Konefal v . Hollis/Brookline CV-94-139-M 01/31/95 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Robert Konefal and Gloria Konefal, Plaintiffs, v. Civil N o . 94-139-M Hollis/Brookline School Coop. et a l , Defendants.
O R D E R
Plaintiff, Gloria Konefal, brings this action for injunctive
relief and damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 to redress alleged
violations of her civil rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. She also sets forth certain
state law causes of action, over which she claims this court has
supplemental jurisdiction. Presently before the court is
defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is
one of very limited inquiry, focusing not on "whether plaintiff
will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to
offer evidence to support the claims." McLean v . Gaudet, 769 F. Supp. 3 0 , 31 (D.N.H. 1990)(citing Scheuer v . Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 236 (1974)). A court must take the factual averments within
the complaint as true, "indulging every reasonable inference
helpful to the plaintiff's cause." Garita Hotel Ltd. Partnership
v . Ponce Federal Bank, F.S.B., 958 F.2d 1 5 , 17 (1st Cir. 1992);
see also Dartmouth Review v . Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 1 3 , 16
(1st Cir. 1989). In the end, a motion to dismiss may be granted
under Rule 12(b)(6) "only if it clearly appears, according to the
facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable
theory." Garita, 958 F.2d at 17 (quoting Correa-Martinez v .
Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 4 9 , 52 (1st Cir. 1990)).
Facts
Reading the pleadings in the light most favorable to Konefal
and "indulging every reasonable inference helpful to [her]
cause," the court adopts the following facts for the purpose of
ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss. Konefal was an English
teacher employed with the Hollis Area High School. She was
second in seniority among those teachers in the English
Department for the 1990-91 school year. Plaintiff has twenty-two
years of teaching experience and two masters degrees.
2 The Hollis School District and the Brookline School District
agreed to form the Hollis/Brookline Cooperative School District
(the "Co-op"), a defendant in the present action. On March 2 5 ,
1991, all teachers employed at the Hollis High School, including
plaintiff, received letters notifying them that they would not be
renominated to teaching contracts because the Hollis School
District would not be operating a high school after June 3 0 ,
1991.
On June 1 , 1991, the Public Employee Labor Relations Board
ruled that the Co-op was obligated to honor the collective
bargaining agreement between the Hollis Education Association
(the "Association") and the Hollis School Board. After the
Board's ruling, all members of the English Department at Hollis
High School had their contracts renewed by the Co-op except for
Konefal. Defendant Philip J. Dahlinger, Superintendent of
Schools, informed Konefal that she was not being offered a
contract for a teaching position with the Co-op because her
position was being terminated.
The Co-op began operation on July 1 , 1991. All members of
the English Department whose contracts were renewed were members
3 of the Association during the 1990-91 school year. Konefal had never been a member of the Association.
DISCUSSION
Konefal brought this § 1983 action to redress alleged violations of her right to freedom of association under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.1 Specifically,
Konefal contends that:
the defendants acting individually and in concert with each other failed to renew her teaching contract because she was not a member of and had refused to join the Hollis Education Association, thereby interfering with her constitutionally protected right to enjoy freedom of association.
Plaintiff's Supplemental Objection to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss, at 4 . Although not clearly set forth in her complaint,
Konefal also alleges violations of her liberty and property interests, as those interests relate to her First Amendment
claim.
1 Plaintiff's complaint contains various state law claims including a claim of loss of consortium by her husband, Robert S . Konefal. The present motion, however, challenges plaintiff Gloria Konefal's federal constitutional claims and this order is therefore limited to an analysis of those claims.
4 I. Plaintiff's First Amendment Right to Freedom of Association
"Freedom of association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom
not to associate." Roberts v . United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 623 (1984). This right is not absolute, however, being
subject to "regulations adopted to serve compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms." Id. at 623 (citations omitted). Thus
an employee may be discharged for nonmembership in a union if an
employer has entered into a union contract. See Radio Officers'
Union v . NLRB, 347 U.S. 1 7 , 41 (1954). If compulsory union
membership extends only to financial support of the union in its
collective bargaining activities, then such an arrangement does
not offend First Amendment values. Lehnert v . Ferris Faculty
Association, 500 U.S. 5 0 7 , 515 (1991)(citing Railway Employees v .
Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 235 (1956)).
