Koppel Industrial Car & Equipment Co. v. Baltimore S. S. Co.

287 F. 203, 1923 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1721
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedFebruary 15, 1923
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 287 F. 203 (Koppel Industrial Car & Equipment Co. v. Baltimore S. S. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Koppel Industrial Car & Equipment Co. v. Baltimore S. S. Co., 287 F. 203, 1923 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1721 (D. Md. 1923).

Opinion

ROSE, Circuit Judge.

In October, 1920, the libelant, a Pennsylvania corporation, shipped from Baltimore to Matanzas, Cuba, by the steamships Lake Ontario and Lake Galata, belonging to the respondent, a corporation under the laws of Maryland, 50 knocked-down steel railroad cars in parts. There were in these shipments an aggregate of 476 packages, weighing in all something over 771 tons. The libelant had contracted to sell and deliver them at Matanzas to a citizen of Cuba, who had been engaged in extensive operations and had been reputed to control large resources. Nevertheless the libelant had the bills of lading issued to its own order. The steamships arrived at their port of discharge on the 24th and 26th of November, 1920, respectively. At that time financial and industrial conditions in Cuba were very bad. On the 10th of the preceding month a moratorium had been declared, with the natural result that ready money was of the scarcest, and there was no market for anything. There was necessarily much delay in unloading ships and in paying duties. The congestion of harbors, lighters, wharves, and bonded warehouses was extreme. For these and other reasons, the steamships were slow in delivering the rest of their general cargo, all or most of which had been [204]*204stowed above the libelant’s cars, and it was not until the 15th of December, or thereabouts, that these other goods were gotten out of the ships, which then became anxious to complete their unloading.

Difficulties, both physical and financial, were in the way. The respondent’s agents at Matanzas had a wharf upon which there was a sufficiently powerful crane, and which also had the benefit of railroad connections. This wharf was, however, not bonded, and special arrangements had to be made before any dutiable goods could be landed upon it. Then there was the government or custom house wharf, at which, in regular course, imported merchandise was discharged and ' held until the duties were paid. It so happened at Matanzas this wharf was seldom used for very heavy material, such as these cars were, and it was at the moment unusually crowded; all the more, because the outer end of it was then, and had been for some time, in process of reconstruction'; nor was it equipped with a crane. Ships of the draft of the Lake Ontario and the Lake Galata could not approach either of these piers, and, if anything was to be landed on them, it necessarily had to be first transferred to lighters.

The testimony leaves no doubt in my mind that at the time there was great hesitation in using the booms of the Lake Ontario, and perhaps of the Lake Galata as well, for unloading such excessively heavy material, and in spite of a.good deal of testimony offered by the respondent to the contrary, I seriously doubt whether it would have been expedient to have made the attempt. At all events, I do not believe that anybody at the time wanted to. Only one of the two floating cranes in the harbor then appeared to be in condition for such use. It belonged to the contractors who were reconstructing the custom house wharf, and they were in the habit, when they did not need it themselves, of hiring it out for $25 an hour to those who had use for it. Perhaps it could have been had in December, but the ships did not ask for it until the 21st or 22d of January, when they promptly obtained it.

The cars could not,' of course, "be landed on the unbonded wharf until the duties on them were paid, and there would necessarily have been difficulties in paying the duties before the merchandise was taken opt of the ships. 'These obstacles might have been gotten around by what is known in Cuba as making quedan; that is, by paying the amount of the duties estimated on the invoices and 25 per cent, extra to secure the government that upon final liquidation it would have in its hands all that was coming to it. If I understand correctly, if this extra 25 per cent, was paid in cash, good bond might be given for the duties, which amounted to some $25,000. Nobody interested in the shipment wanted to lay out so much at the time, with conditions as they were in Cuba, and it is not too much to say that the person who was under the most direct obligation to maka the payment was not then, nor at any Jime thereafter, either able to do so or to furnish security that he would. Under such circumstances, the only place at which the goods could be landed was the custom house wharf.

One of the officers of the respondent, worried at the long detention of the ships in Cuban waters, came from Baltimore. The vessels [205]*205belonged to the Shipping Board, and the official of the respondent, on his arrival in Havana, sought the aid of its representative, who speedily succeeded in obtaining an order from the treasury officials in Havana to the director of the customs at Matanzas to permit the landing of the car parts on the government wharf. As things were, however, there was very little space on that wharf at the time available, and that was on the apron or outer edge of the pier. As the result of the energetic action of the agent from this city, the wharf contractor’s floating crane was hired and the goods were gotten out of the ships and piled in quite a-disorderly fashion in the small available space at the end of the wharf. This task was completed about January 29, and there the goods stayed until the end of the succeeding August.

For some months after the landing had been completed, none of the parties seems to have been conscious that it had any grievance against any of the other-s. It was not until May 26 the libelant made a complaint to the respondent that its goods had been so negligently and unskillfully landed and stored on the wharf that much damage' had resulted. The respondent expressed surprise and incredulity, although it promised to look into the matter, and it.was not until August, and in response to repeated requests, that it gave a definite answer. It then denied that there had been any appreciable damage done, and for the first time suggested that it might have a claim against the libelant for the detention of the ships, and quite plainly hinted that it would be prudent on the part of the libelant to drop its demand altogether.

Libelant, instead of taking this advice, on September 23, 1921, nearly four months after it made its first complaint to the respondent, filed its libel, in which it estimated the damage done at upwards of $20,000. The respondent then waited something more than seven months ■ before filing a cross-libel, in which it claimed $108,000 for the detention of its steamers. Not to be outdone, the libelant on the 30th of June came back with an amendment to its original libel, in which it charged that the combined effects of the delay in discharging the cargo and the physical damage done in the course of the discharge had practically destroyed the value of its merchandise and had damaged it to the extent of $160,700. Much evidence has been taken, some of it ' by deposition, not a little of it in open court. The libelant has attempted to show that, if the cargo had been promptly landed, the Cuban purchaser would have paid, not only the duties, but the price of the cars as well, or that, if he had not done so, their market price at that time wa's very much greater than that which they have commanded at any subsequent period.

It is very doubtful if the latter fact is true, or that there was at any time, for many months after October 10, 1920, a real market in Cuba for such goods; but it is entirely immaterial whether there was of was not. At that time the libelant was not in a position to dispose of the cars to any other than their original purchaser.

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Related

American Steel Co. of Cuba v. Transmarine Corp.
36 F.2d 246 (S.D. New York, 1929)
The Susquehanna
291 F. 698 (D. Maryland, 1923)

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Bluebook (online)
287 F. 203, 1923 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1721, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/koppel-industrial-car-equipment-co-v-baltimore-s-s-co-mdd-1923.