Kramer v. Kramer
This text of 616 P.2d 395 (Kramer v. Kramer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION
By the Court,
Jerome Kramer appeals from an order modifying the distribution of community, property established in a divorce decree entered in January, 1976. He contends that the district judge lacked jurisdiction to modify the judgment entered three years before the motion to modify. We agree and reverse.
In 1973, respondent, Frances Kramer, filed for divorce from Jerome. Thereafter, a reconciliation was attempted and the parties stipulated to dismiss the divorce action. As part of the reconciliation, Jerome quitclaimed his interest in the “Mon-terey Street property” to Frances. Frances quitclaimed her interest in the “Spring Mountain property” to Jerome and his mother as joint tenants. The reconciliation attempt failed, and Frances filed for divorce on July 8, 1975.
A divorce decree was entered July 21, 1975, awarding the “Monterey property” to Frances and the “Spring Mountain property” to Jerome. However, on January 2, 1976, the aforementioned distribution of property was altered in a modified divorce decree wherein both pieces of property were adjudicated to be community property and owned equally by Frances and Jerome as tenants in common.
[761]*761Three years later, on March 6, 1979, Frances filed a motion to modify the modified decree on the ground of intrinsic fraud. The opposition to modify the modified decree was not timely filed pursuant to the Rules of Practice, Eighth Judicial District Court, State of Nevada, Rule 2.3. Jerome failed to file his response within ten days after service of the motion on March 9, 1979.1 As a result, the district court ruled that Jerome had waived his right to object to the motion, and awarded his interest in the “Spring Mountain property” to Frances.
Jerome contends that NRCP 60(b) governs the motion to modify the modified decree regarding property distributions. NRCP 60(b) requires that such motion be filed within six months after the decree was entered.2 Jerome argues that because Frances filed the motion to modify three years after the decree was entered, the district court was without jurisdiction to modify the divorce decree concerning property distributions. We agree.
A decree of divorce cannot be modified or set aside except as provided by rule or statute. Lam v. Lam, 86 Nev. 908, 478 P.2d [762]*762146 (1970). NRS 125.150(5) governed subsequent modification of orders adjudicating property rights.3 NRS 125.150(5) allowed the parties to stipulate to modification of the decree, whether or not the court had retained jurisdiction to modify.4 It did not provide for the court’s continuing jurisdiction regarding property rights. If the legislature had intended to vest the courts with continuing jurisdiction over property rights, it would have done so expressly, as it did in NRS 125.140(2) concerning child custody and support.5
Absent specific authorization for continuing jurisdiction over property rights, NRCP 60(b) governs motions to modify property rights established by divorce decrees. In re Marriage of Gallegos, 580 P.2d 838 (Colo.App. 1978). Frances’ motion to modify was filed three years after the decree was entered; not within six months, as NRCP 60(b) requires. Therefore, the district court was without jurisdiction to modify the decree regarding the property distribution. McCarroll v. McCarroll, 96 Nev. 455, 611 P.2d 205 (1980). The decree in all respects, except as to custody and support of the minor children, became unmodifiable six months after the decree was entered. Schmutzer v. Schmutzer, 76 Nev. 123, 125, 350 P.2d 142, 144 (1960). The fact that Jerome’s opposition to the motion to modify the modified decree was not timely filed, cannot procedurally supply the district court with jurisdiction that is substantively lacking. See Lauer, et al. v. District Court, 62 Nev. 78, 140 P.2d [763]*763953 (1943). Consequently, the order modifying the modified decree of divorce is reversed because the district court lacked jurisdiction to modify.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
616 P.2d 395, 96 Nev. 759, 1980 Nev. LEXIS 699, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kramer-v-kramer-nev-1980.