Krishan Lal v. Kristi Noem, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: April 20, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-01274
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KRISHAN LAL NONE No. 1:26-cv-01274-DAD-DMC-HC A-226-104-618, 12 Petitioner, 13 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS v. 14 KRISTI NOEM, et. al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Petitioner, an immigration detainee who is proceeding with retained counsel, filed 18 a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondents filed a motion 19 to dismiss, ECF No. 6. 20 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Petitioner contends that “is citizen of India who entered the United States 23 without inspection on or about June 26, 2024,” seeking asylum, was issued a Notice to Appear 24 that same day and released on parole. ECF No. 1, pg. 6. Petitioner asserts he timely filed his 25 application for asylum, has no criminal history, and complied with his supervision requirements. 26 See id. According to Petitioner, he appeared for a regular ICE check-in and was re-detained on 27 December 9, 2025, despite there being no change of circumstances to give rise to his re-detention. 28 1 See id. Petitioner asserts he has not had any custody determination or bond hearing. See id. at 6-7. 2 Petitioner argues he is subject to § 1226(a), and therefore, his re-detention violates the 3 Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) and Petitioner’s due process rights. See id. at 11-12. 4 Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) because he is an 5 applicant for admission and therefore Petitioner’s detention is mandatory. See ECF No. 6 at 1. 6 Respondents assert that Petitioner violated the conditions of his supervised release, which resulted 7 in his re-detention. According to Respondents, Petitioner’s prior release does not constitute an 8 admission. See id. at 2. Respondents recognize that district courts within the Ninth Circuit have 9 rejected Department of Homeland Security’s position that “all applicants for admission within the 10 meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1225(a) are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b),” and 11 one of those cases, Maldonado Bautista, is appealed to the Ninth Circuit but has yet to be 12 adjudicated. Id. at 1-2, n. 1 (citing Maldonado Bautista v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-01873, 2025 WL 13 3713987 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025); Garro Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632, 2025 WL 3691938 14 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2025). 15 16 II. DISCUSSION 17 The undersigned finds that Petitioner has a protectable liberty interest in remaining 18 out of custody, and he was deprived of this liberty without due process when re-detained without 19 notice or a hearing. Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend granting Petitioner’s petition 20 for writ of habeas corpus because his detention violates due process and recommend that 21 Petitioner be immediately released from Respondents’ custody under the same conditions he was 22 released previously. 23 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of an 24 individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Session, 872 F.3d 25 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of 26 the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) 27 (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the United States, including 28 noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). These 1 due process rights extend to immigration proceedings. Id. at 693–94. Courts examine procedural 2 due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected liberty interest 3 under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary to ensure any 4 deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of 5 Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 6 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is 7 due.”). The Court considers each step in turn. 8 A. Liberty Interest 9 As for the first step, the Court finds Petitioner has shown he has a protectable 10 liberty interest. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government 11 custody, detention, or other forms of physical restrain—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the 12 Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “Even individuals who face 13 significant constraints on their liberty or over whose liberty the government wields significant 14 discretion retain a protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 15 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025). “Although in some circumstances the initial decision to detain or 16 release an individual may be within the government’s discretion, the government’s decision to 17 release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may 18 rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to the . . . conditions [of 19 release].” Id. (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482) (modifications in original). “Accordingly, a 20 noncitizen release from custody pending immigration proceedings has a protected liberty interest 21 in remaining out of custody.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 22 WL 2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). To determine whether an individual’s conditional 23 release rises to the level of a protected liberty interest, courts have “compar[ed] the specific 24 conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by 25 Morrissey.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01141-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D. 26 Cal. Sept 9, 2025). 