Krant v. UnitedLex Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedJuly 23, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-02443
StatusUnknown

This text of Krant v. UnitedLex Corporation (Krant v. UnitedLex Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Krant v. UnitedLex Corporation, (D. Kan. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

JEREMY KRANT, TODD DEATON, THOMAS NASH, SHANA VACHHANI and KIMBERLY MILLER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 23-2443-DDC-TJJ

UNITEDLEX CORP.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the court on a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) by Settlement Class Representatives Adam Behrendt, Allison Glusky, Jeremy Krant, Todd Deaton, Thomas Nash, Shana Vachhani, and Kimberly Miller,1 individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. The motion asks the court to enter an order preliminarily approving the settlement of this Action against Defendant UnitedLex Corp (ULX). The parties also have submitted their Settlement Agreement dated June 21, 2024, which, together with its attached exhibits, sets forth

1 The court notes that the named plaintiffs in this action differ from the class representatives identified in the motion. Courts often “use the phrase ‘class representatives’ interchangeably with the phrase ‘named plaintiffs’” but “the two are not necessarily the same.” 2 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions § 6:30 (6th ed. 2024). Named plaintiffs “are those plaintiffs identified individually in the complaint, on whose behalf the case is brought absent class certification[.]” Id. Here, that’s plaintiffs Krant, Deaton, Nash, Vachhani, and Miller. Class representatives, on the other hand, “are those plaintiffs whom class counsel proposes, and a court appoints, to represent the class.” Id. Here, plaintiffs propose seven individuals to serve as class representatives: the five named plaintiffs plus Adam Behrendt and Allison Glusky. Doc. 22 at 1. Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Behrendt and Ms. Glusky each filed a putative class action lawsuit in state court, defendant removed those actions to federal court and then transferred those actions here. Id. at 10–11. And Mr. Behrendt and Ms. Glusky voluntarily have dismissed those suits and counsel now has nominated them to serve as class representatives here. In sum, while in “many cases . . . the class representatives proposed by class counsel and approved by the court will be precisely (and only) those plaintiffs named in the complaint,” that’s not the case here. the terms and conditions for a proposed settlement of the Action against ULX and for dismissal of the Action against ULX. The court has read and evaluated the plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Settlement (Doc. 21), its supporting Memorandum (Doc. 22), the Settlement Agreement (Doc. 21-1), and all attached exhibits. The court, as explained below, grants the motion, preliminarily

approves the settlement, preliminarily certifies the Settlement Class for settlement purposes only, and grants related relief. The court begins with the legal standard for preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement under Rule 23(e). Rule 23(e) permits the parties to settle the claims of a certified class action, but “only with the court’s approval.” And the court may approve a settlement only upon finding that it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). The Tenth Circuit has identified four factors that a district court must consider when assessing whether a proposed settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate:” (1) whether the proposed settlement was fairly and honestly negotiated;

(2) whether serious questions of law and fact exist, placing the ultimate outcome of the litigation in doubt;

(3) whether the value of an immediate recovery outweighs the mere possibility of future relief after protracted and expensive litigation; and

(4) the judgment of the parties that the settlement is fair and reasonable.

Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 314 F.3d 1180, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002). The settlement approval process typically transpires in two phases. First, the court considers whether preliminary approval of the settlement is appropriate. 4 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions § 13:10 (6th ed. 2024); Freebird, Inc. v. Merit Energy Co., No. 10-1154-KHV, 2012 WL 6085135, at *4 (D. Kan. Dec. 6, 2012). “If the Court grants preliminary approval, it directs notice to class members and sets a hearing at which it will make a final determination on the fairness of the class settlement.” In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Pracs. Litig., 286 F.R.D. 488, 492 (D. Kan. 2012); see also Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions § 13:10 (“[T]he court’s primary objective [at the preliminary approval stage] is to establish whether to direct notice of the proposed settlement to

the class, invite the class’s reaction, and schedule a final fairness hearing.”). Second, “taking account of all of the information learned during [the preliminary approval] process, the court decides whether or not to give ‘final approval’ to the settlement.” Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions § 13:10. This Memorandum and Order considers just the first step of the analysis. Because preliminary approval is just the first step of the approval process, courts apply a “less stringent” standard than they apply at the final approval stage. Freebird, 2012 WL 6085135, at *5. “[D]istrict courts [have] developed a jurisprudence whereby they under[take] some review of the settlement at preliminary approval, but perhaps just enough to ensure that

sending notice to the class [is] not a complete waste of time.” Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions § 13:10. “The general rule [is] that a court [will] grant preliminary approval where the proposed settlement [is] neither illegal nor collusive and is within the range of possible approval.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “While the Court will consider [the Tenth Circuit’s] factors in depth at the final approval hearing, they are a useful guide at the preliminary approval stage as well.” In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Pracs. Litig., 286 F.R.D. at 502–03. Applying this governing legal standard, the court grants the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement (Doc. 21), as follows: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action and personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs, the members of the proposed Settlement Class, and ULX.2 2. The court hereby certifies a Settlement Class (the “Class”) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3), for settlement purposes only, defined as “the 7,588 individuals

identified on the Settlement Class List, which includes all U.S. residents whose PII was compromised as a result of the Data Breach.” 3. Excluded from the Settlement Class is ULX, its representatives and any judicial officer presiding over this matter, members of their immediate family, and members of their judicial staff. 4. The court appoints Norman E. Siegel and J. Austin Moore of Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP, Bryce Bell of Bell Law, LLC, Tyler W. Hudson of Wagstaff & Cartmell, LLP,

2 The court notes that this is a data breach class action, which often present special Article III standing questions. As avid footnote readers will know, the named plaintiffs here differ from the persons proposed to serve as class representatives. See above n.1. In their brief, plaintiffs assert that all five named plaintiffs have suffered identity theft or fraud because of the data breach. So, the court agrees with plaintiffs. These five plaintiffs have suffered an injury in fact, sufficient to confer Article III standing.

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Related

Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.
314 F.3d 1180 (Tenth Circuit, 2002)
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez
594 U.S. 413 (Supreme Court, 2021)
Eric Steinmetz v. Brinker International, Inc.
73 F.4th 883 (Eleventh Circuit, 2023)

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Bluebook (online)
Krant v. UnitedLex Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/krant-v-unitedlex-corporation-ksd-2024.