Krape v. United States

35 Fed. Cl. 286, 77 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1519, 1996 U.S. Claims LEXIS 44, 1996 WL 137315
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedMarch 19, 1996
DocketNo. 187-85T
StatusPublished

This text of 35 Fed. Cl. 286 (Krape v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Krape v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 286, 77 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1519, 1996 U.S. Claims LEXIS 44, 1996 WL 137315 (uscfc 1996).

Opinion

OPINION

SMITH, Chief Judge.

This case concerns a claim for refund of $211,646.81 in taxes and interest. Plaintiff Frederick G. Krapf, Jr. donated 26,000 shares of Mechtron Industries, Inc., common stock to the University of Delaware on September 2,1976, and plaintiffs claimed a charitable deduction of $260,000 on their joint tax returns on the assumption that Meehtroris shares had a fair market value of $10 per share. However, the Commissioner disallowed plaintiffs’ deduction. Plaintiffs commenced this action to recover the amount paid, contending that the value of Mr. Krapf s shares at the time of gift was $10 per share. This court decided in Krapf v. United States, 17 Cl.Ct. 750 (1989) (Krapf I), that the gifted shares were each worth $4.34, entitling plaintiffs to a deduction of $112,840. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed this court’s opinion and remanded the case for a new valuation on the basis of the existing record. Krapf v. United States, 977 F.2d 1454, 1463 (Fed.Cir. 1992) (Krapf II). After unsuccessful attempts to resolve this case through settlement, and consistent with the Federal Circuit’s opinion, for the reasons set forth below the court finds that plaintiffs’ shares were worth $2.46 per share at the time of the donation and that plaintiffs are entitled to a deduction in the amount of $63,885.

FACTS

The court has previously recounted the pertinent facts in detail. See Krapf I at 753-54. In 1970, plaintiff Frederic Krapf was one of three co-founders of Mechtron Industries, Inc. At its inception, each of the founders contributed $15,000 in return for 26,000 shares of common stock. Although the company originally was in the business of designing scientific instrument chassis, the company in 1972 won a contract to repair and refurbish AMTRAK’s dining cars, and the company began to devote more and more of its resources to servicing this contract. By 1973, more than 50 percent of Meehtroris business came from the AMTRAK contract, and by the end of 1976 90 percent of Meehtroris business came from the AMTRAK contract. However, in December 1976 Mechtron was informed that the AMTRAK contract would not be renewed, apparently because of pressure from labor unions (Mechtron was non-union and had resisted union organizing efforts), and because of continued production problems. Loss of the AMTRAK contract was particularly devastating because it generated so much of Meehtroris revenue and because Mechtron had made significant capital expenditures to service the contract.

In August 1976, prior to the AMTRAK contract cancellation, Mr. Krapf resigned from the board of Mechtron, and less than a month later, on September 2,1976, he donated his 26,000 shares of common stock in the company to the University of Delaware. For the tax year 1976 through 1979, the plaintiffs claimed deductions in the amount of $260,-000, or $10 per share, for the donated stock. The Internal Revenue Service disallowed all deductions for the gift on the grounds that the stock was worthless at the time it was donated to the University. Plaintiff paid the deficiency and interest and commenced the instant action.

In its original opinion, this court found that plaintiff showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the donated Mechtron stock was not worthless and that the company was a “going concern” at the time of the donation. Krapf I at 457-58. Next, in an effort to value the shares, the court evaluated several [289]*289pre- and post-gift share transactions to determine if any could provide a fair measure of the value of the stock when it was donated. After examining the pre-gift transactions and finding them of little assistance in valuing the stock on the date of gift, the court then examined two post-gift transactions in an effort to value the stock.1 After first concluding that the fortunes of Meehtron had undergone a steady decline from its peak in 1975 until the company went bankrupt, the court found that any valid post-gift transaction could serve as a “floor,” or minimum value, for its value on September 2,1976, the date of the gift. That is, because Meehtron’s value declined steadily after the gift, Me-ehtron’s stock could have never been worth less on the date of gift than when a later, bona fide transaction occurred. The court then found that the 1980 stock purchase and debt cancellation by Mr. Edwin Pierce, Me-chtron’s president and one of its co-founders, was a bona fide transaction, and that the total value of the transaction was $4.34 per share. Given the steady decline in the fortunes of the company from September 1976 onwards, the court reasoned that Mechtron’s stock must have been worth at least $4.34 in 1976. Thus, $4.34 served as a plausible floor value of the stock on the date of gift. Since plaintiffs provided no evidence of value above the floor, other than the $10 figure, which the court did not accept, the court found the fair market value to be $4.34.

The Federal Circuit ruled, however, that use of the 1980 Pierce transaction to value the donated stock was inappropriate, for several reasons. First, the Federal Circuit concluded that the valuation of the debt cancellation and thus the court’s finding of the value of the stock were “highly speculative,” and also concluded that there was insufficient evidence of the cash payment for the stock. Krapf II at 1461. Second, the Federal Circuit found that Mr. Pierce was not sufficiently disinterested to serve as a guide to Me-chtron’s fair market value. Id. Third, the Federal Circuit reasoned that, even if Mr. Pierce’s transaction were disinterested, there was no support in the record for the finding that there was a steady decline in the fortunes of Meehtron. Rather, the Federal Circuit believed the evidence instead showed it to be a period of highs and lows, the gift being given during a low period, thus destroying the probative value of using the 1980 transaction as a floor for valuing the 1976 gift. Id. at 1462. The Federal Circuit suggested that a more plausible floor would be the 1979 Meehtron repurchase of the stock from the University of Delaware for $0.40 per share. Id.

The Federal Circuit also found that the adjusted net worth calculations, which this court found would yield a value of approximately $4.34 per share, were not sufficiently supported in the record to uphold this court’s valuation. Id. at 1463. The Federal Circuit then reversed and remanded for a valuation based on the “existing record” (italics in original). Id.

DISCUSSION

The court must determine, based on the existing record as required by the Federal Circuit, the value of a minority interest in Meehtron common stock donated to the Úniversity of Delaware on September 2, 1976. The value of a charitable contribution is the fair market value at the time of contribution. Treas.Reg. § 1.170A-l(c)(l). Fair market value is the price at which the property would have changed hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the [290]*290relevant facts. Id. § 1.170A-l(c)(2). In general, the fair market value of gifted property is discovered by examination of the entire record. Skirpak v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 285, 320, 1985 WL 15315 (1985).

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Related

O'malley, Collector of Internal Revenue v. Ames
197 F.2d 256 (Eighth Circuit, 1952)
Skripak v. Commissioner
84 T.C. No. 22 (U.S. Tax Court, 1985)
Krapf v. United States
17 Cl. Ct. 750 (Court of Claims, 1989)
Estate of Ridgely v. United States
180 Ct. Cl. 1220 (Court of Claims, 1967)

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35 Fed. Cl. 286, 77 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1519, 1996 U.S. Claims LEXIS 44, 1996 WL 137315, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/krape-v-united-states-uscfc-1996.