27 As a preliminary matter, the Court finds Respondents’ argument that Petitioner 28 cannot assert a liberty interest because he is an “applicant for admission” under § 1225 and 1 therefore subject to mandatory detention, ineligible for release, parole, or a custody 2 redetermination hearing, unpersuasive. First, Respondents claim Petitioner is ineligible for release 3 without explaining how, if he is ineligible for release, Petitioner was previously released on his 4 own recognizance. 5 Next, Respondents contend that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 6 1225(b)(2)(A) but there is no evidence in the record that an immigration officer made the 7 requisite determinations for § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply – that Petitioner is seeking admission and 8 not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted. Following and adopting the reasoning of 9 other courts, this Court finds Petitioner is not actively seeking lawful entry because he already 10 entered the United States over three years ago. See Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 11 (collecting cases concluding that § 1225 applies only to noncitizens “seeking admission,” a 12 category that does not include noncitizens like Petitioner, living in the interior of the country.). 13 Indeed, Petitioner applied for asylum in 2023, but was detained in 2025. 14 Respondents’ proposed interpretation of the statute disregards the relationship 15 between §§ 1225 and 1226 and would render the recent amendment to § 1226(c) superfluous. 16 Lepe v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-01163-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 17 Sept. 23, 2025). Specifically, and as many courts have discussed in length, if every “applicant for 18 admission” is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, there would have been no need for § 19 1226(c)(1)(E), which mandates detention for every noncitizen who is “present in the United 20 States without being admitted or paroled” and who has been “charged with, arrested for, or admits 21 to” committing certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E); Maldonado v. Olson, No. 25-CV-3142 22 (SRN/SGE), 2025 WL 2374411, at *12 (D. Minn. Aug 19, 2025) (“The Court will not find that 23 Congress passed the Laken Riley Act to ‘perform the same work’ that was already covered by § 24 1225(b)(2).”). 25 Indeed, prior to a July 2025 memorandum changing its’ policy, the government 26 consistently applied Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2), to noncitizens residing in the United 27 States who were detained by immigration authorities and subject to removal. See Rodriguez Diaz, 28 53 F.4th at 1196. This Court agrees with and joins the majority of courts nationwide, including 1 the Eastern District of California, in rejecting Respondents’ interpretation of Sections 1225 and 2 1226. See Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1, 21-22 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 3 2025) (concluding, after a thorough analysis, that “the government's [interpretation of § 1225] 4 belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and 5 longstanding agency practice”); J.Y.L.C. v. Bostock, 2025 WL 3169865, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 6 2025) (collecting more than thirty cases rejecting the government's assertion that § 1225 7 empowers the DHS to arrest and hold a noncitizen present without legal status who has spent 8 years in the U.S.); Cardona-Lozano v. Noem, 2025 WL 3218244, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 9 2025) (“Repeatedly, [district courts across the country] have found that DHS and the [Board of 10 Immigration Appeals’] construction of the INA is incorrect and that petitioners who have long 11 resided in the United States but are being held under § 1225 are entitled to relief.”) (collecting 12 cases); Faizyan v. Casey, 2025 WL 3208844, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) (holding that § 1226 13 applies to a petitioner who “DHS has consistently treated” as subject to discretionary detention 14 and “who has been residing in the United States for two years” (internal quotation marks and 15 citation omitted)); Josue I.C.A. v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3496432, at *3 n.6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025) 16 (collecting cases); Morales-Flores v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) 17 (collecting cases) (“Courts nationwide, including this one, have overwhelmingly rejected 18 respondents’ arguments and found DHS’s new policy unlawful.”). 19 For these reasons, this Court rejects the government’s contention that Petitioner is 20 an “applicant for admission” subject to § 1225(b)(2) and finds that Petitioner is detained under 8 21 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations because Petitioner has resided in this country 22 for over a year since Petitioner was released into the United States on parole, until Petitioner was 23 arrested and detained on December 9, 2025. Petitioner’s re-detention on December 9, 2025, was 24 not upon Petitioner’s arrival to the United States. Further, even if Petitioner is subject to § 25 1225(b)(2), given Petitioner was previously granted parole, such parole must be pursuant to 26 §1182 (d)(5)(A) and there are statutory requirements for revoking such parole, which the Court 27 will address in the following section. 28 As to whether there exists a protected liberty interest, the Court finds Petitioner 1 was released from immigration detention, which created a reasonable expectation that he would 2 be entitled to retain his liberty absent a material change in circumstances. Petitioner was initially 3 released on his own recognizance. This sets a clear and reasonable expectation that Petitioner 4 would be entitled to retain his liberty absent a material change in circumstances. Though 5 Respondents allege Petitioner’s conditional parole was revoked due to “violations,” they provide 6 no additional information about these alleged violations, nor do Respondents contend that 7 Petitioner was provided notice to inform him his parole was being revoked due to those 8 “violations.” 