Kolstad v. Baillargeon

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 12, 2025
• Docket: 25-2106
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 12 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TODD KOLSTAD, No. 25-2106 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 4:24-cv-00085-SPW v. MEMORANDUM* CYNDI BAILLARGEON; CRYSTAL WHITMORE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 6, 2025 Portland, Oregon

Before: M. SMITH, NGUYEN, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Todd Kolstad appeals the district court’s dismissal of his Fourteenth

Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims as barred by collateral estoppel. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review de novo the dismissal of a claim

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as well as the district court’s

issue preclusion ruling.” Bridge Aina Le‘a, LLC v. Land Use Comm’n, 950 F.3d

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 610, 624 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). We affirm.

1. The district court did not err in determining that there was a final

judgment on the merits in the state court proceedings. See Denturist Ass’n of Mont.

v. Mont. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 372 P.3d 466, 469 (Mont. 2016) (discussing the

elements of collateral estoppel under Montana law). Under Montana Code § 41-3-

437, a state court “may make an adjudication on a petition under 41-3-422 if the

court determines by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that the child is a youth in

need of care.” Mont. Code Ann. § 41-3-437(2). “If a child is found to be a youth in

need of care under 41-3-437, the court may enter its judgment” and make various

“dispositions to protect the welfare of the child” under Montana Code § 41-3-438

including “order[ing] the placement of the child with the noncustodial parent,

superseding any existing custodial order, and dismiss[ing] the proceeding with no

further obligation on the part of the department to provide services.” Id. § 41-3-

438(3)(d).

Here, after finding the child to be a youth in need of care, the state court

dismissed the case pursuant to Montana Code § 41-3-438(3)(d). That section

explicitly contemplates dismissal as a final disposition. See Mont. Code Ann. § 41-

3-438(3)(d); see also In re M.J., 296 P.3d 1197, 1201 (Mont. 2013) (“A [state]

court has several dispositional options once a child is found to be a youth in need

of care. Those options are set forth in § 41-3-438[.]”). Hence, there was no error in

2 25-2106 the district court’s determination.

2. The district court did not err in determining that the issue of whether the

child was a youth in need of care was actually litigated in the state court and that

Kolstad had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. The state court

adjudicated the child as a youth in need of care “based on the evidence set forth at

the hearing and in the record,” and concluded that there was “sufficient evidence

presented to establish, by a preponderance of evidence, that” the child met the

statutory definition of a youth in need of care. Kolstad neither objected to these

findings nor appealed the state court’s decision. That Kolstad stipulated his child

was a youth in need of care does not mean the issue was not actually litigated. See

Mont. Code Ann. § 41-3-434(1)(a) (“Subject to approval by the court, the parties

may stipulate [that] . . . the child meets the definition of a youth in need of care by

the preponderance of the evidence[.]”); cf. In re Marriage of Kolczak, 97 P.3d

1091, 1094 (Mont. 2004) (“A party should not be able to litigate a matter that the

party already had the opportunity to litigate.”).

AFFIRMED.1

1 The motion for judicial notice (Dkt. No. 19) is DENIED. The motion to strike (Dkt. No. 21) is DENIED.

3 25-2106