App’x 591 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation modified). 21 Rose argues that Garcia “committed willful acts in filing this lawsuit against Mr. 22 Rose despite: (a) having been advised of multiple absolute defenses; (b) knowing the 23 claims were time-barred; and (c) having no good faith basis to believe Mr. Rose made any 24 false statement.” (Doc. 5 at 17.) Rose contends that Garcia “acted for ulterior purposes 25 not proper in the regular conduct of litigation, including punishing protected speech, 26 intimidating witnesses, harassing Dr. Jordan through her partner, and imposing costs on 27 Mr. Rose.” (Id.) 28 The Court disagrees. As found, many of Rose’s “absolute defenses” are meritless 1 || and Rose failed to demonstrate that Garcia’s claims were time-barred. Additionally, the 2|| Court is not obligated to accept Rose’s bare assertions that Garcia acted with malicious 3 || intent in filing this case. 4 The Court thus grants Garcia’s Motion to Dismiss and dismisses Rose’s 5 || counterclaim for abuse of process without prejudice. IV. CONCLUSION 7 Accordingly, 8 IT IS ORDERED denying Jonathan Rose’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion to 9|| Strike (Doc. 5) 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff Kristen Garcia’s Motion to 11 |} Dismiss (Doc. 13). Rose’s counterclaim is dismissed without prejudice. Rose may file an 12 || amended counterclaim within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. 13 Dated this 24th day of June, 2026. 14 — . RP 15 SO 16 Gnvted States District ude. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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