9 Petitioner’s detention goes against United States Supreme Court precedent which 10 recognizes that individuals who have been released from custody, even where such release is 11 conditional, have a liberty interest in their continued release. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482. 12 Given this, the Court finds Petitioner has established his liberty interest in his continued release. 13 B. Process Due 14 Having found a protected liberty interest, the Court examines what process is 15 necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the 16 Constitution. To determine such, the Court considers three factors: (1) “the private interest that 17 will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 18 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 19 safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 20 and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 21 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). As set forth below, the Court finds Petitioner has 22 established his due process rights were violated. 23 First, Petitioner has a substantial private interest in remaining free from detention. 24 As discussed above, Petitioner has lived in the United States for a year. Petitioner was actively 25 pursuing his application for asylum during that time. Despite that, Petitioner has now been 26 detained for over four months without any evidence of being afforded a bond hearing. 27 Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding Petitioner’s private interest has been impacted 28 by his detention. See Manzanarez v. Bondi, No. 1:25-CV-01536-DC-CKD (HC), 2025 WL 1 3247258, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (finding similarly); see also Colina-Meira v. Lyons, No. 2 1:25-cv-1716 CSK P, 2025 LX 673205 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025). 3 Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable given Petitioner has not 4 received any bond or custody redetermination hearing. “[T]he risk of erroneous deprivation is 5 high when, as here, parole is revoked without written notice or reason.” Chavarria, 2025 WL 6 3533606, at *3; see also A.E. v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025) 7 (“The risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high” when “[the petitioner] has not received 8 any bond or custody redetermination hearing.”). Civil immigration detention, which is 9 “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is typically justified under the Due Process Clause only 10 when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 11 690; Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023). Thus, Court finds there is a 12 serious likelihood Petitioner will be erroneously deprived of his liberty interest. Moreover, 13 without any procedural safeguards to determine whether his re-detention was justifiable, the 14 probative value of additional procedural safeguards is high. R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4. 15 Indeed, that Respondents allege Petitioner’s re-detention was due to violations, but 16 Petitioner appears to be unaware of these alleged violations, and no record of the violations was 17 provided to the Court. This type of factual discrepancy highlights the need for procedural 18 safeguards prior to being deprived of a liberty interest. 19 Finally, the Government’s interest is low, and the effort and cost required to 20 provide Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal. See Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-CV- 21 01884-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025). This Court finds the 22 government has an interest in enforcing immigration laws but Respondents’ interest in detaining 23 Petitioner without notice or a hearing here is low. See Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970; 24 Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. March 3, 2025). Detention hearings in 25 immigration courts are routine and impose a “minimal cost.” Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. Even 26 if Respondents believed they had a proper reason to detain Petitioner, such decision on their part 27 would warrant written notice and a pre-detention hearing rather than automatic detention. See 28 E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1322 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“That the Government 1 may believe it has a valid reason to detain petitioner does not eliminate its obligation to effectuate 2 the detention in a manner that comports with due process”). 3 On balance, the Court finds the Matthews factors weigh in favor of finding 4 Petitioner is entitled to notice and a bond hearing, and Petitioner should have been provided such 5 notice and a hearing before he was re-detained. The Due Process Clause requires that, at a 6 minimum, “that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and opportunity 7 for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 8 532, 542 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In criminal cases, parolees 9 released on parole, which does not provide “absolute liberty,” but rather “conditional liberty 10 properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions,” are also entitled to due process, 11 including a pre-deprivation hearing before their parole can be revoked. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 12 480-86. “Numerous district courts have held that these principles extend to the context of 13 immigration detention.” F.M.V., 2025 WL 3083934 at *6 (collecting cases). Respondents identify 14 no reason why written notice was not provided or why a pre-deprivation hearing could not be 15 held, and provided no evidence of “urgent concerns,” thus, “a pre-deprivation hearing is required 16 to satisfy due process.” Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, 791 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2025). 17 Further, though the record is unclear as to what statutory mechanism Petitioner 18 was granted parole under, the undersigned finds Petitioner was denied due process, even if his 19 detention is governed by §1225. In that situation, Petitioner’s parole was necessarily pursuant to 20 §1182 (d)(5)(A), as that is the sole mechanism for granting parole for noncitizens detained under 21 §1225(b). Terminating such parole requires a determination that parole is accomplished or no 22 longer warranted. Given that the purpose of parole itself is determined on a “case-by-case basis,” 23 the undersigned finds that revocation requires an individualized determination that Petitioner is 24 no longer suitable for parole. 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(5). Moreover, 8 CFR 212.5 (e) prescribes a 25 specific process for revocation of §1182(d)(5) parole: 26 Termination of parole — (1) Automatic. Parole shall be automatically terminated without written 27 notice (i) upon the departure from the United States of the alien, or, 28 (ii) if not departed, at the expiration of the time for which parole 1 was authorized, and in the latter case the alien shall be processed in accordance with paragraph (e)(2) of this section except that no 2 written notice shall be required. (2) (i) On notice. In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section, 3 upon accomplishment of the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the officials listed in paragraph (a) of this 4 section, neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States, parole shall be 5 terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole. When a charging 6 document is served on the alien, the charging document will constitute written notice of termination of parole, unless otherwise specified. Any 7 further inspection or hearing shall be conducted under section 235 or 240 of the Act and this chapter, or any order of exclusion, deportation, or 8 removal previously entered shall be executed. If the exclusion, deportation, or removal order cannot be executed within a reasonable time, the alien 9 shall again be released on parole unless in the opinion of the official listed in paragraph (a) of this section the public interest requires that the alien be 10 continued in custody.

11 8 CFR 212.5 (e). 12 Respondents do not claim that a change in circumstance resulted in the 13 determination by an official listed in 8 CFR 212.5 (a) that “neither humanitarian reasons nor 14 public benefit warrants” Petitioner’s continued parole, nor that Petitioner was provided notice of 15 such determination, as required by the statute. 8 CFR 212.5 (e). Absent a determination and 16 notice of such determination, Respondents failed to provide Petitioner with the process afforded 17 by 8 CFR 212.5 (e)(2), as required by 8 CFR 212.5 (e)(1)(ii). Accordingly, the undersigned finds 18 that, even if Petitioner is subject to § 1225(b)(2), Respondents revoked Petitioner’s parole without 19 providing Petitioner the process due and will therefore recommend the petition be granted and 20 Petitioner be released immediately upon the same terms of his prior release. 21 Thus, the undersigned finds Petitioner is entitled to relief as to his due process 22 claims and will recommend granting Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. 23 24 III. CONCLUSION 25 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned orders and recommends: 26 2. It is RECOMMENDED that Respondents’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 6, 27 be DENIED; 28 3. It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, 1 ECF No. 1, be GRANTED as Petitioner’s detention violates due process; 2 4. It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Krishan Lal None, A-226-104-618, 3 be RELEASED IMMEDIATELY from Respondents’ custody upon the same 4 conditions as his prior release, with his belongings. Respondents shall not impose 5 any additional restriction on him, such as electronic monitoring, unless that is 6 determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing; 7 5. It is RECOMMENDED that Respondents be ENJOINED and 8 RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent compliance with 9 constitutional protections, including seven (7) day notice and a hearing before a 10 neutral fact-finder where Respondents show: (a) there are material changed 11 circumstances which demonstrate that there is a significant likelihood of 12 Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, or (b) Respondents 13 demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to the 14 community or a flight risk. At any such hearing, Petitioner shall be allowed to have 15 counsel present. 16 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 17 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The undersigned 18 || finds that a shortened objection period is warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at 19 || issue as well as the fact that the parties have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in 20 || written briefs. See United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) 21 || (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) sets the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see 22 || also Local Rule 304(b). Thus, within 7 days after being served with these findings and 23 || recommendations, any party may file written objections with the Court. Failure to file objections 24 || within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th 25 | Cir. 1991). 26 | Dated: April 20, 2026 Co 27 DENNIS M. COTA 28 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10