Kokomo Center Township Consolidated School Corp. v. McQueary

682 N.E.2d 1305, 13 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 65, 1997 Ind. App. LEXIS 888, 1997 WL 378631

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 9, 1997
• Docket: 34A02-9608-CV-514
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

GARRARD, Judge.

Kokomo Center Township Consolidated School Corporation (“School”) appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment, claiming that James McQueary (“MeQueary”) had been discharged for cause as a matter of law and therefore summary judgment should have been granted.

We reverse and remand.

FACTS

McQueary, a school bus driver, filed suit against the School on May 1, 1995, claiming that the school breached his employment contract when it terminated his employment before the expiration of his written contract. McQueary’s termination stemmed from an incident involving MeQueary, McFarren Wright (“Wright”), another school bus driver, and Liz McDorman (“McDorman”), the transportation supervisor for the School, which occurred on January 23, 1995. On that day, McQueary had complained to McDorman that Wright had improperly dropped off his students in front of MeQueary’s bus. After McDorman spoke to Wright, Wright approached McQueary in the parking lot and told McQueary to discuss any problems with him directly instead of involving McDorman. McQueary became angry and told Wright to get off his bus or he would “put him under.” R. 104. After Wright departed, McQueary went to see McDorman about his confrontation with Wright. During this meeting, McQueary yelled that McDorman “better get that black son of a bitch off my back or I’ll put him under.” R. 76. This statement was made in front of McDorman’s secretary, a five year old African-American student, and an African-American bus aide. McQueary was subsequently discharged on March 6,1995, effective January 26,1995.¹

On May 14, 1996, the School filed its motion for summary judgment. McQueary failed to respond to this motion. A hearing was held on the motion on June 28, 1996, with both parties present. During the hearing, McQueary admitted that he had made the statements asserted by the School, but argued that whether these statements constituted cause for his termination was a question of disputed fact. The School argued that because McQueary had failed to designate facts which created a genuine issue of material fact, the facts were deemed admitted. On July 16,1996, the trial court denied the School’s motion for summary judgment. At the request of the School, the trial court certified its order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 4(B)(6) and on September 3, 1996, we accepted the School’s interlocutory appeal.

ISSUE

I. Whether the trial court erred by denying the School’s motion for summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

We stand in the same shoes as the trial court in our review of the trial court’s denial of the School’s motion for summary judgment. Oelling v. Rao, 593 N.E.2d 189, 190 (Ind.1992). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and testimony show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schult, 602 N.E.2d 173, 174 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), reh’g denied. The non-moving party is required by Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) to specifically designate the material upon which it relies to combat the motion for summary judgment. Rosi v. Business Furniture Corp., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 n. 2 (Ind.1993). A party may not orally designate evidence if the party’s brief does not contain a citation to the oral designation. Terrell v. Rowsey, 647 N.E.2d 662, 666 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied.

In addition to failing to respond to the motion for summary judgment, MeQueary failed to file an appellee’s brief in the present appeal. When an appellee fails to file a brief on appeal, we may reverse the trial court’s decision if the appellant makes a prima facie showing of reversible error. Stephens v. Stephens, 646 N.E.2d 682, 684 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). “This rule is not for the benefit of the appellant. It was established for the protection of the court so that the court might be relieved of the burden of controverting the arguments advanced for a reversal where such a burden rests with the appellee.” Id. “Prima facie error is error appearing at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of the argument.” In re Marriage of Holley, 659 N.E.2d 581, 583 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied (emphasis in original).

In the present action, the facts are not in dispute. MeQueary admitted at the hearing on the summary judgment motion and at the hearing before the School Board that he made the statements which the School relied upon when terminating his employment. Further, MeQueary failed to designate any evidence in opposition to the summary judgment motion. We are precluded from finding genuine issues of fact when evidence of disputed fact has not been specifically designated to the trial court. Rosi v. Business Furniture Corp., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind.1993). An employment contract for a definite term can be terminated for cause before the expiration of that term. Rochester Capital Leasing Corp. v. McCracken, 156 Ind.App. 128, 295 N.E.2d 375, 378 (1973). “Where the facts are undisputed, the evidence may be such as to justify discharge as a matter of law.” Id. Because the facts are undisputed, the sole issue before us is whether MeQueary’s statements constituted cause to terminate his employment as a matter of law.

The School claims, and we agree, that MeQueary’s statements to Wright and McDorman were abusive and a threat on Wright’s life. The School contends that the abusive language alone or the threat to kill alone were sufficient cause to terminate McQueary’s employment. In Stoner v. Review Bd. of Indiana, 571 N.E.2d 296 (Ind.1991), our supreme court held that one incident of abusive language by an employee was cause for his discharge. And in Yoldash v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 438 N.E.2d 310, 314-5 (Ind.Ct.App.1982), we held that an outburst of abusive language towards fellow employees constituted cause for discharge. MeQueary’s statements that he would put Wright under and commanding McDorman to “get that black son of a bitch off my back” are clearly abusive language much like the language in Stoner and Yoldash.

We also agree with the School that McQueary’s statement that he would “put Wright under” was a threat to kill Wright. While we have been unable to find any Indiana case law concerning threats to kill as cause for termination, we find Koepplin v. Zortman Mining, Inc., 267 Mont. 53, 881 P.2d 1306 (1994) persuasive. In Koepplin, an employee told a supervisor investigating his behavior that he was about to “take a short trip to hell.” The Montana Supreme Court, quite understandably, reasoned that this was a threat to kill the fellow employee and that this was cause for discharge. Much like the Montana Supreme Court, we believe that a threat to kill may be cause for termination. Because the facts in the present case are undisputed, we hold that as a matter of law McQueary’s abusive and threatening statements were cause to terminate his employment.² The trial court’s denial of the School’s motion for summary judgment is therefore reversed and we remand this cause to the trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the School.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

KIRSCH, J., concurs. STATON, J., dissents with separate opinion.

1 . McQueary does not make any due process claims, but instead only claims that the School breached his employment contract by terminating it before the end of its term.

2 . We explicitly limit this holding to the facts of the present case.