Kovacs v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.

397 N.W.2d 169, 426 Mich. 647
Michigan Supreme Court·Decided December 16, 1986·No. 74779, (Calendar No. 11)·Published·Cited by 17 cases

Opinion

Levin, J.

This is an action for wrongful death brought by the decedent’s widow as administratrix of his estate.

The decedent, Charles L. Kovacs, was killed when the dump truck he was driving was struck by a Chesapeake and Ohio train sometime after 8:00 a.m. in fog so dense that visibility was reduced to under 150 feet.

The principal factual dispute was whether the train whistle had been blown as required by the statute.

The jury found for the plaintiff, assessed the damages at $1,500,000, and found that Kovacs was one-third negligent, and a judgment for $1,000,000 *649 plus interest was entered. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 1 We affirm.

i

The c & o asked the trial judge to substitute twelve percent for five percent in the standard jury instruction concerning reduction to present value. 2 One of the tort reform acts enacted last summer, 1986 PA 178, provides that "[a]fter a verdict rendered by a trier of fact in favor of a plaintiff,” the court shall enter a judgment for, among other things, all future economic and all future non-economic damages "reduced to gross present cash value,” which latter term is defined as meaning "the total amount of future damages reduced to present value at a rate of 5% per year for each year in which those damages accrue . . . .” 3 The Legislature thus has opted for the five percent rate. Although the amendatory *650 provision is not effective except as to cases filed on or after October 1, 1986, we conclude, in light of the legislative action, that no further consideration should be given to the reduction to present-value issue.

ii

We are also of the opinion that the recent tort reform legislation should be our guide to decision of another issue raised by the c & o. The c & o asked the judge to charge the jury that "any sum of money which you award plaintiff is not subject to income tax.” It has not been the practice to charge the jury regarding income tax consequences.

The requested instruction would, in effect, ask the jury to reduce the amount that it might otherwise award the plaintiff by the amount that would be payable as income tax if the damages assessed by the jury were subject to income tax. Such a reduction would be much like the reduction of a judgment for past economic damages by the amount of collateral source payments, also provided for in 1986 PA 178. 4 Under the circumstance that the Legislature has recently considered whether a judgment should be reduced by other benefits accruing to the plaintiff, we conclude that it would not be appropriate for this Court to address the question at this time. 5

*651 hi

The c & o also claims that the judge erred in instructing the jury that it could "consider the effect of inflation on the reduction to present worth and the amount of damages which you find the plaintiffs have suffered.” The majority rule is that the trier of fact may consider possible inflation in determining the damages to be awarded for future losses, 6 and we agree that the trier of fact should do so.

Just as the amount of a plaintiff’s damages should be reduced to present value to take into account the income that might be earned upon investment of the award, so too inflation should be taken into account in assessing plaintiff’s damages to reflect the attrition of the award as a result of inflation.

We are also of the opinion that a plaintiff should not be required to introduce evidence on inflation. Inflation is a fact known to every juror without expert testimony. There is no expert consensus regarding the rate of inflation, and it would unnecessarily and unduly prolong the trial of personal injury actions to require evidence thereon.

On further consideration of the remaining issues raised by the c & o, we are no longer of the *652 opinion that they should be reviewed by this Court, and they therefore are not addressed.

Affirmed.

Williams, C.J., and Brickley, Cavanagh, Boyle, Riley, and Archer, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.

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Kovacs v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 397 N.W.2d 169, 426 Mich. 647 (Mich. 1986).

397 N.W.2d 169 (Kovacs v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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