KOLOSHA v. STATE
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Opinion
KOLOSHA v. STATE
2017 OK 48
Case Number: 115302
Decided: 06/06/2017
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Cite as: 2017 OK 48, __ P.3d __
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
VITALY BURLEOVITSH KOLOSHA, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Defendants/Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY,
STATE OF OKLAHOMA
HONORABLE JAMES CAPUTO, TRIAL JUDGE
¶0 Pro se inmate filed a pleading in his Tulsa County criminal case, seeking return of a computer, a photo camera and a movie camera. He alleged that this property had nothing to do with the criminal charges. Pro se inmate called his pleading a petition for writ of replevin. In response, the Tulsa County District Attorney denied ever having custody of the property. The trial court denied pro se inmate relief, ruling (1) he failed to follow proper procedure provided by statute to initiate replevin and (2) he cannot use a writ to try to regain property from a party that does not possess such property. Pro se inmate appealed. This Court retained the appeal to clarify that replevin is not the only remedy to recover property that is no longer needed as evidence.
APPEAL PREVIOUSLY RETAINED; JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED
Vitaly Burleovitsh Kolosha, Pro se, Lexington, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant,
No appearance for the State of Oklahoma or the Tulsa County District Attorney, Defendants/Appellees.
¶1 This appeal arises from an unsuccessful effort by pro se inmate Vitaly Burleovitsh Kolosha in 2015 to recover a computer, a photo camera and a movie camera seized by law enforcement in 2006. Mr. Kolosha filed a pleading that he captioned "Petition for Writ of Replevin or $2500 Reimbursement" in his Tulsa County criminal case. The pleading averred that this property had nothing to do with the criminal charges and it had not been returned to him. The pleading also contained a certificate signed by Mr. Kolosha declaring the pleading was true and had been mailed to a state senator, the Wagoner County Sheriff, the Tulsa County Sheriff, the Tulsa County District Attorney and the United States Department of Justice.
¶2 The Tulsa County District Attorney was the only party to file a response. The response did not deny or otherwise contest Mr. Kolosha's statement that the property in question had nothing to do with the criminal charges against him. The response was largely devoted to recounting Mr. Kolosha's conviction for Lewd Molestation of a Minor and his unsuccessful efforts on appeal and post-conviction relief to overturn his conviction. The District Attorney's response also stated that his office never had custody of the items in question.
¶3 The trial court denied Mr. Kolosha relief on two grounds. The trial court first ruled that Mr. Kolosha failed to follow proper procedure provided by statute to initiate replevin. The trial court further ruled he cannot use a writ to regain property from a party that does not possess such property. Mr. Kolosha appealed and this Court retained the appeal.
¶4 The Tulsa County District Attorney did not enter an appearance on appeal or file a response to Mr. Kolosha's petition in error. The District Attorney likewise did not respond to (1) this Court's notice concerning his failure to file a response or (2) this Court's order limiting the appellate record and designating this appeal for decision pursuant to Rule 1.36. Accordingly, we proceed to decide this case on the basis of Mr. Kolosha's petition in error and the Rule 1.36 record consisting of the petition for writ of replevin, the District Attorney's response and the trial court's order.
¶5 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's judgment insofar as it denies relief in replevin. We reverse and remand, however, for the trial court to consider granting Mr. Kolosha relief pursuant to 22 O.S.2001, § 1321.
¶6 The trial court was rightly concerned that Mr. Kolosha's petition for writ of replevin did not conform to the statutory requirements for initiating replevin. This defect, however, did not end the trial court's inquiry as to Mr. Kolosha's right to relief. This Court has held that the failure to file the "precise petition" provided by statute is not fatal to granting relief, because the meaning and effect of an instrument filed in court depends on its contents and substance rather than on the form or title given it by the author. In re Estate of Dicksion, 2011 OK 96, ¶ 15, 286 P.3d 283, 287. Mr. Kolosha's "petition for writ of replevin" was sufficient to constitute an application for return of property that was neither stolen or embezzled, nor needed for evidence, as provided in 22 O.S.2001, § 1321.
¶7 This statute provides a remedy to facilitate the return of "property held in the custody of a municipality, county or the state in any criminal investigation, action or proceeding." § 1321(A). 1 The Legislature has declared its intent that such property "be returned to the proper person or its lawful owner without unnecessary delay." Id. A statute that creates a remedy that did not exist at common law is a remedial statute. See Wilhoit v State, 2009 OK 83, 226 P.3d 682.
¶8 In the case of property that is not "stolen or embezzled," the Legislature has authorized a peace officer who has custody of such property to return it to the owner upon satisfactory proof of ownership. § 1321(B).2 Significantly, this provision does not preclude a defendant from securing return of his or her property as the "owner" of the property. The rule that remedial statutes should be liberally construed requires such an interpretation. Wilhoit, 2009 OK at ¶ 13, 226 P.3d at 686. Remedial statutes should be construed liberally enough to leave the courts in a flexible position in exercising judicial discretion to effect substantial justice. Greer v. Yellow Manufacturing Acceptance Corp., 1967 OK 253, ¶ 16, 436 P.2d 50, 54.
¶9 In the event the property is not returned as contemplated by § 1321(B), a defendant /owner may make application to a magistrate for a hearing to order return of the property. § 1321(C).3
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