Of course, constitutional "red flags" arise when membership
dues, voluntary or involuntary, are used to support political
causes objectionable to the payor(s) of such dues. See Keller v .
State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 , 9 (1990); see also Lehnert,
supra at 522 (". . . the State constitutionally may not compel
5 its employees to subsidize legislative lobbying or other
political union activities outside the limited context of
contract ratification or implementation."); Austin v . Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 6 5 2 , 665 (1990)("Although a
union and an employer may require that all bargaining unit
employees become union members, a union may not compel those
employees to support financially `union activities beyond those
germane to collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment.'" (quoting Communications Workers v . Beck,
487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988)).
However, Konefal has not alleged that compulsory financial
support of the Association (if any such support was actually
required) extended beyond that necessary for collective
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Konefal v . Hollis/Brookline CV-94-139-M 01/31/95 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Robert Konefal and Gloria Konefal, Plaintiffs, v. Civil N o . 94-139-M Hollis/Brookline School Coop. et a l , Defendants.
O R D E R
Plaintiff, Gloria Konefal, brings this action for injunctive
relief and damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 to redress alleged
violations of her civil rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. She also sets forth certain
state law causes of action, over which she claims this court has
supplemental jurisdiction. Presently before the court is
defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is
one of very limited inquiry, focusing not on "whether plaintiff
will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to
offer evidence to support the claims." McLean v . Gaudet, 769 F. Supp. 3 0 , 31 (D.N.H. 1990)(citing Scheuer v . Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 236 (1974)). A court must take the factual averments within
the complaint as true, "indulging every reasonable inference
helpful to the plaintiff's cause." Garita Hotel Ltd. Partnership
v . Ponce Federal Bank, F.S.B., 958 F.2d 1 5 , 17 (1st Cir. 1992);
see also Dartmouth Review v . Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 1 3 , 16
(1st Cir. 1989). In the end, a motion to dismiss may be granted
under Rule 12(b)(6) "only if it clearly appears, according to the
facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable
theory." Garita, 958 F.2d at 17 (quoting Correa-Martinez v .
Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 4 9 , 52 (1st Cir. 1990)).
Facts
Reading the pleadings in the light most favorable to Konefal
and "indulging every reasonable inference helpful to [her]
cause," the court adopts the following facts for the purpose of
ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss. Konefal was an English
teacher employed with the Hollis Area High School. She was
second in seniority among those teachers in the English
Department for the 1990-91 school year. Plaintiff has twenty-two
years of teaching experience and two masters degrees.
2 The Hollis School District and the Brookline School District
agreed to form the Hollis/Brookline Cooperative School District
(the "Co-op"), a defendant in the present action. On March 2 5 ,
1991, all teachers employed at the Hollis High School, including
plaintiff, received letters notifying them that they would not be
renominated to teaching contracts because the Hollis School
District would not be operating a high school after June 3 0 ,
1991.
On June 1 , 1991, the Public Employee Labor Relations Board
ruled that the Co-op was obligated to honor the collective
bargaining agreement between the Hollis Education Association
(the "Association") and the Hollis School Board. After the
Board's ruling, all members of the English Department at Hollis
High School had their contracts renewed by the Co-op except for
Konefal. Defendant Philip J. Dahlinger, Superintendent of
Schools, informed Konefal that she was not being offered a
contract for a teaching position with the Co-op because her
position was being terminated.
The Co-op began operation on July 1 , 1991. All members of
the English Department whose contracts were renewed were members
3 of the Association during the 1990-91 school year. Konefal had never been a member of the Association.
DISCUSSION
Konefal brought this § 1983 action to redress alleged violations of her right to freedom of association under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.1 Specifically,
Konefal contends that:
the defendants acting individually and in concert with each other failed to renew her teaching contract because she was not a member of and had refused to join the Hollis Education Association, thereby interfering with her constitutionally protected right to enjoy freedom of association.
Plaintiff's Supplemental Objection to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss, at 4 . Although not clearly set forth in her complaint,
Konefal also alleges violations of her liberty and property interests, as those interests relate to her First Amendment
claim.
1 Plaintiff's complaint contains various state law claims including a claim of loss of consortium by her husband, Robert S . Konefal. The present motion, however, challenges plaintiff Gloria Konefal's federal constitutional claims and this order is therefore limited to an analysis of those claims.
