Kok v. Lattin

Michigan Supreme Court

Kok v. Lattin

246 N.W. 149, 261 Mich. 362, 1933 Mich. LEXIS 767

CourtMichigan Supreme Court

DecidedJanuary 3, 1933

DocketDocket No. 12, Calendar No. 36,612.

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 246 N.W. 149 (Kok v. Lattin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Kok v. Lattin, 246 N.W. 149, 261 Mich. 362, 1933 Mich. LEXIS 767 (Mich. 1933).

Pincite

Opinion

McDonald, C. J.

This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in an automobile collision at the intersection of two county highways. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s proofs, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. To review the judgment entered, the plaintiff has appealed.

The material facts are undisputed. The two roads are of gravel construction. They intersect at approximately right angles. On both roads at about 640 feet from the intersection is the usual sign, marked “cross road.” The plaintiff approached the intersection from the east. The defendant was coming from the south. They reached the intersection about the same time. Neither saw the other until they were about six feet apart, too late to avoid a collision. As the plaintiff’s car approached the intersection it was traveling at a speed of 40 miles an hour. As it entered the intersection it slowed down to 20 miles an hour. The defendant’s car approached at a speed of 40 miles an hour and did not slow down as it entered the intersection. For half a mile back both drivers had a clear and unobstructed view of the intersection. Had the defendant looked he could have seen the plaintiff be *364 fore and when he entered the intersection. Had the plaintiff looked he would have seen the defendant in time to have avoided the collision. He testified that he did look and saw no car approaching. His testimony in this respect is contrary to the physical facts. As his view was unobstructed and the defendant’s car was there in plain sight, it must be held that he did not look. If he had looked, he would have seen what was there to be seen. The two cars reached the intersection at about the same time. If either had looked, he could have avoided the accident. Failure to look was negligence. The undisputed material facts left no question for the jury. The trial court correctly ruled that, as a matter of law, there could be no recovery.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs to the defendant.

Clark, Potter, Sharpe, North, Fead, Wiest, and Butzel, JJ., concurred.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

McDonald, C. J.

This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in an automobile collision at the intersection of two county highways. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s proofs, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. To review the judgment entered, the plaintiff has appealed.

The material facts are undisputed. The two roads are of gravel construction. They intersect at approximately right angles. On both roads at about 640 feet from the intersection is the usual sign, marked “cross road.” The plaintiff approached the intersection from the east. The defendant was coming from the south. They reached the intersection about the same time. Neither saw the other until they were about six feet apart, too late to avoid a collision. As the plaintiff’s car approached the intersection it was traveling at a speed of 40 miles an hour. As it entered the intersection it slowed down to 20 miles an hour. The defendant’s car approached at a speed of 40 miles an hour and did not slow down as it entered the intersection. For half a mile back both drivers had a clear and unobstructed view of the intersection. Had the defendant looked he could have seen the plaintiff be *364 fore and when he entered the intersection. Had the plaintiff looked he would have seen the defendant in time to have avoided the collision. He testified that he did look and saw no car approaching. His testimony in this respect is contrary to the physical facts. As his view was unobstructed and the defendant’s car was there in plain sight, it must be held that he did not look. If he had looked, he would have seen what was there to be seen. The two cars reached the intersection at about the same time. If either had looked, he could have avoided the accident. Failure to look was negligence. The undisputed material facts left no question for the jury. The trial court correctly ruled that, as a matter of law, there could be no recovery.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs to the defendant.

Clark, Potter, Sharpe, North, Fead, Wiest, and Butzel, JJ., concurred.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

246 N.W. 149, 261 Mich. 362, 1933 Mich. LEXIS 767, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kok-v-lattin-mich-1933.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack