Filed 8/27/26 Kowalski v. 220 San Vicente Holdings CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
LAURA KOWALSKI, B351140 (Los Angeles County
Cross-complainant and Super. Ct. No. 24SMCV03048) Respondent,
v.
220 SAN VICENTE HOLDINGS, LLC,
Cross-Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Susan Bryant-Deason, Judge. Affirmed.
Snipper Wainer & Markoff and Maurice Wainer; Law Offices of H. Joseph Nourmand and H. Joseph Nourmand for Cross-Defendant and Appellant.
Teshale Law and Dagmawi Teshale; Schwimer Weinstein and Michael E. Schwimer for Cross-Complainant and Respondent.
__________________________
Cross-defendant 220 San Vicente Holdings, LLC (San Vicente) appeals from the trial court’s order denying its special motion to strike the cross-complaint filed by Laura Kowalski pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.161. In its opening brief, San Vicente focuses on the trial court’s failure to move beyond the first step in its anti-SLAPP analysis to the second step assessing cross- complainant’s probability of prevailing on her claims. San Vicente argues that had the court conducted that assessment, it would have found that Kowalski’s claims lack merit.
Anti-SLAPP motions differ from demurrers or motions that solely test the sufficiency of claims. Anti-SLAPP motions exist to protect acts in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. Because San Vicente does not meet its step one burden of showing that the claims against it depended upon protected acts, it was unnecessary for the trial court to reach step two. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Procedural Background In June 2024, SoCal Investment Company LLC (SoCal)
filed two actions against Kowalski arising from her lease of a unit
1 “SLAPP” refers to “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.”
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in a Santa Monica apartment building (the long-term unit): an unlawful detainer action and a civil action for breach of lease. The cases were consolidated. Kowalski filed a cross-complaint against SoCal and San Vicente with the following allegations.
Kowalski began living in the long-term unit in 2016, and SoCal acquired the building in 2017. She developed a disability due to long COVID that included cognitive and neurological difficulties, and SoCal and San Vicente knew about her disability. In 2021, SoCal and Kowalski entered into a temporary relocation agreement pursuant to which Kowalski agreed to vacate her unit while SoCal renovated the building. SoCal agreed to notify her when it received final inspection approvals from the city and restore her to possession of the long-term unit. SoCal leased a unit (the temporary unit) from San Vicente and placed Kowalski there. Kowalski agreed to pay her regular rent to SoCal, and SoCal was responsible for paying the rent for the temporary unit.
SoCal completed the renovations and received final project approval in June 2024. It did not allow Kowalski to return to the long-term unit, and it ceased paying the rent for the temporary unit. Though San Vicente knew Kowalski was not responsible for making rent payments for the temporary unit directly to it, it harassed her, demanded that she vacate, and sought her removal. Eventually, San Vicente succeeded in “remov[ing] her from possession” of the temporary unit.
Both the long term and temporary units that Kowalski inhabited were subject to Santa Monica Rent Control Law. After she lost possession of the units, SoCal and San Vicente were able to rent or offer to rent the units at significantly higher rates. She believes both So Cal and San Vicente “acted with a financial incentive to remove” her. Kowalski asserted SoCal and San
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Vicente acted as each other’s agents, joint venturers, or alter egos throughout the relevant time frame.
Kowalski asserted causes of action against both cross-defendants for wrongful eviction, tenant harassment (Santa Monica Municipal Code, § 4.56), violation of Civil Code section 1940.2, negligence, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, unlawful business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and housing discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA, Gov. Code § 12955). She asserted additional cross-claims against SoCal only.
B. San Vicente’s Anti-SLAPP Motion San Vicente filed a special motion to strike the entire cross-complaint, or in the alternative, each cause of action against it and three specific sentences that appeared in the cross-complaint’s general allegations.2 In support, it filed declarations from the building’s manager, Cara Holmgren, and a request for judicial notice.
Holmgren attested that, in June 2021, San Vicente and Yousef Golshirazian (Golshirazian)3 entered into a lease for the temporary unit, which identified Kowalski as a nonsignatory
2 San Vicente sought to strike two sentences in the general allegations: one sentence alleging that it “demanded” that Kowalski vacate the temporary unit and another alleging that San Vicente acted with a “financial incentive” to remove her. 3 Holmgren did not explain Golshirazian’s relationship with SoCal. However, a copy of the relocation agreement attached to Kowalski’s declaration was signed by Golshirazian as “Member/Manager” of SoCal.
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occupant. There was no rental agreement between Kowalski and San Vicente. San Vicente received rental payments for the temporary unit until November 2024. By December 2024, unpaid rent exceeded $13,000, and San Vicente served a notice to pay rent or quit on Golshirazian and Kowalski. San Vicente requested judicial notice of an unlawful detainer complaint it filed in January 2025 against them for possession of the temporary unit and Kowalski’s answer to the complaint. According to Holgrem, Kowalski vacated the unit shortly after answering, and San Vicente dismissed the action in March 2025.
San Vicente argued that the entire cross-complaint was subject to the anti-SLAPP statute because it arose “solely out of its exercise of a right to petition the Court through an unlawful detainer” action. It contended the cross-claims arose exclusively from Golshirazian’s failure to pay rent, San Vicente’s service of a notice in anticipation of the unlawful detainer action, and its prosecution of that action.4 San Vicente requested attorney fees.
Kowalski filed a declaration in support of her opposition.
She described SoCal’s refusal to return possession of the long- term unit and its “coordinated effort” with San Vicente to push her out of the temporary unit. In October 2024, she learned from Holmgren that Golshirazian had communicated SoCal’s intent to stop paying rent on the temporary unit. Holmgren also said she was receiving frequent requests from SoCal’s attorney to “push” for Kowalski’s removal, ascertain her moveout date, and “keep pressing” her. Thereafter, Holmgren repeatedly asked Kowalski
4 The parties devoted much of their briefing in the trial court to the merits of the cross-claims. Because we do not reach the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we do not repeat these arguments.
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for a moveout date and told her she needed to leave. Kowalski informed Holmgren of her dispute with SoCal and her disability.
According to Kowalski, San Vicente used the evacuation that was necessitated by a January 2025 wildfire “to further its effort to remove [her] from the temporary unit” and “make [her] continued occupancy impossible.” Management sent building-wide communications acknowledging the health risks posed by fire debris and ash and promising to hire vendors for cleanup. Kowalski obtained a remediation estimate showing hazardous ash contamination in her unit and gave San Vicente permission to enter. However, San Vicente did not remediate the temporary unit, even though it knew that her health condition and contamination made it unsafe for her to return. In March 2025, Kowalski vacated because the unit was uninhabitable and because she had been subjected to harassment and pressure to leave.5 Kowalski argued that San Vicente’s acts of coercion and intimidation and its termination of her tenancy were not protected conduct. She argued that San Vicente was “bootstrapping” protected conduct into the cross-complaint because the pleading did not reference a notice to pay rent or quit, an unlawful detainer complaint, or other litigation. She explained why she was likely to prevail on her cross-claims and requested attorney fees.
The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding the cross-complaint did not arise from protected activity. It found the “gravamen of the [cross-]complaint” relied on “the violations of Santa Monica Municipal Code Chapter 4.36 governing the
5 Kowalski did not mention the unlawful detainer action or related notice in her declaration.
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relocation of tenants for construction purposes.” Kowalski’s action was not based on San Vicente’s “filing or service of the notices or an unlawful detainer action—although that certainly may add context to the allegations.” The court declined to reach the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis and denied the requests for attorney fees.
San Vicente appealed from the order denying its motion.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law - the Anti-SLAPP Statute “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Filing a lawsuit is an exercise of one’s constitutional right of petition and statements made in connection with or in preparation of litigation are subject to section 425.16. (Wittenberg v. Bornstein (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 303, 312.)
“Anti-SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-step process. Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park).) “If the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least ‘minimal merit.’” (Ibid.)
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We review an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion de novo, and in so doing, conduct the same two-step analysis. (Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 42.) We analyze the issues independent of the trial court’s reasoning, and if the decision is correct on any theory, we affirm the order regardless of the correctness of the grounds on which the court reached its conclusion. (White v. Davis (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 270, 287.)
B. Analysis San Vicente contends the cross-claims arose from protected conduct—filing the unlawful detainer action and service of a rent notice—and the trial court erred in deciding these activities were merely context for other claims based on unprotected conduct.
“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1062–1063.) It is defendant’s burden to identify the acts upon which each challenged claim rests and show how they fall within a statutorily defined category of protected activity. (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884.) A “‘claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Where the “[d]efendant provides no analysis of the elements necessary to prove each cause of action, how allegations related to the [protected] speech supply the necessary elements of each cause of action, and whether there are other allegations supporting the causes of action that are not protected conduct,” its motion fails. (Pechkis v. Trustees of California State University (2026) 119
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Cal.App.5th 497, 506 (Pechkis); see also Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1012.)