4 I. Plaintiff's First Amendment Right to Freedom of Association
"Freedom of association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom
not to associate." Roberts v . United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 623 (1984). This right is not absolute, however, being
subject to "regulations adopted to serve compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms." Id. at 623 (citations omitted). Thus
an employee may be discharged for nonmembership in a union if an
employer has entered into a union contract. See Radio Officers'
Union v . NLRB, 347 U.S. 1 7 , 41 (1954). If compulsory union
membership extends only to financial support of the union in its
collective bargaining activities, then such an arrangement does
not offend First Amendment values. Lehnert v . Ferris Faculty
Association, 500 U.S. 5 0 7 , 515 (1991)(citing Railway Employees v .
Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 235 (1956)).
Of course, constitutional "red flags" arise when membership
dues, voluntary or involuntary, are used to support political
causes objectionable to the payor(s) of such dues. See Keller v .
State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 , 9 (1990); see also Lehnert,
supra at 522 (". . . the State constitutionally may not compel
5 its employees to subsidize legislative lobbying or other
political union activities outside the limited context of
contract ratification or implementation."); Austin v . Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 6 5 2 , 665 (1990)("Although a
union and an employer may require that all bargaining unit
employees become union members, a union may not compel those
employees to support financially `union activities beyond those
germane to collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment.'" (quoting Communications Workers v . Beck,
487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988)).
However, Konefal has not alleged that compulsory financial
support of the Association (if any such support was actually
required) extended beyond that necessary for collective
bargaining, to political or legislative activities to which she
objects. Simply stated, plaintiff baldly alleges that she was
not a member of the Association and her contract was not renewed
upon expiration (she was not "fired") because she refused to
join. She has failed to state facts which, if proven, would
constitute a violation of her First Amendment right to freedom of
association as that right has been construed by the United States
Supreme Court, because even if she had been fired due to her
refusal to join the Association, those facts alone would not
6 establish her right to recover for any constitutional
deprivation.
II. Plaintiff's "Property" and "Liberty" Interests
Konefal also claims a deprivation of her property and liberty interests. Complaint, ¶52. Konefal claims a "property
interest" under state law in her position as a tenured teacher,
which interest is "safeguarded by due process." Board of Regents
v . Roth, 408 U.S. 5 6 4 , 577 (1972). She did have a limited
property interest in her teaching position recognized under state
law, and she also received the due process hearing provided for
under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 189:14-a for the purpose of
protecting against her unjust removal. See In re Gorham School
Board, 121 N.H. 878 (1981). After hearing her objections, the
school board upheld the superintendent's decision not to renew
her contract. See Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion to Dismiss, at 6 n.2. Konefal received all the process to
which she was due. Board of Regents v . Roth, supra; Short v .
School Admin. Unit 1 6 , 136 N.H. 76 (1992).
And, for the reasons well expressed in Short, supra, even if
Konefal's allegations are deemed true, they do not establish
that, in declining to rehire her, any of the defendants violated
7 any cognizable liberty interest associated with her employment.
Board of Regents v . Roth, supra; Short v . School Admin. Unit 1 6 ,
supra.
Due process concerns aside, however, the state or those acting under color of state law are still prohibited from denying
a public benefit to a person, even where "a person has no `right'
to a valuable governmental benefit," "on a basis that infringes
[her] constitutionally protected interests - especially [her]
interest in freedom of [association]." Perry v . Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 597 (1972). But again, even if the assumption is made
that plaintiff was discharged for refusing to join the
Association, a requirement that she join the Association upon
pain of discharge would not unconstitutionally encroach upon her
First Amendment right to freedom of association in this context.
Thus, plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden of "show[ing]
that [her] conduct was constitutionally protected." M t . Healthy
City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v . Doyle, 429 U.S. 2 7 4 , 287
(1977).
CONCLUSION
8 Even taking all the factual allegations in plaintiff's
complaint as true, it fails to state a viable federal cause of
action against any of the defendants. In essence, what plaintiff
properly alleges are state law causes of action for wrongful
discharge and related wrongs, not an unlawful infringement of her
constitutionally protected rights.
Accordingly, defendants' Motion to Dismiss (document n o . 8 ) is granted. Having dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the court hereby dismisses plaintiff's remaining state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), without prejudice to pursuing those claims in the state forum.
SO ORDERED.
Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge
January 3 1 , 1995
cc: Barbara F. Loughman, Esq. Thomas G. Cooper, Esq.