Korell v. Commissioner
This text of 10 T.C. 1001 (Korell v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION.
When the coupon rate of interest carried by a bond issue exceeds the going rate for obligations of comparable desirability, the market will tend to place a premium on the bonds. If bonds are purchased for investment under such circumstances, the premium paid must be recovered tax-free out of the earnings of the bond1 very much as depreciation must be recovered out of the income of depreciable property if the true distinction between income and recovery of capital is to be preserved. Cf. United States v. Ludey, 274 U. S. 295. With this objective in mind,2 Congress in 1942 added provisions to the Internal Eevenue Code permitting the amortization of bond premium by deductions from gross income.3
A complication bound to arise was the amortization of premium on bonds callable prior to maturity. Such obligations, although not included in the statute, are covered in a subdivision of the regulations dealing with “Callable and Convertible Bonds.” 4
The debentures purchased by petitioner in the tax year and which form the subject of this controversy were both callable and convertible. They were currently callable at the option of the obligor at any time on 30 days’ notice at 104 per cent of face. They were convertible at any time at the option of the holder into common stock of the obligor upon payment of the difference between the face of the bond and 140 per cent of par.
Petitioner purchased the debentures at approximately 121 when the common stock of the obligor was selling at 163. Relying upon his interpretation of the statute and the regulations, petitioner deducted the difference between 104, the call price, and 121,. his purchase price or basis, as a premium. The entire deduction was taken in the year before us, on the theory that the bond could have been called in that same year, and that in that event the entire premium would have been lost.
Respondent does not dispute such treatment in the case of a bond callable within the current year, but rejects petitioner’s claim here because of the convertible feature of the debentures. His position was set forth in a ruling issued in 1945, dealing with the same issue of debentures as that now in controversy.5
Respondent’s reasoning to justify rejection of the claimed deduction is not without force. He says in effect that what Congress was dealing with when it enacted section 125 was, as we have seen, the investment premium paid in excess of the call or maturity price of an obligation which was required to be paid in order to purchase interest income. Respondent’s regulations, to be sure, do not provide that no bond “convertible into stock” is within the definition of an amortizable obligation, but that “the fact that a bond is * * * convertible into stock does not, in itself, prevent the application of section 125.”6 This, however, advances us only to the point that the mere aspect of convertibility may not necessarily affect the possibility of the payment of an investment premium. • Such would be the situation where the relationship between the conversion figure and' the market price of the obligor’s stock, eliminated value from the conversion privilege. See Badger, Valuation of Industrial Securities* p. 42.7 But in the present case, both the call price and the conversion figures indicate that the premium was paid, not for the investment feature of the bond, but for the rights of conversion.
The final reference in the regulation to a convertible obligation is that contained iii the last sentence of the subdivision previously quoted,8 reading as follows:
* * * A convertible bond is within the scope of section 125 if the option to convert [on a date certain specified in the bond] rests with the holder thereof.
If this statement could be taken as fairly interpretative, and whatever its meaning may be,9 it seems clear that it could under no circumstances apply to these facts, and hence could be disregarded here. The debentures held by petitioner were convertible on any date from the minute he acquired them to their possible future call for redemption and consequently not on “a date certain.” The result of this sentence would then be neutral and leave open for consideration the question whether the section covered such convertible bonds as those held by petitioner.
The difficulty with respondent’s entire position, however, is that it ignores the interpretation which Congress itself placed upon the legislation. In both the Ways and Means Committee report and the Finance Committee report10 there appears in identical language the following :
The fact that a bond is callable or convertible into stock does not of itself prevent the application of this section. In the case of a callable bond, the earliest call date will, for the purposes of this section, be considered as the maturity date. Hence, the total premium is required to be spread over the period from the date as of which the basis of the bond is established down to the earliest call date, rather than down to the maturity date. In the ease of a convertible bond, if the option to convert the bond into stock rests with the owner of the bond, the bond is within the purview of this section. [Italics added.]
The final statement is unequivocal and precisely includes the bonds in controversy. Petitioner’s application of the provision to his situation and his computation of the deduction are thus squarely justified by the expression of congressional intent. The portion of the sentence of the regulation quoted above which is enclosed in brackets appears to be a gratuitous addition by respondent not founded upon the statutory language and directly in conflict with its legislative history. We are accordingly unable to ascribe to it the validity which would result in authorizing respondent’s position in this proceeding. We see no choice but to disapprove the deficiency.
Reviewed by the Court.
Decision will be entered under Rule 50.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
10 T.C. 1001, 1948 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 172, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/korell-v-commissioner-tax-1948.