In the trial court, San Vicente’s step one argument was that all of Kowalski’s claims arose “exclusively from the failure to pay rent by [Golshirazian], the service of a notice in anticipation of, and the prosecution of, an action for unlawful detainer, against [Golshirazian], which action was eventually dismissed when possession was relinquished by those in possession including [Kowalski].” Making this conclusory assertion was not enough. San Vicente did not supply the elements of any cause of action. It did not analyze whether there were other allegations of unprotected conduct supporting the causes of action. It did not meet its step one burden.
On appeal, San Vicente similarly contends, without citing the record, that the cross-complaint “expressly target[ed] San Vicente’s eviction[-]related conduct” by “alleg[ing]” that “San Vicente demanded that [Kowalski] vacate the [t]emporary [u]nit, served a rent notice, and initiated an unlawful detainer action after the rent for the unit went unpaid.” San Vicente has neither analyzed the elements necessary to prove each cause of action nor explained how only protected conduct supplies necessary elements. It is also inaccuratethat the cross-complaint “alleged” the service of a “rent notice” and the initiation of an “unlawful detainer action,” as these terms do not appear in the pleading. San Vicente’s contention remains insufficient to carry its step one burden.
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To the extent that San Vicente makes a cursory effort to address five of the eight cross-claims6 individually on appeal, its efforts are inadequate. Without any citations to the record, it argues that the “sixth cause of action . . . is predicated on an alleged ‘abuse of legal process.’” It further argues the “seventh cause of action” alleges that “San Vicente wrongfully sought to terminate [Kowalski’s] occupancy” and the “ninth cause of action” alleges “San Vicente sought to remove [Kowalski] from possession.” The “tenth cause of action,” San Vicente contends, was based on its “unlawful business practices based on [its] ‘initiating an eviction action,’” and portions of the “eleventh cause of action” relied on allegations of “‘aggressive litigation tactics’ and efforts to deprive [Kowalski] of possession.”7 These conclusory arguments are forfeited, as San Vicente not only failed to raise them below but also fails to explain and support them adequately on appeal. (Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1526 (Hunter) [anti-SLAPP step one argument was waived where plaintiff failed to provide any reason for not presenting it to the trial court]; Swain v. LaserAway
6 San Vicente’s opening brief does not discuss whether the wrongful eviction, negligence, and FEHA cross-claims arose from protected conduct, and we treat any challenge to these causes of action as forfeited. (BioCorRx, Inc. v. VDM Biochemicals, Inc. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 727, 743.) 7 These arguments do not appear under the first subheading (“The Challenged Claims Arise from Protected Petitioning Activity”) of the opening brief’s “Argument” section but appear on the second to last page of the brief under the subheading (“The Harassment Claims Fail”). (Boldface, underscoring, and some capitalization omitted). San Vicente’s failure to provide proper headings is an additional reason we find forfeiture of its arguments. (Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
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Medical Group, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 59, 72 [even when review is de novo, it is limited to issues that have been adequately raised and supported in the appellant’s opening brief]; WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894 (WFG) [reviewing court may disregard points that are unsupported by citations to the record and conclusory arguments that are unsupported by pertinent legal authority].)
We note that San Vicente fails to recognize or address substantively potentially unprotected conduct Kowalski alleged in support of the cross-claims. (Pechkis, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 506.) San Vicente does not discuss, for example, the allegations that it acted as SoCal’s agent or in coordination with SoCal to cause Kowalski’s displacement and emotional harm in violation of Santa Monica laws protecting renters. It does not address the evidence that it wrongfully sought to remove Kowalski from possession of the temporary unit by refusing to remediate, other than to cite Central Valley Hospitalists v. Dignity Health (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 203, 217–219. San Vicente suggests this case holds that a court must analyze only the complaint, not a declaration, in deciding an anti-SLAPP motion. This is inaccurate. In Central Valley Hospitalists, the complaint lacked factual detail. (Id. at p. 217.) The court found that declarations submitted in opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion provided facts indicating the claims were not based on protected activity. The court concluded the motion was properly denied. (Id. at pp. 207, 217.)
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Because San Vicente has not carried its step one burden, it is unnecessary for us to address the parties’ step two arguments.8 (Verceles v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 776, 784.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Kowalski is entitled to her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
DAUM, J.
8 San Vicente requested to strike the entire cross-complaint or entire causes of action, and as we have explained, did not meet its first step burden of showing they were based entirely upon protected conduct. To the extent San Vicente contends the trial court erred in denying its request to strike three statements in the cross-complaint’s general allegations, San Vicente has forfeited its request. It failed to analyze these allegations in its motion at the trial court or to supply cogent argument supported by authority and citations to the record to show that it was necessary to strike these allegations on appeal. (Hunter, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1526; WFG, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 894.)